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Abstract 
Title: Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab 
Citizens of Israel  
 
Keywords: The Arab minority in Israel, elite actions, soft power, international 
community, transnational advocacy networks, internationalisation, ‘boomerang-
spiral’ model, state-minority relations 
 
This study is concerned with the concept of internationalisation as a tool for 
disadvantaged minorities to affect change in their situation. This phenomenon 
has been studied widely with respect to authoritarian regimes and later on with 
liberal Western democracies. The current study has focussed on the state of 
Israel and the situation of its Palestinian Arab minority to investigate the origins 
and purposes of internationalisation, the extent to which these efforts have 
achieved the objectives that were set, and whether this process is in any sense 
capable of achieving them. The analysis shows that the internationalisation 
process whereby the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel sought to reclaim their 
rights by invoking the support of the international community has emerged in 
the 1950s. It came to be perceived as necessary because internal legal and 
political processes were understood to be insufficient to achieve any redress for 
their grievances.  
 
The Arab leadership in Israel articulates internationalisation as a strategy 
designed to invoke the norms of democracy to question the conduct of 
successive Israeli governments, and counter the narrative offered by them on 
the world stage. The internationalisation strategy is seen to undergo a profound 
transformation from public memoranda, to civil and legal advocacy by invoking 
international conventions and treaties and finally to personal diplomacy. The 
results show that it is not a zero sum game; it is an especially effective method 
in different ways and with varying degrees of success. It created an extension of 
the critique of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to  its 
Palestinian minority. Using the international law in the modality of legal 
advocacy to compel the Israeli state to adhere to the commitments it had made 
by acceding to an international convention, proved more effective than mere 
political pressure. Another factors such as the nature of the claims, geopolitical 
circumstances, global momentum, and domestic politics are crucial as well for 
the success of the internationalisation. Yet, Israel’s response varied in particular 
  ii 
cases to minimise external critics, and its respect for the international law was 
uttered by utilitarian justification to protect its reputation. 
 
The application of the social constructivist boomerang-spiral model to the 
process of internationalisation is deemed to be a particularly effective 
instrument to explore both the potential and the limits of the process of 
compelling the Israeli state to conform to internationally supported norms. The 
results of this study demonstrate that the construction of the state’s identity as a 
Jewish and concerns over national security are potentially in conflict with the 
egalitarian democratic norms that it claims to be governed by. The implications 
of these two elements for the operation of the Israeli state has resulted in a 
failure to fully integrate its Arab citizens. The Nation-State Law of 2018 
reinforces the legal and systematic discrimination against the Palestinians in 
Israel and explains why internationalisation has not been successful. 
 
443
It is the first comprehensive investigation into a selected series of case studies 
that document international appeals made by Israel’s Arab elite due to three 
chronological periods: 1948-1979, 1992- 2013 and 2015 onwards. On a 
theoretical level, it is the first time that the spiral model has been tested in the 
context of Israel and its Arab minority. This can serve as a strategic information 
source for Arab MKs, NGOs and Israeli decision makers. 
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Chapter   1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the research 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been at the centre of the regional security 
complex in the Middle East for several decades. Much of the research on this 
issue has focussed on Israel and its relations with the occupied Palestinian 
territories. The relations between the Israeli state and its Arab minority have 
been relatively neglected by comparison.  
 
In the existing academic literature, there is a broad consensus among scholars 
that there are serious issues in relation to the civil status of the Palestinian Arab 
minority in Israel.1 However there has been little discussion of 
internationalisation as a strategy to address them.2 Most authors3 (Theodore 
Sasson, Michael Karayanni) writing on Israel’s Arab citizens analyse them 
mainly in terms of internal relations with the State or Jewish majority and 
minimize or even overlook the attempts of the Arab leadership in Israel to attract 
foreign attention towards the grievances of their people (internationalisation 
attempts). Israeli foreign policy doctrine considers the issue of equality and 
integration of the Arab citizens as an internal matter subject to the jurisdiction or 
Israeli government, local authorities and courts and therefore rejected the 
involvement of outside actors and institutions.4 
                                                 
1 E.g. Sammy Smmoha, Still Playing By The Rules: Index Of Arab-Jewish Relations In Israel (Haifa: University of Haifa, 
2017); Amal Jamal, "In The Shadow  Of The 1967 War: Israel And The Palestinians", British Journal Of Middle Eastern 
Studies 44, no. 4 (2017): 529-544, doi:10.1080/13530194.2017.1360010; Ghanem As'ad, "Israel’s Second-Class 
Citizens", Foreign Affairs, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2016-06-08/israel-s-second-class-citizens. 
2 Shany Payes, "Palestinian Ngos In Israel: A Campaign For Civic Equality In A Non-Civic State", Israel Studies 8, no. 1 
(2003): 60-90, doi:10.1353/is.2003.0016; Shany Payes, Palestinian Ngos In Israel (London: I.b. tauris, 2005). 
Oded Haklai, "Palestinian Ngos In Israel: A Campaign For Civic Equality Or &Quot;Ethnic Civil Society&Quot;?", Israel 
Studies 9, no. 3 (2004): 157-168, doi:10.1353/is.2005.0004; Eli Rekhess, The Arab Minority in Israel: An Analysis of the 
‘Future Visions’ Documents (New York, NY: American Jew ish Committee, 2008), 
http://www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42d75369-d582-4380-8395-
d25925b85eaf%7D/ARAB%20MINORITY%20IN%20ISRAEL.PDF(accessed June 27, 2017); Hillel Frisch, Israel's 
Security And Its Arab Citizens (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
3 E.g. Theodore Sasson, "Review  Essay: Israeli Attitudes On Civil Rights, Democracy And Arab-Jewish 
Relations", Israel Studies 23, no. 2 (2018): 217, doi:10.2979/israelstudies.23.2.10; Michael Karayanni, "Tw o Concepts 
Of Group Rights For The Palestinian-Arab Minority Under Israel's Constitutional Definition As A "Jew ish And 
Democratic" State", International Journal Of Constitutional Law 10, no. 2 (2012): 304-339, doi:10.1093/icon/mos020. 
4 "Building A Political Firew all Against Israel's Delegitimization Conceptual Framew ork", Reut-Institute.Org, 2010, 
http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20100310%20Delegitimacy%20Eng.pdf , 59. 
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Given that relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to this issue, this 
study is designed to explore and analyse the internationalisation process and its 
impact with reference to the Arab community in Israel. The motivation for this 
research based on the currently considerable interest in the ‘internationalisation’ 
of issues pertaining to the Arab minority in Israel. 
 
1.2 The Zionist movement prior the foundation of Israel in 1948  
 
Zionism, a nationalist movement established in the 1800s, believed that 
Palestine rightfully belonged to the Jews, inhabitants from biblical times.5 It saw 
Palestine as a ‘land without a people, for a people without a land’.6 Accordingly, 
the Jewish settlement in Palestine was presented as an ideological and moral 
project that provided a solution to the dilemma of anti-Semitism in European 
communities.7 From the start, the movement requested and received 
agreement from major European powers. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917,8 
and under the British Mandate, the Zionist movement began to encourage 
Jewish people in Europe to return from exile to their ancient homeland. 
Eventually, the partition resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 
29 November 19479 recognised that Jewish state should be established 
alongside Arab one. However, Palestinians who in 1914, comprised about 92% 
of the population in historical Palestine, rejected this resolution. Their rejection 
based on the claim that the 1948 Plan advantaged Jews by granting them more 
than 56% of the land while Palestinian Arabs were offered bout 42% of the land 
despite still being the majority of the population (about 67%).10 The Zionist 
movement accepted the plan and announced an independent Israel as ‘Jewish’ 
and ‘Democratic’ State11 and resulted in the Arab states declaring war on Israel. 
                                                 
5 Oren Yiftachel, "‘Ethnocracy’: The Politics Of Judaizing Israel/Palestine", Ipk-Bonn.De, 2006, http://ipk-
bonn.de/dow nloads/ethnocracy-yiftachel.pdf. 
6 Nur Massalha, "The Expulsion Of The Palestinians: The Concept Of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948, 
Washington, DC (1992), 235". 
7 Massalha, "The Expulsion Of The Palestinians: The Concept Of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948, 
235. 
8 "The Balfour Declaration", Mfa.Gov.Il, 1917, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20balfour%20declaration.aspx. 
9 "UN General Assembly Resolution 181", Unispal.Un.Org, 1947, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253. 
10 Ian Lustick, Arabs In The Jewish State: Israel's Control Of A National Minority (Austin, Tex: Univ. of Texas Press, 
1980). 
11 "Proclamation Of Independence", Knesset.Gov.Il, 1948, https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm. 
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The Israeli military were victorious and claimed 77% of Palestinian land.12 
Following this, the State of Israel became a UN member in 1949.13  
 
The results of the UN 1947 resolution strengthen the claim of some authors who 
believe that both ‘territorial’ and ‘demography’ are the main aspects two aspects 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.14 In the same vein, it is important to note that 
both Israeli Jews and Arabs regard themselves as native to the area. In this 
sense, some authors claim that one of the crucial issues that lay at the core of 
the tension between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens is the contradictive 
narratives between the two-ethnic groups.15 While the Jewish historical 
connection to the land of Israel was recognised by the UN partition plan, the 
narrative of the Palestinian citizens omitted it.16 One example for this 
contradiction can be found in the 2007 Haifa Declaration that was published by 
Arab intellectuals as part of their attempts to draw a future vision for the Arab 
minority within Israel. In one of the paragraphs the authors describe Israel as a 
colonial state that occupied its homeland: 
 
‘Towards the end of the 19th century, the Zionist movement initiated its 
colonial-settler project in Palestine. Subsequently, in concert with world 
imperialism and with the collusion of the Arab reactionary powers, it 
succeeded in carrying out its project, which aimed at occupying our 
homeland and transforming it into a state for the Jews’17 
 
Despite the Jewish claim to Palestine based on biblical ideology, only 7%-8% of 
the land was actually owned by Jews prior to the establishment of Israel.18 As a 
result, the Arab view is that the state has illegally commandeered public land 
and illegally confiscated Arab homes and land. 
 
                                                 
12 Ismael Abu-Saad, "Retelling The History: The Indigenous Palestinian Bedouin In Israel", Alternative: An International 
Journal Of Indigenous Peoples 1, no. 1 (2005): 25-47, doi:10.1177/117718010500100103. 
13 "Admission Of Israel To The United Nations- General Assembly Resolution 273", Mfa.Gov.Il, accessed 6 November 
2018, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook1/pages/admission%20of%20israel%20to%20the%20u
nited%20nations-%20general.aspx. 
14 Yitzhak Reiter, "The Land Issues, Chapter 5 [In Hebrew ]", Abraham Fund, 2009, https://www.abrahamfund.org/5544; 
Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing Of Palestine (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007). 
15 Sammy Smooha, "Arab Jew ish Relations In Israel As A Jew ish And Democratic State", in Trends In Israeli 
Society (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 2001), 322-323. 
16 Dov Waxman, "Israel's Other Palestinian Problem: The Future Vision Documents And The Demands Of The 
Palestinian Minority In Israel", Tandfonline.Com, 2013, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2013.748295. 
17 "The Haifa Declaration", Mada-Research.Org, 2007, http://mada-research.org/wp-
content/uploads/2007/09/watheeqat-haifa-english.pdf. 
18 Yitzhak Reiter, "The Land Issues, Chapter 5 ", Abraham Fund, 2009, https://www.abrahamfund.org/5544. [In Hebrew ] 
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1.3 Arabs in Israel: Background 
 
1.3.1 General review 
 
Demography growth 
 
The War of 1948 described by Palestinians as Nakba (Catastrophe) as it 
heralded an era of dramatic demographical and territorial change for the 
Palestinian people. For example, it is estimated that the Nakba resulted in the 
destruction of about 500 Palestinian villages, and turned nearly three-quarters 
of a million Palestinians into refugees.19 Accordingly, the number of Palestinians 
who managed to survive the 1948 War and became Israeli citizens following the 
inclusion of their lands within the new State of Israel, was reduced from 2:1 
majority in the area of Mandatory Palestine to a small minority (about 12.5% of 
the population of the State of Israel).20 That is, only a community of 160,000 out 
of 900,000 Palestinians remained in the part of Palestine upon which Israel was 
established due to the UN Partition Plan.21  
The majority of the Arab community in Israel concentrated mainly in the centre 
and northern part of the country,22 and it is believed that they were granted 
Israeli citizenship to allow the approval of the 1947 UN General Assembly’s 
Partition Resolution, which in turn acquired Israel international legitimacy.23 The 
issue of the Israeli citizenship is a critical point as it makes the key difference 
between the political status of Arab Palestinians who live in Israel, and the rest 
of Palestinians who live in the Occupied territories (OT) and in diaspora. 
In the last seven decades the Arab population has experienced a huge 
increase. Today the Arab population of Israel numbers 1.9 million (20.9%)24 of 
                                                 
19 Nur Masalha, The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating The Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory (London: Zed 
Books, 2012). 
20 Ian Lustick, Arabs In The Jewish State: Israel's Control Of A National Minority (Austin, Tex: Univ. of Texas Press, 
1980). 
21 Nur Masalha, The Palestine Nakba (London: Zed Books, 2012), 5.  
22 Majid Al- Haj and Henry Rosenfeld, Arab Local Government In Israel (Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1990). 
23 Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy And The Legal Construction Of Citizenship: Arab Citizens Of The Jew ish 
State.", American Political Science Review 86, no. 02 (1992): 432-443, doi:10.2307/1964231; Nadim N. Rouhana and 
Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, "Settler-Colonial Citizenship: Conceptualizing The Relationship Betw een Israel And Its 
Palestinian Citizens", Settler Colonial Studies 5, no. 3 (2014): 205-225, doi:10.1080/2201473x.2014.947671. 
24 According to the Israeli Central Bureau Of Statistics, the number of Muslim citizens by the end of 2017 w as 1.562 
million, Druze citizens 141,000, and Christians 135975. https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/Pages/default.aspx.  
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the total population of the state, the largest ethnic minority in Israel.25 In other 
words, one in five Israeli citizens is Arab Palestinian. This massive 
demographical growth in the number of the Arab citizens has been viewed as a 
threat by the state’s authorities as it can undermine the State’ Jewish identity. 
Such a concern expressed by Benjamin Netanyahu in (2003) when he was 
Finance Minister who stated:  
 
‘Israel's growing demographic problem is not because of Palestinians, 
but of Israeli Arabs’26 
 
Predictably, his comments aroused claims of racism and widespread 
condemnation from Arab leaders.27 The demographic discourse continues to 
dominate the Israeli political debate. According to figures presented by the Civil 
Administration during a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committee in March 2018, the number of Muslims living in the West Bank, 
Gaza and the territories of Israel (6.5 million) is equal to the number of Jews 
living in Israel. This information sparked a storm among many Israeli 
personalities in the political system who considered it ‘concerning’ data.28 Arabs 
in Israel make up roughly third of the Palestinians living in historical 
Palestine29’30 and approximately 12% of the Palestinians worldwide.31 
Most Arab citizens of Israel are Sunni Muslims including Bedouin who account 
for 16 per cent of the Muslim population, and Circassians for 0.3 per cent. There 
are also Druze and Christian who each group of them constitute about 8%.32 
                                                                                                                                               
"The Central Bureau Of Statistics (Israel)-Society&Population-Population& Demography", Cbs.Gov.Il, 2017, 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_SHTML&ID=705. 
25 Dov Waxman and Ilan Peleg, The Rights Of Israel's Palestinian Minority In The Two-State Solution To The Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper (New  York: City University of New  York, 2011). 
26 Gideon Alon and Aluf Benn, "Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs Are The Real Demographic Threat", Haaretz.Com, 2013, 
https://www.haaretz.com/1.4802179.  
27 Alon and Benn, "Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs Are The Real Demographic Threat". 
28 Yaron Avraham, "2018: Equality Betw een Muslims And Jew s", Mako, 2018, https://www.mako.co.il/news-
military/israel-q1_2018/Article-9c5f88e90916261004.htm. Also the Central Bureau of Statistics data confirmed that as of 
2017 there w ere slightly more than 6.5 million Jew s in Israel, almost the same number as Muslims in Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. 
29 "Israel And Its Palestinian Citizens", Mossawa.Org, 2017, 
http://www.mossawa.org/uploads/Israel%20and%20its%20Arab%20Palestinian%20Citizens%20-
%2024%20May%202017.pdf .  
30 The data show s that as of 2016, 4.88 million Palestinians lived in the territories – 2.97 million in the West Bank and 
1.91 million in the Gaza Strip. Yotam Berger and Jack Khoury, "How  Many Palestinians Live In Gaza And The West 
Bank? It's Complicated", Haaretz.Com, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/how-many-palestinians-live-in-gaza-
and-the-west-bank-it-s-complicated-1.5956630. 
31 Dov Waxman, "Israel's Palestinian Minority In The Tw o-State Solution: The Missing Dimension", Middle East 
Policy 18, no. 4 (2011): 68-82, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00511.x. 
32 Dov Chernichovsky et al., "The Health Of The Arab Israeli Population: A Chapter From The State Of The Nation 
Report 2017", Taubcenter.Org.Il, 2017, http://taubcenter.org.il/wp-content/files_mf/healthofthearabisraelipopulation.pdf . 
The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
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The Arab citizens of Israel live in in three main areas in Israel: The Galilee area 
in the Northern district (over 50%), the ‘Triangle’ in the Centre (23%), and in the 
Naqab (Negev) desert region in the South (12%), and the rest live in mixed 
cities (about 8.5%). 33  
 
Land 
Although Arabs in Israel represent 20% of the population, the data show that 
they own only 3.5% of the country's total area, and a mere 12% -17% of the 
land previously owned by Palestinians including Palestinian refugees, prior to 
the establishment of the State.34 The question of land has a significant impact 
on the psyche of the Arab citizens of Israel. As Reiter (2009) argues:  
‘The issue of land is the burning, the most inciteful and the most uniting 
in the Arab society in Israel, and it is connected to many of the feelings 
of deprivation and discrimination of this population. Since Arab society 
was mostly agricultural during the establishment of the state, it saw the 
land not only as a vital resource, but also as a national symbol of its 
attachment to the land and its struggle for rights and collective status 
within the state’35 [translated from Hebrew] 
 
Therefore, the question of land has a significant impact on the tension between 
the Arab minority and the State authorities through issues related to building 
permits, demolition orders, and the right or denial of the right to settle and 
purchase land. Recent data shows that 66% of Arab citizens living in Arab 
localities cannot receive building permits under approved plans as the 
communities in which they live are subject to a lengthy process of planning led 
by government ministries and planning offices.36 According to another report 
published in June 2016 dealing with the housing shortage in minority 
communities, less than 2% of all housing transactions are conducted in the 
Arab community.37 Given the constraints above, and in response to natural 
population growth, the Arab population has been forced to build without permits, 
                                                 
33 As'ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, Palestinians In Israel: The Politics Of Faith After Oslo (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); Gabriel G Tabarani, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington, IN: Author house, 2008). 
34 Yitzhak Reiter, "The Land Issue, Chapter 5 ", Abraham Fund, 2009, https://www.abrahamfund.org/5544. [in Hebrew ]. 
35 Reiter, "The Land Issue, Chapter 5 ". [in Hebrew ] 
36 "41Th Land Day In The Shadow  Of Legislation Designed To Increase Houses Demolitions", Mossawa.Org, 
2017,http://mossaw a.org/he/article/view/651. 
37 Hagi Amit, ""We Will Soon Explode": The Real Estate Crisis That Threatens To Ignite Israel", Themarker, 2017, 
https://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.3439243. [In Hebrew] 
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which in turn results in house demolitions, that become one of the major 
struggles they faces. The on-going dispute between the Bedouin population in 
the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Southern Israel and the Israeli government 
illustrates the major tension around the land issue.38 (This will be further 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4).  
 
Complex dual identity: Israeli ‘civil identity’ versus Palestinian ‘national identity’ 
The way this special minority group’s identity is defined has changed over the 
years both in terms of how Israeli Arabs define themselves and how the state 
and the Jewish majority define them. For instance, in the British Journal of Holy 
Land and Palestine Studies (2016), Muhammad Amara39 lists forty-five phrases 
commonly used in reference to Palestinian society in Israel, including: 
Palestinian citizens, The Arabs of the Green Line, The ‘Arabs of the inside’, 
‘The Arabs of 1948’, ‘The Palestinians of 48’, ‘Arab-Israeli’, etc.40 Amara (2016) 
argues that the terms serve as symbolic means for the Israeli government to 
‘tame’ the Palestinian citizens in attempt to make them accept the preferred 
identity by the state, which is ‘Arab-Israeli’. In an interview for BBC Arabic TV in 
2016, the head of the Joint List MK Ayman Odeh spoke about this issue: 
 
‘The Israeli institution wants to build a character called the “Arab-Israeli”. 
Who is the Arab Israeli? He is not 100% Arab. That is, he is not 
connected to his roots, his issue, and not working for his national issue. 
Meanwhile, he is not 100% Israeli as only Jewish can be 100% Israeli in 
the Jewish state... The “Arab-Israeli” is a second-class Arab, and a 
second-class Israeli’41  
 
It is claimed that considering the Arab citizens of Israel simply as an ethno 
linguistic minority by referring to them as ‘Arab-Israeli’ reflects the reluctant of 
the Israeli government to recognise their Palestinian identity and their existence 
                                                 
38 "MJB Data Snapshot: The Bedouin In The Negev", Brookdale.Jdc.Org.Il, 2017, http://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/MJB-Data-Snapshot-The-Bedouin-in-Israel-May-2017-FINAL.pdf.  
Deborah F Shmueli and Rassem Khamaisi, Israel's Invisible Negev Bedouin [Recurso Electrónico] (New York: 
Dordrecht and London, 2015). 
39 Muhammad Amara, "Language, Identity And Conflict: Examining Collective Identity Through The Labels Of The 
Palestinians In Israel", Journal Of Holy Land And Palestine Studies 15, no. 2 (2016): 203-223, 
doi:10.3366/hlps.2016.0141. 
40 See also Azmi Bishara, "On The Question Of The Arab Minority In Israel", Theory And Criticism, 1993, 7-20. 
41 Ayman Odeh, MK, interview  by Gisele Khoury, BBC TV, 2016. 
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as a national minority.42 Various surveys suggest that the Arab citizens in Israel 
increasingly choose to define themselves as ‘Palestinian Arab citizens of the 
state’.43 Therefore, they may be described as living in a schizophrenic situation 
in terms of their identity, caught between their Palestinian national identity and 
their Israeli civil one.44 In this sense, some scholars argue that Arab citizens in 
Israel are undergoing a simultaneous process of ‘Palestinization’45 where 
emotionally they are increasingly identify with the Palestinians,46 and 
‘Israelization’47 as they became bilingual and bicultural by accepting the Israeli 
system and seeking to improve their status in the state. This ‘dual identity’ of the 
Arab minority (Israeli and the Palestinian alike) that entails identification with the 
‘enemy’ (Palestinians) of the state, is seen as threaten by the Israeli political 
elite who views it as a problem of irredentism. The concept irredentism 
describes the national aspirations of a minority group in one state to be related 
to another country based on different ties such as ethnic, religious and 
national.48 
 
Most Israeli Jews see a contrast between the Israeli civil identity of the Arab 
citizens and their Palestinian national one. National surveys highlighted this 
trend, revealing that over 60% of Israeli Jews believe that ‘an Arab who defines 
himself as a ‘Palestinian Arab in Israel’ cannot be loyal to the state and its 
laws.49 In this context, it is important to notice that while the Israeli government 
refuses to recognise the Palestinian identity of the Arab minority, it does not 
                                                 
42 Muhammad Amara, "Language, Identity And Conflict: Examining Collective Identity Through The Labels Of The 
Palestinians In Israel", Journal Of Holy Land And Palestine Studies 15, no. 2 (2016): 203-223, 
doi:10.3366/hlps.2016.0141; Esra Bulut Aymat, Roundtable Discussion On Israel's Internal L Tension In A Changing 
Region (Paris: European Union: Institute for Security Study, 2012), 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Roundtable_report.pdf ;  
43 Aas Atrash and Ameed Saabneh, "‘Attitudes Of Palestinians In Israel: Government Performance, Issues Of Equality 
And Democracy, And Peace Negotiation", Mada-Research.Org, 2015, http://mada-research.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/aas_ameed-final.pdf; As'ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, Palestinians In Israel: The 
Politics Of Faith After Oslo(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
44 Muhammad Amara, "Language, Identity And Conflict: Examining Collective Identity Through The Labels Of The 
Palestinians In Israel", Journal Of Holy Land And Palestine Studies 15, no. 2 (2016): 203-223, 
doi:10.3366/hlps.2016.0141. 
45 Eli Rekhess, The Arab Minority In Israel Between Communism And Arab Nationalism, 1965-1991 (Tel Aviv: Hakibubtz 
Hameuchad, 1993). [in Hebrew ] 
46 Muhammad Amara and Izhak Schnell, "Identity Repertoires Among Arabs In Israel", Journal Of Ethnic And Migration 
Studies 30, no. 1 (2004): 175-193, doi:10.1080/1369183032000170222. 
47 Sammy Smooha, "The Israelization Of The Collective Identity And Political Orientation Of Israel's Palestinian 
Citizens", in The Arabs In Israeli Politics: Dilemmas Of Identity (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 1998), 41-
53. [in Hebrew ] 
48 Ephraim Lavie, "Integrating The Arab-Palestinian Minority In Israeli Society: Time For A Strategic 
Change", Peace.Tau.Ac.Il, 2016, 
https://peace.tau.ac.il/sites/peace.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/peace/PDF/books/INSS_EphraimLavie.pdf. 
49 Dov Waxman, "A Dangerous Divide: The Deterioration Of Jew ish-Palestinian Relations In Israel", The Middle East 
Journal 66, no. 1 (2012): 11-29, doi:10.3751/66.1.11. 
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recognise their ‘Israeli’ nationality as well. Thus, the ethnicity of ‘Arab’ appears 
in their Israeli ID cards instead of ‘Israeli’ as nationality, and the same for Jews. 
This issue was debated in the Supreme Court upon the request of a group of 
liberal Israeli Jews who asked to change their nationality from ‘Jewish’ to 
‘Israeli’, but eventually the court backed the government and refused to 
recognise ‘Israeli’ as nationality.50 Thus, the State differentiates between its 
citizens based on their ethnicity, ‘Jews’ and ‘Arabs’. Yet, while the former is 
eligible for national rights, the latter cannot have them.  
 
The leadership of the Arab citizens  
 
 
  
The leadership of the Arab citizens of Israel is diverse as it includes secular and 
religious figures; those with a civil line and others with nationalist ideas.51 The 
Arab leadership can be divided into four centres of power: 
 
● The political leadership: The ‘Joint List’  
The ‘Joint List’ Party is the only Arab political Party in the Israeli 
parliament (Knesset). It emerged following the 2015 elections and 
includes twelve Arab members of the Knesset (MKs), and one 
Communist Jewish MP. Its formation considered as a major 
milestone in the history of the Arab citizens of Israel as it was the 
first time that all the four Arab parties have united together in one 
political party. This Party is the third largest bloc in the 20th 
Knesset election. The Communist member of the Knesset (MK) 
Ayman Odeh is the Head of the Joint List, and he is known by his 
dual policy approach of economic and social integration on one 
hand, and Palestinian Arab nationalism on the other.52 The last 
few years witnessed a sharp increase in the international activities 
of Arab MPs as part of their efforts to internationalise the inferior 
political status of the Arab citizens. Therefore, they are identified 
                                                 
50 Revital Hovel, "Supreme Court Rejects Citizens' Request To Change Nationality From 'Jew ish' To 
'Israeli'", Haaretz.Com, 2013, https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-court-israeli-isn-t-ethnicity-1.5343897. 
51 "The Protest Among Israeli Arabs - Characteristics, Reasons, And Trends", Maarachot, 2014, 93. 
52 Ephraim Lavie, "Integrating The Arab-Palestinian Minority In Israeli Society: Time For A Strategic 
Change", Peace.Tau.Ac.Il, 2016, 
https://peace.tau.ac.il/sites/peace.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/peace/PDF/books/INSS_EphraimLavie.pdf. 
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in this study as prominent actors in the internationalisation 
process, and their pattern of activity is described will be described 
as ‘personal diplomacy’ (This will be further discussed in Chapter 
6). 
 
● Heads of Arab civil associations (NGOs) 
Since the 1980s, Arab NGOs have become an important 
component of the political and social landscape in Israel. Later 
these organisations adopted advocacy and lobbying strategies at 
the local and international levels, which have established their 
role in the public sphere. The academic literature acknowledges 
the prominent role of Arab NGOs in Israel in promoting the social 
and the political status of the Arab citizens, and democratisation 
of the Israeli society and state.53 Notably, the Arab civil society 
organisations are not only campaigning for civic equality, but also 
for their national empowerment both locally and internationally.54 
In mid-2000, few Arab NGOs achieved consultative status for the 
UN bodies, which raised their international legitimacy. 55  
During 2006- 2007, Arab NGOs played an important role in the 
publication of the vision documents, which largely reflected the 
expertise of the civil society organizations. The vision documents 
also reflected the centrality of the discourse of justice with regard 
to the Palestinian national question and issues relating to the 
Palestinians in Israel. Arab NGOs as identified in this study, are 
another key force in the internationalisation process of the 
grievances of the Arab citizens in Israel, and their international 
pattern of activity is described as ‘civil and legal advocacy’ (this 
will be further discussed in Chapter 5).  
                                                 
53 Amal Jamal, Arab Minority Nationalism In Israel: The Politics Of Indignity (London, New  York: Routledge, 2014), 
189.   
54 Oded Haklai, "Palestinian NGOs In Israel: A Campaign For Civic Equality Or ‘Ethnic Civil Society’?", Israel Studies 9, 
no. 3 (2004): 157-168, doi:10.1353/is.2005.0004. 
55 "Activity Of Israeli Organizations With Advisor Status To The United Nations, Against Israeli Policy", Imti.Org.Il, 2015, 
https://imti.org.il/w p-content/uploads/2015/09/Activity-of-Israeli-Organizations-with-Advisor-Status-to-the-United-Nations-
Against-Israeli-Policy.pdf. 
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● The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Councils  
The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Councils 
in Israel was established in mid-197456 as part of the process to 
establish Arab national institutions in Israel. 57 Despite its civil 
agenda that largely focused on improving municipal issues in the 
Arab society, the committee’s leaders had initiated and involved in 
activities that aimed to raise national demands as well.58 Today 
the work of the committee is related to the Local Council 
Authorities, and its leaders’ relations with the state authorities 
focus on improving daily life issues of the Arab citizens. Heads of 
the Arab Local Councils had a notable role in internationalisation 
process during the 1990s.  
 
● The Islamic Movement 
The Islamic Movement in Israel established during the 1970s 
under the influence of the revolution in Iran and the rise of Arab 
political movements in Israel that had a Palestinian national 
character. As apolitical movement it is inspired by the Muslim 
brotherhood movement in Egypt which was created by Hassan 
Al-Banna in 1928.59 Despite its split in 1996 into Northern and 
Southern factions, and its on-going controversial relationship with 
the Israeli government, the Movement remains a key influential 
player in Palestinian minority affairs within Israel. During the late 
1980s, the movement gained a remarkable political support 
across Arab towns and villages in Israel, and as a result it raised 
its power at both municipal and local government level. However, 
the Northern branch of the Movement started boycotting the 
                                                 
56 Bartosz Hordecki, "Freedom OF Conscience And Religion In The Documents Of The Council Of Europe: Selected 
Issues SSUES", Wnpid.Amu.Edu.Pl, 2014, https://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/~wnpid/attachments/article/2894/035-046.pdf. 
57 Eli Rekhess, "The Arabs Of Israel After Oslo: Localization Of The National Struggle", Israel Studies 7, no. 3 (2002): 1-
44, doi:10.1353/is.2003.0009. 
58 Bartosz Hordecki, "Freedom OF Conscience And Religion In The Documents Of The Council Of Europe: Selected 
Issues SSUES", Wnpid.Amu.Edu.Pl, 2014, https://wnpid.amu.edu.pl/~wnpid/attachments/article/2894/035-046.pdf. 
59 Gadi Hitman, Israel And Its Arab Minority, 1948-2008: Dialogue, Protest, Violence (Laham, Boulder, New  York, 
London: Lexington Books, 2016). 
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Israeli national politics, and this put the Movement under threat of 
being banned.  
By holding the yearly conference ‘al-Aqṣā in Danger’ that focused 
on protecting Jerusalem and the Aqṣā mosque from the 
government’s policies, Shaykh Raed Salah, the prominent leader 
of the Northern branch of the Movement has succeeded in 
internationalising the issue both for Western countries and the 
Islamic world. Due to its separatist national activities, the 
Movement has been understood as a new form of Palestinian 
resistance inside Israel, with Jerusalem as the focus and symbol 
of its mobilization. In 2015, the Israeli cabinet declared the 
Northern branch illegal and withdrew its status as a recognized 
organization by enacting to the emergency regulations.60 Yet, the 
Southern branch of the Islamic movement has three 
representatives in the parliamentarian Joint List Party. 
 
● The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel 
The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel is an 
elected representative body that consists of all the Arab political 
parties, Heads of Arab Local Councils, and civil society 
organisations.61 It was established in 1982, and since then it 
started to take part in some of the activities of the Arab political 
leadership both in Israel and worldwide.  
The landmark of Higher Arab Monitoring Committee and the 
Committee of Arab Local Council Heads activities was in 
December 2006 when they published the controversial 'Future 
Vision of the Arab Palestinians in Israel',62 which was the first of 
its kind to challenge the status of the Arab minority within Israel. 
                                                 
60 Mansour Nasasra, "The Politics Of Claiming And Representation: The Islamic Movement In Israel", Journal Of Islamic 
Studies 29, no. 1 (2017): 48-78, doi:10.1093/jis/etx078. 
61 Eli Rekhess, "The Arabs Of Israel After Oslo: Localization Of The National Struggle", Israel Studies 7, no. 3 (2002): 1-
44, doi:10.1353/is.2003.0009. 
62 "The Future Vision Of The Palestinian Arabs In Israel", Mossawa.Org, 2006, 
http://www.mossawa.org/uploads/Future_Vision_ENG.pdf. 
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The 2006 Document called for economic and social equality for 
the Arab citizens in Israel while focusing on their indigenous 
status coupled with the annulment of Israel's Jewish character. It 
is believed that the document was published in English as part of 
the endeavours to internationalise the status of the Arab citizens 
that was amid its main purposes.63 
Notably, two years ago, the Chairman of the High Follow-Up 
Committee, Former MK Mohammad Barakeh (Hadash-Israeli 
communist party) declared January 30, 2016 the ‘International 
Day for Supporting the Rights of the Palestinian Citizens of 
Israel’. Barakeh sought to increase international attention towards 
the Arab citizens following the ban of the Northern branch of the 
Islamic Movement that antagonised the secular Arab elite. 64 
There are increasing evidences about the active role of the High 
Follow-Up Committee in internationalisation of the grievances of 
the Arab citizens either independently,65 or in cooperation with the 
Joint List66 and other NGOs.67 
The common between the Arab leadership is that their legitimacy is 
questioned by the state. Recent research conducted by Mitvim, The 
Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, shows that the Arab 
leadership in Israel are excluded from Israel’s foreign policy due to 
psychological and ideological barriers that characterise both the Arab 
society and the Israeli Foreign Service. As a result, the Arab elite prefers 
to carry independent foreign affairs activities that aims to improve the 
status of the Arab community through Arab NGOs, MPs and other 
internal associations such as The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab 
                                                 
63 Elie Rekhess, "The Arab Minority In Israel – An Analysis Of The "Future Vision" Documents", American Jewish 
Committee, 2008. 
64 The High Follow -Up Committee for the Arab Citizens, International Day For Supporting The Rights Of The Palestinian 
Citizens Of Israel, 2017; "International Arab Rights In Israel Day Marked In 35 Cities Worldw ide | Communist Party Of 
Israel", Maki.Org.Il, 2018, http://maki.org.il/en/?p=6907. 
65 "Barakeh Meets With Russian Deputy Foreign Minister In Moscow  To Consider The Implications Of The Nationality 
Law ", Alarab.Com, 2018, https://www.alarab.com/Article/874133; "The United Nations Investigates A Complaint Against 
Israel For Its Approval Of The National Law ", Alwatanvoice, 2018, 
https://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2018/08/04/1163786.html. 
66 "For The First Time, Palestinians In Israel Host Senior UN Official", Middle East Monitor, 2018, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180510-first-the-first-time-palestinians-in-israel-host-senior-un-official/. 
67 "A Political Delegation Representing The "Follow -Up" Holds Meetings On The Nationality Law  At United Nations 
Headquarters In Geneva", Meezaan, 2018, http://meezaan.org/?mod=articles&ID=458. 
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Citizens rather than taking part in official missions on behalf the Israeli 
government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFO). This pattern of 
behaviour proved to have a negative impact on their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Israeli Jewish public who consider it as disloyalty to the 
state.68 
 
Military service 
 
The Israeli military service in the Israeli Military Defence (IDF) is considered as 
the fundamental basis of the very existence of the state.69 Therefore, it is a 
central pillar of the Israeli society and a key test for loyalty to the state. 70 The 
service is compulsory for Jews and Druze, with the exemption of Arabs (Muslim 
and Christian) and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Some Bedouin Muslims and Christians 
serve in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on voluntary basis. The logic of 
security in Israel underscores the justification for giving privileges to those who 
served in the IDF.71 It is proper to give certain benefits to ex-soldiers within the 
first three years of their discharge.72 Hence, it is believed that the Israeli 
citizenship does not guarantee Arab citizens legal equality as the Jewish 
majority.73 The extensive use of military service as a criterion for allocation of 
benefits is one of the most striking reasons for the inequality between Arabs 
and Jews in Israel. 
 
State’s official language 
 
Hebrew is the official language of the State of Israel. Although Arabic, the 
mother tongue of many of its citizens, has had an important role in the State of 
                                                 
68 Inbal Ben-Ezer, "The Involvement Of Palestinian Citizens Of Israel In The Israeli Peace Camp", Mitvim.Org.Il, 2018, 
http://mitvim.org.il/images/Inbal_Ben-Ezer_-_Summary_-
_The_involvement_of_Palestinian_citizens_of_Israel_in_the_Israeli_peace_camp_-_March_2018.pdf. 
69 Ronnie Olesker, "National Identity And Securitization In Israel", Ethnicities 14, no. 3 (2014): 371-391, 
doi:10.1177/1468796813504093. 
70 Sammy Smooha, "Minority Status In An Ethnic Democracy: The Status Of The Arab Minority In Israel", Ethnic And 
Racial Studies 13, no. 3 (1990): 389-413, doi:10.1080/01419870.1990.9993679. 
71 Ronnie Olesker, "National Identity And Securitization In Israel", Ethnicities 14, no. 3 (2014): 371-391, 
doi:10.1177/1468796813504093. 
72 Sammy Smooha, "Class, Ethnic, And National Cleavages And Democracy In Israel" (Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1993), 309-342, https://poli.hevra.haifa.ac.il/~s.smooha/download/ClassEthnicandNationalCleavages.pdf.  
73 Sammy Smooha, "Minority Status In An Ethnic Democracy: The Status Of The Arab Minority In Israel", Ethnic And 
Racial Studies 13, no. 3 (1990): 389-413, doi:10.1080/01419870.1990.9993679. 
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Israel, the status of Arabic as an official language was downgraded in July 
2018.74 (This will be further discussed in chapter 6). 
 
Unique status 
 
The 1948 War left hostility and resentment between Jewish and Arab citizens in 
Israel, and posed a serious fear of the future of the two communities.75 Some 
scholars believe that what makes the status of Arab citizens so unique is the 
fact that they are part of an Arab majority in the Middle East region who are 
perceived by the Jewish citizens as a security, cultural and demographic 
threat.76 This perception was one of the main reasons that led to the creation of 
Military Government (1948-66) in areas populated by the Arab minority. There 
were also worries in relation to the internationalisation of their status as Yigal 
(1968) puts it: 
 
‘The Arabs were suspected of espionage, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, 
terror against collaborators, and a political struggle both internally and 
internationally that might internationalise their problem and damage 
Israel’s standing in the world’77 
 
 
Yigal’s quote also shows that it was expected that the Palestinians in Israel 
would use the internationalisation as strategy to pressurize the State of Israel 
and challenge its global reputation. Despite viewing them as a security risk, 
there has been little involvement from their side in terrorism,78 and the fifth 
column theory proved to be unfounded. Yet, they still perceived as a national 
security concern. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 "Israel And Arabic: Where Else Do Language And Politics Collide?", BBC News, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-44892114. 
75 "Protest Among Israeli Arabs - Characteristics, Reasons, And Trends", Maarachot, 2014. 
76 E.g. Sammy Smooha, "Ethnic Democracy: Israel As An Archetype", Israel Studies 2, no. 2 (1997): 196, 
doi:10.1353/is.2005.0060. 
77 Yigal Allon, A Curtain Of Sand (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1968), 332. [In Hebrew ] 
78 "Head Of The Shin Bet To The Foreign Affairs And Defense Committee: "Hamas, Which Is In A Strategic Situation, Is 
Interested In Undermining The Security Situation In Judea And Samaria By Means Of Terror 
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http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/ForeignAffairs/News/pages/pr200317_1.aspx. 
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Integration in workplaces 
 
Recent data shows that Israel’s unemployment rate has remarkably fallen in 
recent years, reaching only 4% in 2017.79 However, this figure does not reflect 
the situation in the Arab society where about two-thirds of Arab women of 
employment age who make up around 10% of the total population of Israel, are 
hardly participate in the workforce.80 This inequality is highlighted when 
considering that only 34% of Arab women were in employment in 2017, 
compared with 85% of Jewish women, which was even above the OECD 
average 76.5%.81  
 
Furthermore, Arabs are not merged into the national power structure and are 
excluded from Israel’s scientific or business leaders. While Israel is widely 
recognised as a start-up nation for having the highest number of start-up 
companies on the U.S. NASDAQ stock (about 125 companies) after the U.S, 82 
the Arab society has remained in a state of stagnation, representing only 1.5% 
of the Israeli tech workforce of (around 280,000).83 Another statistic reveals that 
only 12 of 823 employees of the Bank of Israel are Arabs.84  
 
Arabs in the civil service also still suffer from under-representation. At the senior 
level of civil service, government companies, and statutory corporations. 
According to Mohammad Darawshe, Director of Planning, Equality and Shared 
Society. Givat Haviva Centre: 
 
‘Many bodies in the government do not think that the integration of Arab 
citizens is a national interest. They see it as a Jewish interest to 
                                                 
79 "Startup Nation Or Left-Behind Nation? Israel's Economy Is A Study In Contrasts", The Economist, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2017/05/18/israels-economy-is-a-study-in-contrasts. 
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preserve these places of employment for Jews only’85 [translated from 
Hebrew] 
 
This has resulted in a paucity of Arabs at the top three levels of civil service, 
and they are underrepresented in governmental offices. For example, the Prime 
Minister's Office employs ten Arab workers out of 822 employees (1.2%). The 
Ministry of Finance has 27 out of 1,028 employees (2.6%), the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs employs 41 Arab workers out of 1,834 employees (2.2%), the 
Ministry of Economy 21 out of 537 (3.9%). Official data shows that as of 2017 
Arabs in public service was 11.3%, a figure that appears to meet the 
government target. However, a closer look at some government ministries 
reveals that in most cases the numbers fall significantly below this.86 In reality, 
Arabs today represent only 3.2% of the senior civil service staff (except the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and hospitals include 11.7% of the Arab 
population). The data also reveals that of the Arab and Druze population enjoy 
a relative advantage in this context because of their army service. For example, 
the Ministry of the Interior, where 63% of the workers are from the Arab 
population (most of them from the Druze sector). In many government ministries 
there are no Arabs at all. These include the Ministry of Energy and Water, the 
Ministry of Development of the Periphery, Negev and Galilee, the Ministry of 
Intelligence, Ministry of Strategic Affairs, The Minister of Jerusalem Affairs 
and Heritage, Ministry of Diaspora, and Ministry of religious services.87  
Added to this, data show significant gaps in both representation and wages 
between Jewish and Arab academics, with academic education unable to 
redress the balance. Within the insurance industry, Arab academics earn 46% 
of the wages of their Jewish counterparts, whilst in the field of scientific 
research and development; Arab women earn 65% of their Jewish 
counterparts.88 
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Socio economic 
 
Political scholars and academics tend to agree that the minority Arab citizens of 
Israel are heavily disadvantaged compared with the Jewish majority, even 
though they are said to have full civic, political, socio-economic, and cultural 
rights.89 This hardship is emphasised when considering the socio-economic 
conditions of the Arab people in Israel, which reveals significant challenges. 
Lavie (2010) explains:  
 
ʻTo date only limited progress has been made in civil equality for the 
Arab minority... The general picture is one in which the Arabs in Israel 
are still in many ways a social group that is marginalised, discriminated-
against, and lacking civil equality. The group suffers from 
institutionalised discrimination manifested in legislation unequal 
distribution of resources and budgets; a lower level of employment in 
public service positions; and unequal settlement policies, as well as non-
institutionalised social discrimination. The latter stems from the conflict 
between the two societies and is manifested in everyday discrimination, 
such as rejection in job searches, opposition to Arabs living in Jewish 
cities, prohibitions on Arabs entering places of recreation, and use of 
racist language toward Arab citizens. The gap between them and the 
Jewish population is widening, even if their socioeconomic situation has 
improved.’90 
 
Current data support Lavies’ argument about the inferior status of the Arab 
citizens. For example, as of 2018, it was revealed that while Israel has a strong 
economy that allows it to compete with Japan’s GDP,91 it has one of the highest 
rates of poverty in Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) countries. 
These contradicting facts are explained by the significant gaps between the 
annual income of Jewish majority and the Arab minority who their income is 
50% lower than Israeli Jews.92 As a result, the poverty among the Arab 
community reached the country’s highest rate of 50% compared to 17% in 
Israeli society overall.93 This bad socio-economic situation has a negative 
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influence on Arab children. According to the Israeli Council for the Child, two out 
of three Arab children live below the poverty line (about 62%) compared with 
one out of five Jewish children (21.2%).94 A further effect of the marginalising 
the Arab citizens is the high rate of infant mortality among Arabs, 6.1 deaths per 
1,000 births compared with 2.2 in the Jewish society. This data even rises to the 
highest rate recorded with 11.1 per 1,000 births when considering Bedouin 
births.95 
According to the OECD, Israel has a serious economic, social, and educational 
challenge in relation to the Arab society that poses a serious threat on the 
success of the state’s economy.96 It is estimated that failing to narrow the gap 
between Arabs and Jews will cost the Israeli economy about NIS 40 billion a 
year.97 In the same vein, Former Shin Bet Chief, Yuval Diskin argued that the 
importance of integrating Arab citizens outweighs the Iranian threat.98  
Admittedly, there is a clear discrimination evident in the socio-economic data, 
but there are positive aspects, which demand recognition. According to new 
research by Israel’s Council for Higher Education (CHE), the number of Arab 
students in Israeli universities grew up 78% in the last seven years. Arab 
students accounted for 16.1% of undergraduate students in Israeli universities 
compared with 10.2 % in 2010. This increase has carried over to graduate 
programs, where the percentage of Arab students since 2010 has doubled from 
6.2% to 13%. In postgraduate programs, the percentage of Arab students rose 
60% from 3.9% to 6.3%.99 Strikingly, Arab students who study the Hi-Tech 
subjects in the in the prestigious Israel Institute of Technology (Technion) make 
up 25% of the overall students, of them 44% Arab female students, which is 
                                                 
94 "The Annual Statistical Bulletin "Children In Israel 2017"", Go.Ynet.Co.Il, 2018, 
http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/shnaton2017.pdf. 
95 Mazal Mualem, "Morbidity Among Israeli Arabs: A Strategic Problem", 2018, https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/iw /contents/articles/originals/2018/07/israel-arabs-ahmed-tibi-public-health-weapons-education.html. 
96 Michal Margalit, "OECD On Israel: The Economy Is Stronger But More Poor Workers; Criticize The Resident 
Price", Ynet, 2018, https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5155925,00.html. 
97 "The Israeli Economy Is Losing NIS 40 Billion A Year As A Result Of The Non-Integration Of Arab Citizens Into The 
Economy", Economist.Co.Il, 2008, http://www.economist.co.il/?CategoryID=1540&ArticleID=6138; Keren-Or Greenberg, 
""The Damage To The Economy From The Failure To Integrate Arabs - NIS 40 Billion A Year"", www.Calcalist.Co.Il, 
2018, https://www.calcalist.co.il/conference/articles/0,7340,L-3731666,00.html. 
98 Mazal Mualem, "Morbidity Among Israeli Arabs: A Strategic Problem", 2018, https://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/iw /contents/articles/originals/2018/07/israel-arabs-ahmed-tibi-public-health-weapons-education.html. 
99 "An Increase In The Number Of Students From The Arab Sector", Council For Higher Education (CHE), 2018, 
https://che.org.il.  
  20 
among the highest in the World.100 These positive developments have 
undoubtedly empowered the Arab citizens. Other statistics show that 35% of all 
doctors in Israel are from the Palestinian minority. A particular impressive 
statistic refers to a small Arab village called ‘Arraba’ (a community with 24,000 
residents), in lower Galilee, which has one of the highest numbers of doctors 
per capita in the world, that is, more than six doctors per thousand inhabitants 
(6:1000). By comparison, Israel as a whole has 3.1:1000, and the OECD 
average is 3:3:1000.101 Arabs also account for 35% of all pharmacists in 
Israel.102 Both education and medical professions are the only subjects in which 
Arab students were represented in proportion to their percentage of the 
population were.103 
 
Rhetoric of delegitimisation against the Arab citizens and their political 
leadership 
 
The rhetoric of delegitimisation against the Arab citizens is mainly 
reflected by either describing them as the ‘enemy within’ through the 
enactment anti-democratic laws.104 Essentially, radical language against 
Arab citizens tends to be increased particularly at times of threats to 
security. For example, during July 2017, the Israeli Minister of Defence, 
Avegdor Lieberman, stated in an interview with the Knesset TV channel 
that Arab citizens are one of the three main enemies of Israel: 
‘Israel has a three-dimensional conflict: (1) the Arab world (2) 
Palestinians (3) Israeli Arabs’105  
 
Categorising the Arab citizens as enemies and asserting that they are posing 
threat on the state as Hezbollah and Hamas, means that their mere existence 
within the state has no legitimacy as the two aforementioned movements are 
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defined by Israel as terror groups that should be defeated by unconventional 
force. In the same interview, Lieberman also described the Arab Joint List as a 
representative of a ‘terror organisation in Knesset Israel’.106 This kind of 
statements undoubtedly creates a hostile atmosphere and gives rise to Anti-
Arab populism.  
A further noticeable political move that was taken by the Israeli government and 
considered as a harmful for the legitimacy of Israel’s Arab citizens was when 
the Prime Minister Netanyahu asked U.S. officials to promote a land-swap plan 
as part of a future peace deal. The proposed plan aims to transfer about 
300,000 Arab citizens to the Palestinian territories, in exchange for settlements’ 
annexation. This proposal was even raised at the United Nations.107 Arab MKs 
strongly condemned the land swap described as a war crime as they see 
themselves as ‘indigenous’ citizens that their status cannot be compared with 
illegal settlers.108  
The current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu used his ‘Anti-Arab’ policy for 
electoral benefits during the 2015 elections. His statement ‘Arab voters are 
coming out in droves to the polls’ was condemned by The United States 
President Barak Obama who declared that he is ‘Deeply concerned by the use 
of divisive rhetoric in Israel that sought to marginalise Arab Israeli citizens’.109 
This political radicalism has undoubtedly contaminated public opinion in the now 
deeply divided Israeli society and created more social polarization. According to 
a survey that was conducted by the prestigious American Pew Research Centre 
in March 2016, nearly half of Jewish Israelis agree that Arabs should be 
transferred or expelled from Israel, and a solid majority (79 per cent) maintain 
that Jews in Israel should be given preferential treatment.110 Another national 
survey from 2017 showed a further decline in the mutual distrust and legitimacy 
of Arab citizens as perceived by Jews, and in the legitimacy of Jews and the 
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state as perceived by Arabs.111 Overall, Arabs in Israel suffer from a poor 
national image as the leading Israeli sociologist Smmy Smooha (2016) puts it: 
 
‘The picture that many in the academic world, media and government 
paint of the present and future of the Arab citizens is very gloomy, best 
captured by their depiction as a ticking bomb. We are told time and 
again that the Arabs are increasingly disaffected with Israel, rejecting 
their minority status, developing a Palestinian identity, embracing 
fundamentalist Islam, boycotting Knesset elections, and sympathising 
with Palestinian terrorism’112  
 
1.3.2 The national aspirations of the Arab minority in Israel 
While the non-citizen Palestinians have always struggled for sovereignty and 
liberation,113 Israel’s Palestinians citizens have developed over the years their 
own aspirations and modus operandi of struggle for achieving them within 
Israel. Although they support the right of their Palestinians brethren for 
sovereignty and self- determination, 114 they are focusing on a civil rights 
struggle through political and legal means. Ilan Pappe, a leading post-Zionist 
historian, summarises their strategy in his book ‘The Forgotten Palestinians’ as 
follow:115 first, a moral support for the official PLO demanded for the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel; second, a 
demand for equal civic and human rights for the Palestinian minority in Israel; 
and, finally, a decision to employ only tactics that were possible within the 
Israeli legal system. In addition to Pappe’s opinion, the Arab elite in Israel also 
looks to fulfil their national aspirations, which clearly appears in the 2006-2007 
future vision documents,116 and in political program of the 2015 Joint List 
Party.117 The existing academic literature recognises two layers of demands 
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that the Palestinian minority within Israel is seeking to achieve 1) the traditional 
quest for full equal civil rights, and 2) the demand to be recognised as a national 
and indigenous minority. In this thesis the former demand will be described as 
the civil-right approach and the latter as the political one. Below a brief 
description of each approach: 
● The civil-rights approach: The demand for equal rights 
The Arab citizens of Israel struggle to achieve equal ‘citizenship 
and individual right’118 (what Kymlicka terms ‘integrationist 
demand’).119 The Arab leadership have been calling the state for 
granting them an equal footing with Israeli Jews such as equal 
access to public services, and fairly allocation of civil-service 
jobs.120 From their point of view, the state must serve the two 
groups (Jews and Arabs) equally, and they believe the state’s dual 
identity as Jewish and Democratic makes it impossible.121  
Generally speaking, this ‘Civil-rights approach’ demand is seen as 
legitimate and accepted by the Israeli government as long as it 
does not challenge the Jewishness nature of the state.  
 
● The political approach: the demand for national recognition 
While in the past, the Arab leadership aspiration for equality 
was based mainly on individual liberal philosophy and 
distributive justice some Arab politicians and intellectuals 
begun to refocus their demand for equal citizenship by 
emphasising the obligation of the state to recognise the status 
of the Arab citizens in Israel as a national minority (what 
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Kymlicka terms ‘accommodative demand’).122 In other words, 
they started to ask for collective rights as a precondition for 
ensuring their individual equality.123 They believe that this 
demand is seen as complementary to civil equality. This 
political aspiration grounded on international human rights 
covenants and declarations that acknowledge the right of self-
determination for national minorities.  
It is believed that the Arab leaders have realised that by calling 
for collective rights based on international law, they are 
bringing a new challenge Israel as it seeks to retain the Jewish 
nature of the country while adhering to international norms to 
achieve acceptance in the global community.124 Accordingly, 
this demand increases the tension with the state.125 Yet, there 
are specific areas where the Arab citizens are enjoying 
collective rights mostly expressed by limited cultural autonomy, 
separate education and religious administrations. 
The Arab citizens’ demand for national recognition seen as a 
threat by Israeli governments therefore it is strongly rejected. 
Israeli officials argue that the establishment of a Palestinian 
state should give an answer to the national aspirations of 
Israel’s Arab citizens. As Former Foreign Minister Tzipi Levni 
puts it: 
‘Once a Palestinian state is established, I can come to the 
Palestinian citizens, whom we call Israeli Arabs, and say to them 
'you are citizens with equal rights, but the national solution for you is 
elsewhere’126  
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Levni’s statement shows that only Israeli Jewish citizens are 
entitled to both national and civil rights, while Arabs only civil 
rights and if there is a conflict between the ‘citizenship’ rights 
and the ‘national’ rights, the Jewish national rights triumph the 
Arab individual citizenship rights. 
 
1.3.3 The question of the Palestinian minority in Israel in the          
Israeli Palestinian conflict 
There is a wide international consensus among the world powers that ending 
the Israeli Occupation, and endorsing the ‘Two-State’ solution based on the 
1967 borders is the best formula for a sustainable peace in the Middle East.127 
Even though there are more Palestinians,128Israelis,129 and geopolitical 
experts130 who doubt the feasibility of the Two-State formula based on the 
political situation on the ground (e.g. settlement expansions), this formula 
remains the most debated one. Nonetheless, neither the civil nor the national 
rights of the Arab citizens appear on the agenda of this debate. It is because 
Israel sees their political-legal status as a national matter that should not be 
raised in foreign negotiations. Accordingly, every external attempt to mediate 
between Israel and its Arab citizens was perceived as an involvement in Israel's 
internal affairs.131 This resulted in international ignorance of the issue of the 
Palestinian minority in Israel.132 Many international commentators are hardly 
aware of the mere existence of the Arab minority in Israel. However, Arab 
citizens of Israel have not only been ignored only by the international 
community, but also by the Arab world and the formal leadership of the 
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Palestinian Authority (PA), and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).133 
In his in 2011 article Dov Waxman describes the longstanding ignorance of this 
group of Palestinians as follow:  
‘A widespread and longstanding disregard for the Palestinian minority in 
Israel has been reflected in all of the accords, initiatives, conferences 
and summits aimed at achieving Israeli-Palestinian peace. No peace 
plan, whether official or unofficial, has ever dealt with the situation of the 
Palestinian minority in Israel, especially its future status in a two-state 
solution.8 The 1993 Oslo Agreement, the 2001 Clinton Parameters, the 
2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the 2003 Road Map, and the 2003 Geneva 
Accord all failed to address this issue. Not only has the Palestinian 
minority consistently been ignored; it has always been excluded from 
participating in the peace process itself. Its specific interests and 
concerns have therefore never been addressed in any of the numerous 
attempts at Israeli-Palestinian peace-making’134 
 
This situation resulted in double marginality of the Palestinian minority in Israel. 
On one hand they remain marginal to the Palestinian struggle for a national 
independent state, and on the other hand, they find themselves also excluded 
from the Israeli national agenda, as Israel defines itself first and foremost as a 
Jewish- Zionist state. Maybe this explains is Arabs in Israel were described in 
the academic literature as ‘part of the problem but not part of the solution’,135 
the ‘forgotten Palestinians’,136 the ‘missing dimension’,137 and even as 
‘invisible’.138  
Recent polls from the current year (2018) showed that a strong majority Arab 
citizens of Israel were in favour the Two- State solution as the guiding principle 
to end the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict (83%), compared with a deep decline in 
the faith of both Palestinians and Israeli Jews in it.139 The establishment of a 
Palestinian State is supported by most Palestinian citizens of Israel not only 
because it could solve the problem of the their people, but it is also because 
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they believe that it would improve their situation within Israel.  
It is noticed that despite the significant interest of the Arab citizens in resolving 
the conflict, their involvement in the peace camp is perceived to be limited.140 
The reason for that refers to their lack of legitimacy from both Israelis and 
Palestinians, which in turn resulted in their absence not only from the official 
peace negotiations that have been taking place until now, but also, they are not 
represented in Israeli or Palestinian Peace-Making Organisation. According to 
Amnon Be'eri-Sulitzeanu (2018) the Israeli Peace Organisations define 
themselves as Zionist and this creates an ideological barrier for Arab Citizens 
who find it very difficult to identify with the Zionist sentiment. Sulitzeanu adds 
that also the legitimacy of the Israeli Peace-Making Organisations will be 
questioned in the Israeli mainstream public if they would include Arabs in their 
activities, hence, they are not welcomed to join them. Meanwhile, the same 
Israeli majority will question the loyalty of Arab citizens if they join the 
Palestinian Peace-Making Organisations.141  
The issue of legitimacy of Israel’s Arab citizens appears to be the source of 
many of their difficulties within the State. Recent results of the annual public 
opinion poll of the Israeli Democratic Institute show that the vast majority of 
Israelis do not want to count the vote of the Palestinian citizens in any future 
decision regarding national security foreign issue. Accordingly, while the Arab 
citizens, while being strongly connected to the border Palestinian problem and 
to the question of the one or Two- State formula, they continue to be excluded 
from any prospective solution for the Israeli- Palestinian issue. 
 
1.3.4 Internationalisation of Arabs in Israel: Turning points 
The internationalisation of the status of the Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli 
citizens has assumed a key importance in the role of the community in the 
construction of the Israeli state. It has been on the agenda of the United Nations 
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since the organisation’s earliest days. In fact, their fate was the very first 
question Israel faced at the UN, when the Arab delegations complained about 
the treatment of the Palestinian citizens in Israel. One of the charges levelled 
against Israel raised by El- Khouri, the Syrian delegate to the eleven-member 
Security Council:   
 
‘Let us see what the Jews have done in that area over which they claim 
to have authority. They say that there is an Arab minority in their 
country. Let us agree, for the sake of argument, that the Arabs are a 
minority there. But the charter of the United Nations and the principles 
on which the organization is based call for the protection of rights of 
minorities and prohibit their molestation. How have the Jews in Palestine 
treated what they call the Arab minority in their area? Where are those 
Arabs now? They have been dispersed, widely scattered; they are dying 
of starvation and disease…. Can any state, which has respect for 
international law or for human rights, deal with minorities in that way and 
then come before the United Nations and ask to be admitted to 
membership? Is membership in United Nations the reward that they are 
to receive for expelling the Arabs in numbers equal to their own, for 
exposing them to danger and death in other parts of the world? Would it 
be fair to give consideration to this application for membership when we 
see how the Jews are dealing with those whom they call a minority in 
their own country? Seventy or eighty thousand people have been 
expelled from Jaffa, cast out naked into the desert of Sinai of forced to 
take to the sea in small boats. The people of Haifa have also been 
subjected to the same miserable treatment, as have the people of Acre, 
Tiberias and many other places in Palestine. The Jews having expelled 
people from their homes on that manner, how can the Security Council 
now consider them to be a legitimate State, a peace-loving people, a 
civilized nation?’142 
 
As a result, Israel’s first application for UN membership was rejected and it was 
forced to justify itself before it could succeed in joining the UN organisation on 
11 May 1949.143 In his address before the United Nations AD Hoc political 
Committee, which was evaluating this second application, Abba Eban, the 
representative of Israel at the United Nations declared: 
 
‘The Government of Israel reaffirms its obligation to protect the persons 
and property of all communities living within its borders. It will 
discountenance any discrimination or interference with the rights and 
liberties of individual or groups forming such minorities. The 
Government of Israel looks forward to the restoration of peaceful 
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conditions that might enable relaxation of any restrictions on the liberty 
of persons or property’144 
 
A brief look at the Israeli Foreign Ministry website shows that Israel refers to the 
‘armistice agreements’ that were signed with its neighbouring Arab States 
(Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan) as the main reason for its acceptance as a UN 
member.145 Clearly, the Israeli narrative ignores the issue of the Arab minority 
and this is in contrast to the argument that sexists in academic literature. In fact, 
the 1949 ‘armistice agreement’ with Jordan or as it is known the ‘Rhodes 
agreements’ was the first an international agreement that dealt with the issue of 
Arabs in Israel. In this agreement Jordan agreed to hand over Palestinian Arab 
villages which included about 30,000 Arabs in the area constituting ‘the 
Triangle’ in the centre part of the country146 while this area was never occupied 
by Israel, but it required it for strategic reason. 
 In light of the aforementioned background, one might assume rightfully that the 
issue of the Palestinians who became citizens of Israel has achieved to some 
extent an international attention during Israel’s first two decades. Indeed, some 
scholars confirm that but assert that this international attention came to end by 
the termination of Military Government in 1966 and the Six-Day War as since 
then, a new international discussion has instigated of what has become known 
as the Palestinian ‘problem’ or ‘question’ that focused almost exclusively on 
Palestinians living in these areas.147 As Hillel Halkin (2009) puts it: 
 
‘The problem of Israel's Arab citizens has been overshadowed by 
Israel's prolonged conflict with the Palestinians living in the territories 
occupied in the 1967 war ….. ’148 
 
The academic literature highlights the beginning of the 1990s as a positive 
turning point, which witnessed re- emergence of international interference in the 
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status of the Arab citizens in Israel. It is assumed that no United Nations forum, 
including the Palestine Committee, had made any decision directly concerning 
the status of the Arab citizens before these years.149 
The peace process of the 1990s that followed that first Palestinian Intifada 
(uprising) (1987-1993) has strongly impacted the political and ideological and 
national agenda of the Arabs in Israel as it made them realise that they have to 
raise their voice without to rely on neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian sides.150 
For example, The Madrid conference of 1991 that aimed to mediate between 
Israelis and Palestinians represented a first opportunity for Arab citizens of 
Israel to voice their complaints but they were disappointed when the PLO 
rejected to raise their demands at the Conference. 
A further frustration was following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 that 
promised a potential peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.151 
The fact that no reference was made to the Arabs in Israel in the Oslo Accords 
ingrained in them an acute sense of disappointment and exclusion.152 
Interestingly, the Oslo Agreements were approved in the Knesset because of 
the support of Arab MKs who voted with the coalition headed by Yitzhak Rabin 
government. It was the first and the only Israeli government that legitimised the 
vote of the Arab citizens. Five Arab votes were the reason that Oslo Accords 
were promoted. 153 Yet, the PLO did not have even a formal status to 
representing the Arabs citizens during the Oslo process. Therefore, many within 
the Arab community in Israel realised that the answer to their political 
aspirations would not be fulfilled through the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian entity,154 and it became clear that the Israeli Arab leadership would 
have to raise their own grievances by themselves.155 The ideological and 
strategic shift of the Arab leadership was noticed during the 1990s in their 
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attempts at developing a system of foreign relations with foreign nations and 
their representatives in Israel. There were a few notable events where they 
gained international attention and support. These included in particular inquiries 
from the USA, criticisms from the UN and the European Committee (EC) 
regarding their daily life issues of Israel’s Arab citizens. 
 In his academic publications, Alexander Bligh156 who was himself a Former 
Adviser for the Israeli Prime Minister (a position that is not existed anymore) 
introduces a series of events where foreign states intervened in the affairs of 
the Arab community in Israel.157 Bligh articles are particularly interesting 
because he provides first-hand information about this topic. The following 
sections aim to highlight turning points events where international interference 
in the domestic status of the Arab citizens took place, or in other words, when 
internationalisation attempts succeeded: 
 
● The 1991 ‘Shifter Report’ of the U.S. Justice Right Report  
 
The ‘Shifter Report’ of the U.S. Justice Right Report that was published in 1991 
is considered a significant achievement of the Arab leadership in the foreign 
affairs realm, as it was the first time that the plight of Arab citizens received 
attention in the State Department’s annual report on human rights. It is noticed 
that the report’s tone was positive about the overall Israeli policies; yet, the fact 
that it dedicated a section to the Israeli policies towards the Arab minority and 
included a series of figures reflected a shift in the American foreign policy 
towards them. This change implies that their issue is not anymore, a pure 
internal Israeli matter. 158 That year, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, who was then the 
Israeli Prime Minister of Israel, instructed his adviser on Arab affairs to 
cooperate with the US embassy to prepare annual report on human rights in 
Israel. Previously, Israel had always argued that the status of its Arab citizens 
was a domestic issue. In fact, this was the first time that the Israeli government 
                                                 
156 Alexander Bligh, "The intifada and The New  Political Role Of The Israeli Arab Leadership", Middle Eastern 
Studies 35, no. 1 (1999): 134-164, doi:10.1080/00263209908701259. 
157 Bligh, "The intifada and The New  Political Role Of The Israeli Arab Leadership", 134-164. 
158 Bligh, "The intifada and The New  Political Role Of The Israeli Arab Leadership", 134-164. 
  32 
under the Likud bloc recognised that the problems related to the Arab minority 
were no longer domestic.159  
 
Yet, it is worth noting that a year later, in July 1992 the United States 
Ambassador, William Harrop, met with strong opposition from the Israeli 
government following his statement about the intention of the United States to 
hold discussions with Israel regarding discrimination of its Arab citizens. These 
utterances by the US ambassador seemed to create the impression that the 
United States no longer viewed the issue of Israel’s Arab minority as a purely 
domestic issue. As a result, the General Directors' Committee on the Arab 
citizens Affairs (as a substitute for the position of the Prime Minister's Adviser 
on Arab Affairs, which was eliminated and replaced by a lower level position), 
had the following reply:  
 
'The Government of Israel does not need the intervention of any non- 
Israeli factors in handling minority rights'160 
 
The statement attributed to the ambassador in relation to the Arab minority 
within Israel seems to be in line with the international human rights rhetoric that 
emerged in the aftermath of the failure of the Communist block where the issue 
of minority rights was on the global agenda. Therefore, it might be said that the 
American stand was influenced by the human rights climate during the 1990s 
that allows it to consider the issue of the Arab minority to be on the common 
agenda of the two nations.161  
 
The internal affairs of Israel’s Arab citizens continued to be monitored and 
reported in the US State Department Human rights Reports that acknowledge 
their inferior status. For example, the 2012 Report admitted that the Arab 
citizens are facing institutional discrimination and concluded that: 
 
‘Israel practices “institutional and societal discrimination” against its 
Palestinian citizens’162 
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This understanding of Israel’s problematic attitude towards its Arab minority was 
affirmed again in the 2016 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: 
 
‘… Institutional and social discrimination against Arab citizens of Israel, 
many of whom identify as Palestinians, particularly with equal access to 
education, housing and employment opportunities...’163 
 
Interestingly, in 2017 the American attention towards the Arab community within 
Israel largely focused on the conditions of the Bedouin citizens in the 
unrecognised villages in the Negev:  
 
‘Arab communities in the country generally faced economic difficulties, 
including discrepancies in access to healthcare. The Bedouin segment 
of the Arab population continued to be the most disadvantaged. More 
than one-half of the estimated 230,000 Bedouin population lived in 
seven government-planned communities. Approximately 70,000 
Bedouins lived in 35 unrecognized tent or shack villages that did not 
have water and electricity or educational, health, and welfare services. A 
three-billion-shekel ($840 million) multi-year plan the government 
approved in February to promote economic and social development in 
Bedouin communities excluded the unrecognized villages. In nine of 11 
recognized villages, all residences remained unconnected to the 
electricity grid or to the water infrastructure system, and only seven had 
high schools, according to the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil 
Equality’ 164 
 
Indeed, the issue of the Bedouin citizens in the unrecognised villages in the 
Negev is much more acute than the rest of the Arab community members who 
reside in another geographical area in Israel, yet, it does justify neglecting the 
general challenging political status of the Arab citizens as the 2017 Report 
attempted to do. 
 
In addition to the criticism on Israel’s policy that largely focused on the Bedouin 
citizens of the ‘unrecognised’ villages, it is noticed that the name of the annually 
report was changed from ‘Israel Human Rights Report’ to ‘Israel and the Golan 
Heights 2017 Human Rights Report’. Clearly, these changes reflect the new 
pro–Israeli strategic vision of Trump’s Administration. Mentioning the Golan 
Heights, which is defined as an occupied territory under the international law in 
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the headline of the report about the human rights situation in Israel, signals a 
strong American political statement on the issue. 
● The United Nations (UN) 
The academic literature highlights January 1992 as turning point in the relations 
between the Arab citizens and the UN because it was the first time that the 
petition of Israel’s Arab representatives received attention. During this year, the 
UN's Palestine Committee concluded its discussions with a statement that dealt 
with the problems of the Arab citizens and included an appendix about the 
issue.165 This announcement apparently was based on a draft that was 
submitted by Arab representatives from Israel who based their claims on the 
argument that the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is the main reason for their 
mistreatment within Israel.  The UN’s statement was a symbolic achievement 
that increased the desire of the Arab leadership to follow more international 
forms to redress their grievances.166 
 
● The EC- The European Community (EC) and the EU 
 
 The Israeli –European special relations have their roots in the 1950s when 
Israel was among the first countries to join the European Community (EC), and 
have a diplomatic mission in Brussels. Nonetheless, these strong economic ties 
are not the same when it comes to the diplomatic level. The main reason for 
that is the Israeli policies that supports settlements in Palestinian territories, 
which is considered in European eyes a serious obstacle for ending the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. As a result, Israel has been always criticised by European 
key officials.167 
 
European criticisms on Israel’s policies towards its Arab minority started to 
evolve during the end of the First Intifada (uprising), that is, between 1991 and 
1992. For example, diplomats from EC countries such as France, Britain, Italy 
and Germany, signalled the support of the European Community for Arab 
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citizens through intense debates over the land dispute with the state’s 
authorities in northern Israel.168 This interest in the cause of the Arab citizens 
presented the Israeli government with a challenging diplomatic dilemma. On the 
one hand it was determined to apply its national plans while on the other one, it 
did not want to put in risk its relations with foreign diplomats and media. 
Eventually, the Israeli government asked not to interfere in its relationship with 
the Arab minority. In response, the EC countries expressed understanding of 
Israel’s stand but in the same breath expressed their dissatisfaction about this 
matter. For example, the French Ambassador implied that his state does not 
view the issue of Israel’s Arab minority as domestic Israeli matter. 169  
 
Remarkably, in during the 1990s Britain also began to show interest in the 
status of Israeli Arabs. For few months, high-level British delegates drew their 
attention to Arab citizens who reside in illegal and unrecognised settlements. 
Additionally, in the summer of 1992 the British cultural attaché visited Umm al-
Fahm and promised to examine the complaints of the local municipality. This 
visit in particular was seen as a problematic by the government, since Umm al-
Fahm is the largest Arab municipality in Israel that at that time was ruled by the 
Islamic movement. From the state’s perspective, the Islamic movement was 
seen as a fundamentalist that should not be legitimised by foreign diplomats. In 
May 1992 the State Department of the United States asked for information on 
the sewage of Kufr- Qassim.170 The Dutch embassy also expressed interest in a 
sewage plan of the municipality of the Arab village Jaljuliya.171  
 
The peak of the endeavours to bring Western attention to the cause of Arab 
citizens occurred in February 1992, when the Galilee Association applied to the 
International Water Tribunal in Hague, Holland, claiming that Israel was 
preventing unrecognised Arab villages from access to drinking water.172 (This 
will be further discussed in Chapter 5). These efforts of internationalisation were 
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not ignored by the Israeli authorities. Thus, during the 1990s, an official report 
entitled ‘The Arabs of Israel and the International community’173 warned from 
the increasing internationalisation attempts of the Arab citizens.174 
 
● October 2000 
 
The academic literature also refers to the year 2000 as a watershed in the 
history of the Arab citizens that triggered the increase of their international 
pleas. The first week of October 2000 marked by massive protests in Arab 
areas throughout Israel in sympathy with the Second Palestinian Intifada 
(uprising); during these demonstrations, thirteen Arab civilians were shot dead 
by Israeli security forces, about thousand were injured, and hundreds were 
detained. The second week witnessed vigilante Jewish actions against Arab 
citizens, including attacks on stores, clinics, mosques, and homes.175 
Accordingly, it is believed that the bloody events of October 2000 had increased 
the need to internationalise the status of the Arab citizens who petitioned the 
UN in order to ask for an international protection. As Cohen-Almagor (2005) 
puts it: 
 
 
 
      
‘…. Israeli Palestinians were deeply shocked by the fact that their Israeli 
citizenship had not provided them with any advantages in status 
compared to their brethren in the occupied territories. That is to say, the 
citizenship of the Arabs in Israel had not protected them from being 
targeted with live ammunition by Israel security forces. Moreover, the 
way in which security forces in the west bank in terms of methods, 
weapons and intensity. The feeling of Palestinian citizens that their 
citizenship had not shielded them resulted, for the first time, in appeal, a 
petition signed by more than 10,000 Arab citizens of Israel, for 
international protection by the United Nations. The initiative, however, 
remained just a symbolic act. Nevertheless, it had far-reaching 
repercussions in terms of an attempt to internationalize the problem of 
the Arab minority in Israel’ 176 
 
Since then, internationalisation the grievances of the Arab citizens in the 
aftermath of October 2000, become prominent. For example, the year 2001 
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marked the first occasion that Israel was officially criticised directly in an official 
international document regarding its policies towards the Arab citizens including 
internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages.177  
Arab NGOs have also sent two reports to the UN Commission for Human 
Rights, one of them was regarding the Citizenship Law178 and as response the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) asked Israel 
for the annulment of the Citizenship Law. In December 2004, the report of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) criticized Israel’s 
relations with its Arab citizens. In the same year, the UN Commission on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) questioned Israel about 
the rights of the Arab women. A year later, in May 2005 the European 
Parliament held a discussion on the topic of the Arab minority in Israel at the 
instigation of the Mossawa (Equality) Advocacy Centre for the Arabs in Israel. 
As a result, the EU parliament decided to create a lobby for the protection of 
Israel’s Arab rights and declared that the issue would be addressed in each 
political debate between the EU and Israel.179 
 
The increasing international involvement in the affairs of the Arab citizens 
during the 2000 was seen as threat to Israel’s global standing. It is noticed that 
since 2005 the leading Israeli think tank called The Reut Institute, started to 
publish a yearly warn of the growing international scrutiny and criticism about 
the relations between the Israeli government and the Arab minority.180 The 
Report stated that foreign governments and international organisations have 
criticised the lack of equality between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority 
within Israel (e.g. law enforcement and budget allocation), and considered it as 
a breach of Israeli sovereign discretion.181 Generally speaking, the status of the 
Arab citizens of Israel is considered as especially sensitive for the Israeli State 
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as it is repeatedly leveraged in order to undermine Israel’s global standing and 
delegitimize it.182  
Another notable international criticism against Israel’s treatment of its Arab 
minority emerged in the 2009 ‘Goldstone Report’ that was produced by the 
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the IDF's 22-day offensive on Gaza. 
The report concluded the results of an independent investigation into all alleged 
violations of international humanitarian law. Yet, interestingly, it devoted four 
paragraphs for accusing Israel of mistreatment of its Arab citizens during the 
war. These included, accusations of giving preferential security to Jewish 
citizens over Arabs as the state failed to protect its Arab minority against the 
rocket fire in the same way that it protected Jews.183  
The internationalisation of the Arab citizens was further elevated following 
Israel’s membership in the OECD in 2010. This move is particularly interesting 
as it brought an automatic European attention to the civil status of minorities 
within Israel including the Arab minority that was unintentional. It is because the 
principle of giving equal opportunities for minorities is among the main policies 
of the OECD. For example, in 2010 the OECD called Israel to: ‘[Israel must] 
Urgently take practical steps to connect Bedouin settlements with electricity, 
sewerage and transport systems. Continue with efforts to improve their 
educational opportunities and outcomes, including vocational training’184 
 
Several European bodies (e.g. European Commission, European 
Neighbourhood Policy Progress Report “ENPPR”) and UN committees have 
repeatedly expressed concern about the Israeli policies including laws that 
violate the rights of the Arab minority in Israel. In 2011, the EU Ambassadors 
wrote a classified report describing the deteriorating status of the Palestinian 
minority. This paper stated that the EU should consider Israel's treatment of its 
Palestinian population a ‘core issue’ rather second tier to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. It also discussed wider issues related to the civil and the political status 
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of the Arab minority including the impact of Israel's self-definition as 'Jewish and 
democratic' on the Arab citizens population and suggested to condemn anti -
democratic Israeli laws. Eventually this document was not published due to 
several objections from EU Member States but was classified as 'food for 
thought.’ 185  
 
It is obvious that the EU is highly aware about the challenges of the Arabs in 
Israel; yet, the evidences show the EU tend not to focus on the issue of the 
Arab citizens in its multifaceted relationship with Israel, and European actors 
openly stated that the Union does not have adequate official policy mechanism 
to influence the situation of the Arab minority.186 For example, during 2012 the 
EU-Israeli Association Council called upon Israel to increase its efforts to 
'address the economic and social situation of the Arab minority, to enhance 
their integration in Israeli society and protect their rights'. However, at the end of 
the meeting, it was announced that Israel and the EU are willing to expand their 
mutual cooperation in over fifteenth fields. This elicited criticism by several 
human right organizations such as Human Rights Watch that in response said, 
'the EU's package of benefits gives Israel a green light to continue the violations 
that European politicians claim to want to end’.187 
 
 
Clearly, the international endeavours of the Arab leadership were to a large 
extent fruitful in a sense the Israeli governments became exposed to increasing 
international involvement in the status of its Arab citizens. It is argued that these 
dynamics exemplify a significant gap that has been exposed between Israel's 
bilateral economic ties, trade relations and security on one hand, and its 
political-diplomatic situation, on the other. On the surface, Israel's political 
standing in the international community appears to be strong; it is a regional 
power in the Middle East and one of the U.S.'s closest allies, it holds close and 
unique relations with leading states such as Canada, Russia, France, Germany, 
                                                 
185 Dua' Nakhala, "Shackled At Home: The Palestinian Minority In Israel", Europarl.Europa.Eu, 2012, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dplc/dv/palestinian_minority_/palestinian_minority_en.
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186 Nathalie Tocci and Benedetta Voltolini, "Eyes Wide Shut: The European Union and The Arab Minority In 
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the UK, Italy, and Australia, it has peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt; 
and it even joined the prestigious OECD in 2010. Meanwhile, it is continuously 
criticised by the same states with which it maintains close ties in relations to its 
policies on the Palestinian issue in general and with regards to the treatment of 
Arab minority in particular.188 Perhaps this international political criticism about 
Israel explains the findings of the 2017 Swiss KOF Index of Globalisation that 
ranked Israel’s political globalisation in a low place (116.3) compared with a 
more advanced results for the 40 the economic (40) and social dimension 
(34).189 
 
On the academic level, some Israeli experts acknowledge that the 
internationalisation process has ‘explanatory and political value’.190 Yet, they 
believe that it is said to have limited impact on changing Israeli official 
policies.191  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
Given the scant attention to the issue of internationalisation of the rights of the 
Arab minority in Israel, it is not surprising that the empirical basis of the existing 
research is relatively thin and relies principally on secondary sources. A deeper 
approach that uses interviews and other research methodologies to get a 
clearer view of the motivations, purposes and the conceptualisation of the 
actors involved is therefore appropriate to achieve a fuller understanding of this 
process. 
 
The literature does not pay much attention at all to the early period of the 
existence of the Israeli state. Thus, the efforts to internationalise the violation of 
human rights of the Arab minority during this period have not been sufficiently 
studied.  
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190 Sammy Smooha, "Arab Jew ish Relations In Israel as a Jew ish and Democratic State", in Trends In Israeli Society, 
ed. Ephraim Yaar and Ze'ev Shavit (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 2001), 322-323. [in Hebrew ] 
191 "Protest Among Israeli Arabs: Characteristics, Reasons, And Trends", Maarachot, 2014. [in Hebrew ]; Sammy 
Smooha, "Arab Jew ish Relations In Israel as a Jew ish and Democratic State", in Trends In Israeli Society, ed. Ephraim 
Yaar and Ze'ev Shavit (Tel Aviv: The Open University, 2001), 322-323. [in Hebrew ] 
  41 
The literature focuses primarily on internationalisation efforts by leaders of the 
Arab minority from the 1990s onward until mid 2000. It acknowledges that there 
was a positive response from international actors, but the results reported are 
very general and lack the empirical richness of a closer investigation of the 
ideas and motives of the actors involved. There is an acknowledgement that 
there was some success with respect to internationalisation, but the analysis 
remains superficial. 
 
The period from 2015 onwards has not so far been studied in the academic 
literature, and this works seeks to remedy this situation by looking very closely 
at more recent developments in relation to the internationalisation. 
 
In order to go beyond a purely empirical report and achieve a proper analysis of 
the data, it is proposed to use the spiral model. This model has been used to 
conceptualise the internalisation of international norms by political systems on a 
trajectory from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance. Chapter 3 will 
provide a detailed explanation of the model and how it can be applied to the 
theme of this research. The model also enables a comparison between various 
cases of the internationalisation of the violations of the rights of the Arab 
minority in Israel and provide an understanding to what extent and in what 
manner it was successful in some and not in others. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
 
The key research questions of this thesis are the following: 
1. How can the origins, the purposes and modalities of internationalisation 
be explained?  
 
2. To what extent did the process of internationalisation achieve its 
expected objectives and how can its success or failure be evaluated?  
 
The research questions give rise to subsidiary questions:  
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1. What are the factors that gave rise to the internationalisation process and 
how can we understand and explain its modalities? 
 
2. What type of instruments do they rely on in their lobbying efforts? What 
are the main international institutions used to promote 
internationalisation? 
 
3. How do the efforts by Arab leaders in Israel to internationalise the 
situation of the Arab minority affect the way in which the targeted 
international institutions articulate their stance on these issues? 
 
4. How does the Israeli state respond to the international pressure on Israel 
generated by the efforts to internationalise the situation of the Arab 
minority in Israel? 
 
1.6 Research hypotheses 
 
1. Internationalisation is partially successful in achieving redress in 
individual cases, but the behaviour of the Israeli state changed to 
respond to the international pressures to the minimal extent considered 
necessary to alleviate possible damage to its reputation.  
 
2. Internationalisation was successful if it relied on using international 
conventions that Israel had acceded to in order for Israel to avoid being 
found in violation of its treaty commitments. 
 
3. The process of internationalisation has had the unintended consequence 
of antagonising and alienating the Jewish majority and contributing to 
tension, a sense of threat, hostility between the Arab citizens and the 
state. 
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1.7 Research methodology 
 
1.7.1 Data collection methods 
 
This study seeks to obtain data that will help to address the dearth of research 
in relation to the internationalisation mechanism used to address the problems 
of the Arab minority in Israel by employing qualitative modes of enquiring 
supported by relevant underpinning theory. For this purpose, a multi-strategy 
approach called ‘Methodological Triangulation’192 will be adopted to collect data. 
The method applies primary and secondary data collection techniques. The 
primary sources consist of nineteen semi-structured broad, open-ended 
interviews with elite and expert participants, statements and speeches, official 
documents from EU and UN debates, and closely examined Israeli 
documentary sources and reports such as key Arabic and Hebrew articles. The 
secondary sources consist of key case studies from the academic literature, a 
literature review relevant academic journal articles and other reliable local and 
international media sources. The case studies are based on three distinct 
chronological periods where internationalisation is seen to undergo a profound 
transformation from written documents, to legal actions and finally to personal 
encounters. The three periods are respectively: 1948-1979, 1992- 2013 and 
2015 onwards. These three periods represent cases on which the thesis is built, 
and evidence several defining moments, which will be analysed according to 
the social constructivist spiral model and then further triangulated with 
interviews with key participants who have intimate knowledge with the chosen 
cases studies. 
 
Following each case study in the three-time periods, a figure will be presented 
to illustrate visually the internationalisation process through the application of 
the spiral model, participants in the case studies, the modality of the 
international activity carried out in each period and the outcome level following 
application of the spiral model. These figures clearly highlight the impact of the 
internationalisation strategy for each time period. At the end of each one of 
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these three Chapters, a comparison table of the spiral model results in relation 
to the case studies will be displayed to summaries differences and similarities. 
A further graph will be presented in the main conclusion (Chapter 7) to illustrate 
the overall progression or otherwise of the strategy throughout 1948-2017 
according to the spiral model.  
 
1.7.2  Target groups 
 
Early engagement with the literature and news online websites revealed that 
Arab MPs and Arab NGOs are the two key players who are leading cross-
border activities. This indicated the best potential interviewees for primary 
source data. Additionally, Israeli-Arab scholars who were indirectly relevant to 
this process were contacted based on their expertise in the Israeli Arab-Jewish 
relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the EU Delegation to Israel, 
were also identified as relevant to the internationalisation process. Hence, 
interviewees selected from 5 categories provided inside knowledge of the 
current situation. 
 
Fifteen interviewees comprised: 
 
● Seven Arab Parliamentarians from the Arab Joint List party.  
● Three representatives of Arab non-governmental organisations in 
Israel 
● The Head of the Higher Follow-up Committee for Arab citizens  
● Former Head of the Northern Islamic Movement (before outlawing 
it) 
● Four Academic experts on Israeli Jewish- Arab relations  
● Official at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)  
● Official at The Delegation of the European Union to Israel 
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1.8 Contributions of the Study 
 
This thesis has contribution on several levels. Firstly, to date, no systematic 
investigation has considered the role of both Arab parliamentarians and NGOs 
of in international activities, and much uncertainty still exists about the impact of 
the internationalisation process on the relations with the state. So, this thesis 
has provided a deeper insight into the plight of the Palestinian Arab citizens of 
Israel. It is the first investigation into a selected series of case studies, which 
document international appeals made by Arab MPs, NGOs, and extra-
parliamentarian movements in Israel from 1948-2017. Thus, it contributes to the 
evolving literature on the relations between the Arab citizens and the 
international community. This issue has grown in importance in the light of a 
recent sharp increase in the number of international petitions, as will be further 
discussed in the case studies in Chapter 6. 
 
On a theoretical level, this work introduces for the first time the application of 
the spiral model to an example of a ‘hybrid regime’. The original spiral model 
was intended for authoritarian and repressive regimes,193 and later on several 
studies have used it to evaluate Western democracies alongside the USA  .194 In 
this study, the model is applied to Israel in relations to its Arab citizens. The 
period between 1948-1966, whereby the Israeli state identified itself as a 
democracy but in reality, democratic rights were afforded only to its Jewish 
citizens. Also, previous studies applied the model with respect to the Israeli -
Palestinian conflict as a whole195 and did not focus on Arab citizens of Israel. 
So, it is the first time that the spiral model has been tested in the case of Israel 
and its Arab minority. This use of the spiral model has also raised questions 
regarding the existing five levels. Therefore, a number of modifications are 
suggested.   
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Because this work views the question of the Arab citizens of Israel through the 
lens of internationalisation and by applying the spiral model, it adds an 
important dimension to explain the internationalisation of the national 
aspirations of the Arab minority in Israel and as such contributes new 
understanding to that provided in the existing literature. Therefore, it is hoped 
that the findings of the current study will attract other authors’ and researchers’ 
attention to the issues discussed in this work. Although the Arab minority in 
Israel is the focus of this thesis, its theoretical implications reach beyond this 
group. The Arab leadership case is a paradigmatic example of how an ethnic 
and racial group deals with its challenges through the mechanism of 
internationalisation, whilst highlighting both success and failure of the process.  
 
1.9 Limitations of the study 
 
One of the most challenging points of this thesis was the issue of measurement, 
which is also a striking weakness of the concept of soft power that 
internationalisation based on. It was not always easy to identify the extent to 
which the various actors or their actions in the internationalisation process are 
responsible for successful outcomes. For example, the internationalisation 
processes in 1960s and 1992 were highly successful. Nevertheless, this fails to 
identify the extent to which local protests and other geostrategic factors 
contributed to the success of internationalisation. 
 
With regard to the evaluation of the success of the internationalisation process, 
only the results from 1948-2013 are currently available. This means that the 
third-time period 2015-2017 cannot offer any significant results. Although this is 
a notable limitation, it is not unexpected as there is no concrete time limit for 
evaluating the success of NGOs and parliamentarian advocacy. In previous 
time periods, results of the impact of the strategy have not been available for 
approximately between four and ten years. Hence, these case studies continue 
to be of interest now and for the foreseeable future.  
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Finally, this thesis is focused on Arab citizens of Israel but does not include 
three groups: the Palestinians residents of East Jerusalem (about 300,000- 
37% of Jerusalem's population),196 Druze in the Golan Heights (about 20,000), 
and Arab Druze living in the Galilee district of Northern Israel (about 110,000 
citizens).197For different reasons, the minorities they do not share the same 
national aspirations as those of Arab citizens. Therefore, they are excluded from 
the analysis of this study. 
 
1.10 The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of seven Chapters. Chapter 2 presents the existing 
international mechanisms that are designed to protect minority rights and 
presents quasi-democratic models in states with a significant minority. The third 
Chapter introduces the theoretical framework of this study, which is based on 
the constructivist boomerang-spiral model and presents definitions of relevant 
theoretical concepts (to internationalisation). Chapters 4,5, and 6 consist of 
case studies investigating different mechanisms whereby the Arab minority in 
Israel, represented by their elite, sought to internationalise their fight against 
discrimination and the denial of their human rights. These case studies are 
grouped chronologically according to different modalities of internationalisation 
used. Chapter 4 considers the use of ‘public memoranda’ sent to international 
organisations to draw international attention to the mistreatment of the Arab 
minority in Israel between 1948-1979 [These are: the Kufr-Qassim massacre in 
1956, the al-Ard movement in 1964, and the Galilee Judaization Plan in 1975]. 
The cases were chosen because they underscore the ways in which Israel’s 
Arab elite chose to resist the violation of human rights by turning to the existing 
international platforms. Also, these events are key dates on the calendar of 
anniversaries for the Arab citizens inside Israel and considered as defining 
moments that triggered the use of memoranda as a means of 
internationalisation. Chapter 5 examines cases involving the use of ‘legal and 
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civil advocacy’ approaches led by NGOs through invoking international 
conventions and treaties to compel the Israeli state to change its behaviour 
(1992-2013). This pattern of internationalisation is one of the multiple modes of 
resistance that characterise the Bedouin struggles for recognition in Israel. The 
1992 case study examines the issue of clean water shortage and unsanitary 
waste disposal in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin communities in the Northern 
Israel through a petition to international tribunal. The 2013 case study looks at 
the ‘Prawer-Plan’ in relation to the arrangement for thirty-six ‘unrecognised’ 
Bedouin villages in the Southern area through international advocacy. Chapter 
6 considers the use of ‘personal diplomacy’ and interaction with key foreign 
figures and international organisations (2015-2017) as a third pattern of 
internationalisation promoted by the Arab parliamentarians. These are: The 
meeting of MK Ahmad Tibi’s with the State Department in the US during 
February 2016, The meeting of MK Ayman Odeh’s, the Head of the Joint List, 
with the Secretary General of the UN in April 2016, and the meeting of the Arab 
Joint List legislators to Brussels in November 2017. There are a variety of 
examples that could be provided about the involvement of Arab politicians in 
international activities. However, these cases were chosen as each one of them 
exemplifies an unprecedented move in the history of Arab politicians in Israel. 
All activities will be analysed using the social constructivist spiral model, and 
empirical data from the interviews conducted with key participants who had an 
intimate knowledge of the defining moments in these case studies. Finally, 
Chapter 7 summarises the case studies and introduces the results obtained by 
the study and analysis of the internationalisation strategy and the application of 
the spiral model. It presents the answers to the research questions and explains 
their meaning and limitations as well as the significance for the understanding of 
the relations between the Israeli state and its Arab minority.  
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Chapter 2: Protection of minority rights in international law and 
practice 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The current chapter aims to present the existing international mechanisms that 
are designed to protect minority rights, and the theoretical debate that emerged 
about them. The first section introduces a historical background in relation to 
the development of global minority protection before and after the creation 
League of Nations. Then, the second part moves to review the relevant UN and 
the EU conventions and declarations of minority rights. The third section, 
introduces essential conceptual approaches to the issue of internationalisation 
of minority rights. The fourth part, presents the international mechanisms for 
state-minority regulations. Finally, the last section examines quasi-democratic 
models in states with a significant minority. 
 
2.1 Historical Background of the Minority Rights’ Protection   
2.1.1 Pre-League of Nations 
 
The academic literature shows no consensus on the historical narrative of 
minority protection prior to the setting up of the League of Nations. While some 
authors198 make reference to the seventeenth century as a key period that 
witnessed the emergence of the issue of the protection of minorities, others 
highlight the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Some examples include 
agreements such as the Austro-Ottoman Treaty, signed in 1615, which 
protected the rights of Protestant minorities of Transylvania.199 Others refer to 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which granted freedom to all persons to 
practise religious faith and which ended the thirty years war between the Holy 
                                                 
198 E.g. Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Minority Rights In Europe: From Westphalia To Helsinki", Review Of International 
Studies 23, no. 1 (1997): 75-92, doi: 10.1017/s0260210597000752; Patrick Thornberry, "Is There A Phoenix In The 
Ashes? International Law  And Minority Rights", Texas International Law Journal 15, no. 3 (1980): 421-58; Joseph S. 
Roucek, "The Problem Of Minorities And The League Of Nations", Journal Of Comparative Legislation And International 
Law 15, no. 1 (2018): 67-76; Patrick Thornberry, "Is There A Phoenix In The Ashes? International Law  And Minority 
Rights", Texas International Law Journal 15, no. 3 (1980): 421-58; Joseph S. Roucek, "The Problem Of Minorities And 
The League Of Nations", Journal Of Comparative Legislation And International Law 15, no. 1 (2018): 67-76. 
199 Joshuia Castellino, Protection Of Minorities And Indigenous Peoples In International Law: A Comparative Temporal 
Analysis, The Special Issue: Multicultural Policies, 2010. 
  50 
Roman Empire and France.200 Another example refers to the Congress of 
Vienna (1815) following the Napoleonic Wars, which likewise protected minority 
groups and enhanced the status of Jewish citizens, and in the same year, 1815, 
the Polish constitution became the first legal document in modern times to grant 
protection to minorities. These conventions referred to the protection of minority 
groups living within a territory ruled by a foreign sovereign.201   
 
However, it is argued that the European narrative of protecting minorities is 
biased in that it failed to acknowledge the protection and esteem given to 
foreigners in Asia, and ignores African humanitarian customs, which prided 
themselves in affording esteem and human rights to women, children and the 
elderly.202 Another study that also challenges the European history of minority 
rights refers to the protection afforded to minority groups in the early seventh 
century by Prophet Mohammad who drafted the ‘Constitution of Medina’. 203 
This Constitution was based on Qur’anic law, and gave special protection to the 
‘people of the book’ that is, Jews and Christians, and allowed them freedom to 
practice their religions and to express their cultural values. It is also believed 
that European treaties for protecting religious minorities from the 17 th were 
inspired by this Islamic notion of freedom of religious expression.204 
 
2.1.2 The League of Nations 
 
The League of Nations was established in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Its foundation reflected an attempt to support security and peace after the First 
World War (1914-18) through the protection of minorities worldwide and the 
internationalisation of their challenges such as political and physical 
persecution.205 Despite the fact that there were historical antecedents for 
minority rights (as discussed in the previous section), the League was the first 
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international body that codified the protection of minority rights.206 Notably, 
unlike previous treaties that were mainly dedicated to religious minorities,207 the 
League focused on ethnic and linguistic minority groups. 208  
 
 One of its remarkable achievements of the League was the establishment of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) that promoted the notion of 
internationalisation of the treatment of minorities, dealt with issues of racism 
against minorities, and supported equality for linguistic, religious and racial 
minority groups.209 Nonetheless, the league’s ambiguous attitude to the 
principles of self-determination and cultural autonomy for minorities combined 
with its failure to resolve state-minority conflicts and the vicious events of the 
Second World War, all resulted in its dissolution and increased the need for 
establishing an international strategy for regulating States’ behaviour.210  
 
2.2 The United Nations (UN) 
 
The United Nations is an international organisation that officially supplanted the 
League of Nations by the end of Second World War in 1945, and as of 2018 it 
has 193 member states. 211 The work of the United Nations is based on the 
principles and purposes contained in its founding Charter.212 There is a major 
difference between the provisions adopted to protect minorities by the UN and 
those that had been set up under the League of Nations.213 One of the most 
prominent arguments is that minority rights were shadowed after the Second 
World War by human rights provisions.214 Put differently, unlike the League of 
Nations, which had a constrained, yet specific, approach to the protection of 
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minorities, the United Nations displayed an unwillingness to consider the 
position of minorities as an exclusive matter.215 This argument was further 
supported based on the fact that neither the 1945 United Nation’s Charter,216 
nor the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)217 made any 
direct reference to minorities. These documents were significant because of 
their focus on individual rights and the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, but they did not to refer to the concept of minorities. 
Nonetheless, the UN has gradually increased its attention towards the minority 
question. The following section presents the existing UN mechanisms that deal 
with the issue of minorities. 
 
2.2.1 The Existing UN Mechanisms for Minority Protection 
 
Although non-discrimination clauses can be found in all main UN conventions, 
there are at least nine UN documents that include provisions to ensure ethical 
and moral codes that aim to protect minority groups. The State of Israel signed 
these documents: 
 
● Article 11 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
1948 Crime of Genocide.218 Ratified by Israel in 1950.219 
 
● Article 5 of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 
of 1960.220 Signed by Israel in 1961.221 
 
● Articles 2 and 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 (ICERD).222 Ratified by Israel in 
1979.223 
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● Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).224 Ratified by Israel in 1991.225 
 
● Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966 (ICCPR).226 Ratified by Israel in 1991.227 
  
 
● Article 5 of the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 
1978.228  
 
● Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989.229 
Ratified by Israel in 1991.230 
 
● The Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious or Linguistic Minorities of 1992.231  
 
● The UN 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.232 Israel 
was absent for the vote on this declaration, and did not ratify it.233 
 
On the surface it does not look like the UN is neglecting the issue of minorities. 
However, a deeper look at these conventions and declarations reveals a more 
problematic picture as will be discussed below. The academic literature234 
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highlights one article and two declarations as central to the case study of the 
Palestinian Arab minority in Israel. The following section will briefly introduce 
them and point to their problematic aspects. 
 
2.2.1.1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)235 
 
Article 27 of the ICCPR has been widely recognised as the first and the sole 
international legal document that addresses the protection of minority rights.236 
The text of Article 27 of the ICCPR is key and reads as follow: 
 
‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language’237 
 
Despite being described as a milestone achievement, Article 27 was criticised 
for many reasons. The first criticism refers to the wordings ‘in those states in 
which minorities exist’ that as claimed does not regard minority questions as a 
universal problem, and leaves an opening for individual states to deny that any 
minority exists within their national boundaries.238 The second claim was 
against its general formulation that stressed ‘individual rights’ rather than to 
‘groups’. For example, the provision about the protection of minorities’ cultures 
refers to ‘persons belonging’ to minorities rather than the rights of the minority 
as such.239 Furthermore, it is argued that the use of negative language such as 
‘shall not be denied’ does not impose positive obligations on the States. Finally, 
article 27 was also criticised the lack of attention given to political rights.240 The 
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ICCPR ratified by Israel in 1991,241 and its status as a binding resolution makes 
its implementation compulsory upon states.242  
 
2.2.1.2 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(UNDM) 243 
 
The 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM) is the first international 
instrument that referred to minority rights as collective rather than individual.244 
Unlike Article 27, the Declaration refers to the term ‘minorities’ rather than 
‘individuals who belong Minorities’, which shows an international intention to 
legitimise the issue of minorities. It is believed that this Declaration intended to 
cover the shortcomings of article 27 of ICCPR, and that it was inspired by 
Western standards of multiculturalism that developed after the collapse of the 
communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe. Essentially, the 1992 
Declaration calls for non- discrimination against minorities, and for granting 
minorities the right to effectively participate in the decision-making process on 
the national, and where appropriate, on the regional level. The main noticeable 
difference between the 1992 Declaration as compared with article 27 of ICCPR, 
is the positive obligations it imposes on states as appears in Article 1:245  
 
‘states are obliged to protect the existence and the national, or ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their 
respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of 
that identity. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other 
measures to achieve those ends’246 
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The 1992 document regarded as crucial but it reflects international intentions at 
best, as it does not carry the same legal weight as the ICCPR. In Other words, it 
is non-binding instrument and its impact on international law is not clear. Yet, 
UNDM ‘has become the most important frame of reference when questions 
regarding minorities are discussed’.247 The UNDM was ratified by Israel in 1992.  
 
2.2.1.3 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples248 
 
The 2007 U.N. Declaration in the Human Rights of Indigenous peoples has a 
particular significance in international minority rights law, as it was the first 
international legal document that expressed the distinct rights of the 
‘indigenous’ people.249 This Declaration acknowledges that the mere reference 
to individual rights and integration in previous treaties (e.g. the 1992 Declaration 
on Minorities)250 is in ineffective in supporting the aspirations of the indigenous 
peoples.251 Therefore, this Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has 
greatly expanded and improved the understanding of the Indigenous Peoples 
as a sub-category of minority groups,252 legitimised and strengthened their 
claims.253  
 
Essentially, the literature emphasises two major areas in which the 2007 
Declaration contributes to minority rights, particularly, these are in relation to (1) 
the right to self-determination and autonomy, and (2) land rights as historical 
rights. It is noticed that one of the most prominent features of indigenous 
peoples, as opposed to other minorities, is their connection to a geographical 
area, while this area is regularly exposed to mass confiscations of land that 
result in prolonged and serious conflict. Therefore, the emphasis on land 
ownership rights in the 2007 Declaration was considered a major moral 
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achievement for indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, on the practical level, issues 
related to land are still problematic and controversial, and the land rights of 
indigenous minorities as a collective have not been guaranteed.254 
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was criticised on the 
ground the it did not address areas such as education, redress and reparations, 
immigration and citizenship, effective participation in political decisions, 
linguistic rights and shared national symbols.255 Also, similarly to The 1992 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, despite its significance, the 2007 Declaration, does not 
have the same legal weight as the ICCPR.256 Rather, it is considered as a ‘soft 
law’ due to its nonbinding nature. Most states would not be motivated to sign on 
a document such as the 2007 Declaration that grants some ‘veto power’ and 
autonomy for indigenous peoples as it is seen as threatening their sovereignty 
as ‘cohesive national units’.257  
 
Given the explanation above, it could be said that the UN approach towards 
minority rights reflects a mixed trend. On the one hand it shows a development 
in the international approach towards legitimisation of the needs of minorities 
including granting them collective rights. On the other hand, its most 
instruments are declarations that countries are not obliged to apply. In any 
case, the UN seems to give special attention to minorities through its various 
bodies that deal with monitoring minority rights such as The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), a post established in 
1993 by UN General Assembly; The UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues 
(former Working Group on Minorities in 1995).258 Apart from the more global 
provisions in UN conventions and declarations, minority rights are also 
embedded in regional law mechanisms in Europe as will be detailed below. 
                                                 
254Yousef T Jabareen, "Redefining Minority Rights: Success And Shortcomings Of The U.N. Declaration On The Rights 
Of Indigenous Peoples", UC Davis Journal Of International Law And Policy,18, no. 119-161 (2012), doi:http://dirasat-
aclp.org/f iles/Yousef_Jabareen_UCDavis_2012.pdf. 
255Yousef T Jabareen, "Redefining Minority Rights: Success And Shortcomings Of The U.N. Declaration On The Rights 
Of Indigenous Peoples", UC Davis Journal Of International Law And Policy,18, no. 119-161 (2012), doi:http://dirasat-
aclp.org/f iles/Yousef_Jabareen_UCDavis_2012.pdf. 
256Yousef T Jabareen, "The Arab-Palestinian Community In Israel: A Test Case For Collective Rights Under 
International Law ", The George Washington International Law Review, 2015. 
257 Abdulrahim P. Vijapur, "International Protection Of Minority Rights", International Studies43, no. 4 (2006): 367-394, 
doi:10.1177/002088170604300402. 
258 "Promoting And Protecting Minority Rights: A Guide For Advocates", Refworld.Org, 2012, 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5289ce5b4.pdf. 
  58 
2.3 Codification of minority rights in Europe 
 
The importance of protecting minority rights in European nations as a national 
security interest refers to the fact that they have many national minorities within 
their territories. The recent history of Europe has demonstrated that protection 
of national minorities is an essential condition to maintain security and peace.259 
The academic literature highlights the fact that the question of minority rights 
had received scant international attention until the vast revolutionary impulses 
swept Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and toppled the Soviet empire. Since 
then, the internationalisation of the issues experienced by national minorities 
became more prevalent practice.260 The primary aim of internationalisation was 
to counter the threat of increased ethnic violence in Central and Eastern 
through monitoring the adherence of these countries to European standards. 
Accordingly, from the early 1990s onwards, several international and regional 
human rights instruments that included minority rights provisions were adopted. 
 
The EU standards for minority protection and non-discrimination are mainly 
codified under three international groups working jointly, though not always 
were working actively and in full agreement.261 These bodies are the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and, more recently, the EU, although in a limited way.262 The following 
sections summarise the role of each one of these organisations including their 
mechanism to protect minority rights. 
 
2.3.1 The Council of Europe (CoE) 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) was created in 1950s as a regional 
intergovernmental organisation to promote democracy and human rights.263 The 
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CoE commenced its work with the adoption of the European Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and basic freedoms (ECHR)264 that did not 
differentiate minority rights from individual human rights granted to all.265 Yet, a 
remarkable development occurred in 1995 when a minority rights protocol was 
added to the ECHR that became known as the European Social Charter 
(revised) of 1996.266    
 
The CoE has gradually promoted instruments to protect minority rights. Most 
prominently the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages267and the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM),268 which is considered the first legally binding 
document that offered protection for ‘national minorities’.269 It is argued that the 
1995 FCNM aim was to develop specific norms in relation to the category of 
‘national minority’ to move beyond the UN’s ‘indigenous’ versus ‘minority’ 
dichotomy.270 This Convention calls for full and effective equality of people 
belonging to national minorities in all areas of life to allow them preserve, 
express and develop their distinctive identity.271 According to Article 17 (2) of 
the convention, states are not allowed to interfere with the right of individuals 
belonging to national minorities to participate in non-governmental activities at 
the national and international levels. Put differently, states have to respect of 
national minorities to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across 
frontiers with persons lawfully staying in other states, particularly those with 
whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity or a common 
cultural heritage.272  
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Analysis of the 1995 Convention reveals that while it only applies to national 
minorities; it fails to define the ‘national minority’ as is drafted to ‘people 
belonging to minorities’. The Charter recognises that ‘ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
and religious identities of national minorities will be protected’ and that 
‘individuals belonging to minorities have the right to express, preserve and 
develop their identity without discrimination and full equality before the ‘law’. 
The lack of definition of ‘national minority is further aggravated by the ‘margin of 
appreciation’; States parties are given the discretion to qualify the minorities 
who can benefit from the Convention.273 The CoE formulates legally binding 
rules protecting human and minority rights and it also has a supervisory role 
over judgements made by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.274 
 
2.3.2 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) 
 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was created 
in 1975 (as the CSCE) during the Cold War275 as a framework for collective 
security in Europe, which contained political mechanisms for promoting the 
protection of minorities, and identification of early solutions for ethnic distress 
that might threaten stability and peace.276 It has fifty-six-member States 
including European countries, former Soviet Union states, Canada and the 
United States.277 
 
It is believed that internationalisation of the question of minority rights was 
promoted firstly by the OSCE between the years 1989-1999 as part of the 
organisation’s endeavors to gain an international profile as a leading post- Cold-
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War institution that set standards for the ‘new democracies’ to ensure peaceful 
Europe.278 The academic literature279 stresses the 1991 report that all OSCE 
member states signed it to protect minority rights and confirm that the issue is 
beyond the states’ borders: 
  
‘issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with 
international obligation and commitments concerning the rights of 
belonging to them, are maters of legitimate international concern and, 
consequently, do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of 
respective state’280 
 
The OSCE standards on minority protection are largely reflected in Articles 31-
35 of the 1990 Copenhagen document,281 and the 1998 Oslo 
Recommendations on Linguistic Rights of National Minorities. While the latter 
include significant provisions in the domain of language rights, the 1998 Oslo 
Recommendations on Linguistic provides a reflects the development of minority 
language policies, including the use of languages in education, religion, media, 
community life and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as in 
communications with public authorities, in judicial proceedings and in the 
operation of private businesses. 282 
 
 
2.3.3 The European Union 
 
The European Union’s role evolved in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Its Pact on Stability (1995) laid down the political ground rules for former 
communist satellite countries seeking EU membership. This has led to a 
number of treaties enshrining the rights of minorities in domestic policies. 
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Therefore, the EU insists upon respect for human and minority rights amongst 
its current and prospective members.283 
 
In recent decades, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of 
mechanisms to ensure that minorities are treated with respect and that their 
rights are protected. The Union’s attitudes towards the protection for minority 
rights are manifested in the work of number mechanisms. These include the 
European Council/ Commission, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia (EUMC), the EU Network of Independent Expert, and the work 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Clearly the EU does not have a distinct 
implementation body on minority rights, nevertheless, these mechanisms show 
the special attention it pays for anti-discrimination minorities.284 
 
Although Israel is not a member state of the EU, it defines itself as a democracy 
that in many ways aspires to emulate European standards in order to maintain 
strong relations with Western countries and the EU. It is also bound to follow 
several EU-Israel agreements that contain human rights obligations.285 Israeli 
experts claim that its own interpretation of international law is in line with other 
Western countries such as the US and UK. It is also believed that Israel meets 
all the requirements of international law in relation to the protection of the 
collective rights of minorities, and that Israel even allows a lot more than 
required according to the international official documents. 286  
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2.4 Conceptual approaches to the internationalisation of 
minority rights 
 
2.4.1 Minority 
 
The definition of minorities is contested, as there is no legally binding and 
agreed definition of the concept under international law to date.287 The most 
universally accepted definition of the term ‘minority group’ lies within the 
framework of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).288 It was developed in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, a Special 
Reporter of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities: 
 
 ‘group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
language’289 
 
While the definition involves the combining of objective and subjective 
characteristics, some theorists emphasise objective markers of identity, such as 
race, language, or religion that distinguish members of minorities from other 
sub-state communities. Others focus on subjective characteristics, such as 
belief in common descent or possession of a shared culture. Most theorists 
insist that minorities can only be defined by a combination of objective and 
subjective elements. 290 Typically, the following elements are included in most of 
alternative legal definitions of minority (only varying slightly from Capotorti’s 
‘general line of demarcation’): 
 
1. To be a citizen of, or reside in a state which is awarding minority 
status 
2. To be at a numerical disadvantage 
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3. Whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, 
cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics that distinguish them 
from the rest of a country’s population 
4.  To preserve distinctive cultural characteristics such as language, 
religion and ethnicity291 
 
Whereas the first three criteria are objective, the fourth is subjective and, as 
such, is determined by the group itself. Commentators refer to the lack of 
accepted definition of the ‘minority’ concept, and point to the traditional 
antipathy and ‘fear’ that talk of minority rights invoke in national governments as 
a source for the complexity of the issue.292 A major obstacle to affording special 
rights for minorities, both at international and regional level, may reside in the 
absence of a generally agreed definition of minorities.293 It seems paradoxical to 
discuss the rights of ‘people’ who could not yet be identified. 
 
Due to the lack of a universal definition of the term of minority, it a decision of 
each state whether to recognise a certain group of its citizens as a minority and 
support their protection. Admittedly, the recognition of minorities within states is 
the precondition for their rights.294 Although under international law, the Arab 
citizens in Israel meet the definition of national, ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
minority, they are not recognised as such under the Israeli law.295 
 
There is almost a large tendency within the international community to 
distinguish between two categories of ethno-cultural groups, ‘old minorities’ and 
‘new minorities’.296 This distinction is found in international law and the policies 
of almost every European State and it has legal implications.297 Some common 
cultural and civil rights are provided to all ethno-minorities; yet, there are 
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specific rights that guaranteed only to certain groups. These precise groups 
differ from state to state, but they normally meet the same basic definition.298 
 
2.4.2 ‘Old minorities’  
 
‘Old minorities’ are defined as ethnic groups, which, for different reasons, did 
not achieve their own state; rather they became part of a larger state or several 
ones.299 ‘Old minorities’ are often also termed as ‘homeland minorities’ since 
they were historically settled on their land for a long time and, as a result of 
historic circumstances; they begun to see that part of the state as their historic 
homeland.300 There are broad categories of ‘old’ and ‘new minorities’. The 
theory distinguishes between two types of ‘old minority’ groups: ‘indigenous 
peoples’, ‘national minorities’.301 
 
2.4.3 ‘Indigenous peoples’  
 
 
 
 
The term ‘indigenous peoples’ emerged in the context of ‘New World Settler’ 
countries to describe descendants of the native non-Europeans who are living 
in territories that was colonised by Western powers.302  
Like the concept ‘minority’, there is no universally accepted definition of 
indigenous peoples. The most widely accepted definition of an indigenous 
people is the one given by Jose Martinez-Cobo, Special Rapporteur of the U.N. 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
in his well-known study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations.303 Cobo’s definition is based on four criteria: first, priority in time; 
second, voluntary perpetuation of cultural uniqueness; third, self-identification 
as indigenous; and fourth, the experience of marginalisation, subjugation, 
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discrimination, exclusion and dispossession by the dominant population in a 
society. Self- identification, which reflects the group’s self-consciousness, is 
considered as one of the essential tenets of the establishment of indigenous 
peoples.304 The element of self- definition in the discourse of indigenousness 
was also amplified in the United Nations through Article 33 (1) in the 2007 
Indigenous Peoples Declaration.305  
There are two explicit international legal instruments that were designed to 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples: Convention 107 of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) that was adopted in 1957,306 and the 2007 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).307 The former 
convention was criticised on the ground of its assimilationist policy. 
Consequently, a new convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (Convention 
169)308 that acknowledges the rights of indigenous people was adopted by the 
ILO in 1989. This Convention calls states to respect the lifestyle of Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples, and stresses their duty to consult with indigenous peoples 
about decisions that have a direct impact on their life.309 Convention 169 
enacted in 1991 and acts as a law to protect indigenous people’s rights but its 
application was very restricted due to the fact that it was ratified only by few 
states. Israel is not a party to the ILO Convention 169 as it did not ratify it, and it 
is accused of violating parts of its articles.310  
 
The Second fundamental international instrument for the protection of 
indigenous people’s rights is the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP)311 adopted by UN General Assembly and purports that the 
indigenous population have a much greater entitlement to self-government than 
minorities have and have land rights as historical rights. UNDRIP is not subject 
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to ratification and, hence, does not have a legally binding status. (this will be 
discussed in the next section). 
 
The indigenous rights movement in the second half of the 20 th century and 
developments in recently established UN forums have increased global 
awareness of indigenous people’s living conditions and strengthened their 
collective rights at UN and regional levels. According to the UN, indigenous 
people have much stronger claims to self-government than minorities; United 
Nations offers special mandates and mechanisms that are dedicated 
specifically to protecting their rights.312 These include the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), the Working Group in Indigenous 
Populations (WGIP), the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII) and the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous peoples (SR). Also, there are several (international) organisations 
that promote, safeguard or at least acknowledge indigenous people’s rights 
such as the Indigenous World Association (IWA), Amnesty International (AI), 
the Minority Rights Group International (MRG), and other non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) including. 
 
Indigenous peoples are seen among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups of people in the world today. The international community now 
recognises that special measures are required to protect the rights of the 
world's indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples around the world have sought 
recognition of their identities, their ways of life and their right to traditional lands, 
territories and natural resources yet, throughout history, their rights have been 
violated. Indigenous minority community of a country has more rights, on the 
level of language, culture and identity, than immigrants who come from another 
country. 
While the political elite of the Arab citizens defines the Arab minority as 
indigenous people, the academic literature and international bodies mainly 
focus on the Bedouin in Israel as indigenous people of Israel. However, their 
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indigenous status is not officially recognised by the State of Israel and the 
Bedouins are politically, socially, economically and culturally marginalised from 
the rest of the Israeli population, especially challenged in terms of forced 
displacement.313 The inclusion of the Bedouins in the category of indigenous 
peoples derives from the definition carried by 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention: 
 
'peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all 
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions’314 
 
2.4.4 National minorities 
 
 
Similarly to ‘indigenous people’, ‘national minority’ is also considered a 
homeland group.315 However, while the former have been colonised by a 
Western power, the latter was integrated in a larger territory by a neighbouring 
European country, but remain connected to their so-called original or ‘external 
national homeland’ that is also described as ‘kin-state’ or ‘mother–state’.316 
History showed that minorities without a ‘mother–state’ had been especially 
vulnerable before, during and after the two World Wars.317 There is no clear 
definition of the concept ‘National minority’. Yet, this group received special 
recognition in the European Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1134 
(1990): 
 
‘Separate or distinct groups, well defined and established on the territory 
of a state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have 
certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which 
distinguish them from the majority of the population’318 
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There is no recognition under international law (the UN) for national minorities. 
This category was created in the European legal system in 1995 through the 
Council of Europe’s (CoE) Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM). 319 In this sense, it might be said that the Arab citizens in 
Israel are doubly vulnerability. First of all the state of Israel still refuses to offer 
them recognition or protection as members of a national minority in domestic 
law. Even though they meet the definition of an old-homeland minority (both 
indigenous and national minority alike), they still not officially recognised by the 
state as such. So far, the Arab citizens within Israel are seen as members of 
religious groups and they are often described in internal official documents as 
‘Minorities’. They enjoy a status of an ethnic, but not, a national minority,320 and 
their rights as a national minority are restricted. The second major challenge for 
Arabs in Israel is that their national affiliation towards what is supposed to 
represent their ‘kin-state’, that is, the Palestinian State, is not recognised by the 
Israeli State due to a prolonged conflict.  
 
2.4.5 ‘Homeland minorities’ 
 
The term ‘Homeland minority’ refers to a non-dominant group who remained in 
their homeland, and as a result of historical circumstances such as war or 
colonialism, their status was transformed from majority to minority.321  
‘Homeland minorities’ share common features of both national and indigenous 
minorities.322     
 
 
2.4.6 ‘New’ minorities/ Immigrant minorities 
 
‘New minorities’ which is also known as ‘immigrant ethnic groups’323 has been 
generally used in order to describe minority groups resulted from post Second 
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World War immigration.324 Accordingly, these new groups refer to those who 
settle in an independent state as immigrants or refugee.325 This group of 
minorities include different subcategories with different legal statuses such as 
illegal immigrants, short-term guest workers and permanent immigrants.326  
 
‘New minorities’ have been defined in opposition to ‘national minorities’ while 
the two groups share some basic common claims and aspirations such as the 
right to existence, the right to non-discrimination and equality, the right to 
diversity and identity, the right to the meaningful participation in economic, 
cultural, and social life in civic matters. Yet, in international law, the instruments 
to protect minority rights have been traditionally conceived for, and applied to 
old minority groups with the exclusion of new minority groups originating from 
migration.  Overall, the importance for protecting both ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities 
stems of necessity to maintain and promote security and peace, protect human 
rights and cultural diversity, and to ensure democratic participation and 
democratic pluralism.327 As Steven Wheatley (2009) puts it:  
 
‘There is no objective distinction that can be made between groups 
recognised as minorities, national minorities, indigenous peoples and 
peoples. What distinguishes these groups is the nature of their political 
demands: simply put, minorities and national minorities demand cultural 
security; peoples demand recognition of their right to self-determination, 
or self-government’ 328 
 
2.5 Regulatory approaches for addressing minority rights 
 
Minority rights and status have become increasingly significant issues in the 
study of prominent fields such as political philosophy and constitutional law.329 
The international community and academics tend to categorise the options 
faced by minorities as either integration or accommodation. Whereas the former 
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provides only individual rights, the latter offers collective rights as 
complementary to individual rights.330 Before moving to introduce the two main 
international mechanisms for addressing minority demands, it is important to 
explain the terms: ‘individual rights’ and ‘collective rights’.  
 
At the core of this discussion lays three different approaches for human rights in 
democracies: Conservatism, Liberalism, and Communitarian. Conservatism 
sees the election process, loyalty to the political system, and granting few basic 
civil rights such as the freedom of speech as key aspects for the democratic 
process. Put simply, the conservative philosophy regards the democratic 
process as a main theme while considers basic individual rights as part of the 
democratic process. On the contrary, liberalism identifies individual rights 
including minority rights as main theme in the democratic process. It based on 
the belief that a just political system should also protect minority rights, and not 
only to ensure the existence of democratic process. The third approach, 
Communitarian highlights the issue of collective rights as an addition to 
individual rights. While both conservative and liberal focus on the idea of nation 
state, the communitarian philosophy draws attention to the fact that most 
countries on the world have are multi-national where each one includes at least 
two national groups. Hence, granting only individual rights would not be 
sufficient to minority groups; therefore, it is necessary to add collective rights.331  
 
The international human rights law approach towards minorities has undergone 
changes in relation to the notion of collective rights. The classic approach 
rejected the option of granting collective rights on the ground of the assumption 
that individual rights, mainly ‘the right to equality’ and the ‘non- discrimination’, 
are adequate to secure the protection and culture of minorities. However, a new 
understanding begun to evolve in relation to the importance of collective rights 
for minorities, both in in states and international law alike.332 
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The notion of collective rights has emerged as a contrary approach to the 
individualistic proposal offered by of liberal democracy. It is based on the 
growing belief that civil equality for minorities cannot be attained without 
granting some collective rights.333 The collective rights approach offers three 
types of rights; first, self-government to guarantee territorial authority or political 
autonomy. Second, poly-ethnic-rights to ensure non-discriminative policies. 
Finally, special representation rights to assure bridging gaps resulted from 
historical marginalisation of members of ethno-culture groups experienced. 
Each separate category is meant to protect the autonomy of individuals within 
minority groups while ensuring their ability to participate in larger society.334  
 
Some scholars335challenge the classic liberal assumption on the existence of a 
conflict between individual rights and collective rights, and argue that in fact 
there is connection between them. This approach evolved in the most recent 
development in the interpretation of minority rights that seek to secure rights to 
individual member of a minority group on the one hand, and the representation 
of group interests on the other.336 Put differently, minorities are entitled to 
special collective rights as distinguishable members of a minority in addition to 
individual rights as indistinguishable citizens. Also, it is accepted to distinguish 
between two meanings of ‘collective rights’, one that refers to the right of a 
group but limit the liberties of its members due to the general interest of the 
group such as solidarity (internal restrictions), or the right of a group to limit the 
powers of a majority to curtail the interests of minorities (external 
protections).337 Criticism against the acknowledgment of collective rights is 
made on the ground that they are incompatible with individual rights. Yet, 
advocates of the liberal theory see that it accepts some external protections for 
ethnic groups and national minorities and pays less attention to the internal 
restrictions.338  
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Generally speaking, minorities are often regarded as a destabilising factor in the 
international system that is based on states. For this reason, collective rights 
are not accepted in the same manner as individual rights. The legal hegemonic 
nature in democracies is mostly conservative or liberal as it refrains from 
recognizing communities. Such recognition is still seen as threat to the 
sovereignty principle in nation states that see both the country and the society 
as one entity that includes many individuals rather than separate 
communities.339 
 
The demand for collective rights that is also can be called as can be called 
collectivities, is normally raised by disadvantaged non dominant groups who 
look to end the racism against their members, to protect and improve their own 
specific cultural uniqueness.340 
 
Granting of collective rights to minority groups such as national or indigenous 
minorities is seen as one of the central tenants of the international law.341 Unlike 
other minorities who are eligible to either individual or collective rights, 
indigenous communities are especially entitled to both individual and collective 
rights: they are protected from discrimination on the basis of their membership 
of indigenous groups, and must also be allowed to express, preserve and 
develop their identity, culture, religion, language and other aspects of their 
unique experience both as individuals and as a group.342  Yet, while the 
contemporary legal debate is more focused on individual rights rather than 
collective rights, minority groups and particularly indigenous groups remain 
highly disadvantaged.343 
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As individual citizens, Arabs in Israel are eligible to formal equality, this include 
right to participate in the political process through voting and electing their own 
representatives in the parliament, alongside other. In fact, they are not eligible 
for collective political rights (except of some certain cultural, religious, 
educational collective rights, and social freedoms)344 as the State of Israel does 
not recognise them as a national or indigenous minority, a fact that has 
negatively affected their livelihood and political rights.345 In relation to the Arab 
minority, the Israeli state refused to accept the existence of both collective and 
individual rights. 
 
2.5.1 Integration versus Accommodation 
Generally speaking, there are certain universal cultural and civil rights that are 
given to all ethno-cultural minorities; yet, there are specific rights that are 
guaranteed only to targeted categories of groups. Although these categories 
are varying from state to sate, they still remain fall into the basic pattern.346The 
current literature describes two international outstanding approaches offered to 
countries to deal with minority rights, one is integration, and the other is 
accommodation.347  
 
2.5.1.1 The integration approach 
 
The main principle of the integrative approach is based on offering equality for 
minorities under law and in public organisations only on an individual basis. This 
approach provides three main policy outlines: individual rights, codes of non-
discrimination, and official integration in the political area.348 The integrative 
philosophy is the preferred policy for Western democracies and officials in 
intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations to integrate members 
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of in relation to ‘new’ and ‘national’ minorities in the state system.349 The cultural 
claims of new minority groups are typically addressed through a more 
integrationist approach, based on non-discrimination, civil rights, and the reform 
of common institutions to make them more accessible to, and respectful of, the 
new minorities.350 
 
2.5.1.2 The Accommodation approach 
 
While integrative approaches often offer only individual rights; the 
accommodative one supports collective rights in addition to individual 
rights.351In essence, the accommodative approach encourages multiculturalism 
by allowing minority groups to preserve their uniqueness through distinct 
institutions.352 The accommodative approach is usually based on the basic 
recognition of more than one ethnic, linguistic, national or religious group lives 
in the state. It is also based on the acknowledgment that such characteristics 
are resilient, durable and either cannot be or should not be integrated.353 
Generally speaking, accommodative policies provide three different outlines; 
collective rights, institutional separateness, and self-government.354 This 
mechanism is usually appropriate for dealing with the basic rights of indigenous 
peoples. 355  
 
Both integration and accommodative policies are endorsed by states and 
international organisations, for minority groups in different contexts. It is not 
easy to determine which one of these two international mechanisms is better as 
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there are various principles and assumptions that underlie them, and each 
raises its own political and moral dilemmas.356 In order to see which one of the 
two aforementioned international mechanisms (integrative versus 
accommodative) works better for regulating diversity, it is necessary to look 
closely at three key issues that have influence on the fate of minorities. These 
are: the type of the group (e.g. national minority versus indigenous minority), the 
regulatory mechanisms of the global actors, that is, the UN and EU, and the 
democratic model of the state.  
 
Overall, countries encourage assimilation of minority groups to the mainstream 
culture or allowing minority groups to preserve their distinctiveness through 
separate institutions. The Israeli governments’ policies favour the integrative 
approach, which entails individual rights. The Arab minority in Israel has always 
demanded both integrationist and accommodative rights. Since the 1950s, Arab 
leaders have called for full equal citizenship rights, and to be recognised as a 
‘national’ and ‘indigenous’ minority. On the surface these demands were 
articulated in an integrationist language, yet, public figures and political parties 
have always stressed the historical relationship between the Arab citizens and 
the land of Palestine, and the Palestinian people.357 
 
2.5.3 The UN versus EU approaches for regulating minority 
rights  
 
Traditionally, the decision about the international mechanism to regulate state-
minority relations (integration or accommodation) was to a large extent 
regarded as internal matter of individual states. Nonetheless, the international 
community became gradually a significant player in influencing policy in this 
domain by encouraging strategies of accommodation and integration and 
omitting others.358  
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While the United Nations framework categorises non-dominant ethnic groups as 
either ‘indigenous’ people or ‘minorities’, the EU label them as ‘national 
minorities’ and ‘new minorities’. This distinction is found in the laws and policies 
of almost every European State. Put differently, the distinctive needs and 
aspirations of ‘national minorities’ that based on their historic settlements and 
territorial concentration are ignored under the existing UN framework; therefore, 
they are lumped in the same category with new minorities. 359 Yet, due to the 
EU legal system, ‘national minorities’ are treated as ‘indigenous peoples’ who 
are eligible for accommodative rights. It means that the standards of the UN and 
Western democracies converge in two key contexts: both endorse a norm of 
accommodation for ‘indigenous’ people, and integration for ‘new minorities’.360 
The UN’s basic official position for addressing minorities based on the belief 
that ‘indigenous’ peoples have the right for accommodation (focuses on 
autonomy/self-government and institutional pluralism),361 whereas the rest of 
minorities have a right for integration (focuses only on non-discrimination and 
civil rights). 362  
 
Echoes of this approach in other major intergovernmental organisations, such 
as International Labour Organisation and the World Bank, which have adopted 
similar official policies. These strategies are articulated most clearly in two key 
texts; the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,363and the 2007 Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,364 which remained a draft despite the intensive 
debate about it.365  
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2.5.4 Limitations  
 
There are several limitations associated with the issue of internationalisation of 
minority rights. Firstly, the fact that the international community is not a single 
actor that shares homogeneous philosophies creates variances in the rights of 
minorities and even in the mere definition of who constituted a minority and 
under which category. In other words, there is no consensus on the valid claims 
of minority groups, which raises difficulties when attempting to outline 
international norms. Therefore, the current policies and practices of international 
organisations are seen as inconsistent and ambiguous.366   
 
Furthermore, it is claimed that there is a dichotomy between the integration and 
accommodation philosophies, and that overall they are incapable to address the 
states’ challenges.367 Professor Amal Jamal, who is himself an Arab citizen of 
Israel argues that neither integrationist nor accommodative can be effective in 
the case of ‘homeland minorities’ minorities who share the characteristics of 
both indigenous people and national minorities resided in their homeland before 
the state was established, and that the only relative success of the international 
community in this regard can be referred to the applicability of accommodative 
policies in the case of ‘indigenous people’. Therefore, their efforts to protect 
various forms of their way of life, including culture and language, overlap with 
their need to be integrated into the job market and state institutions. The right 
for political participation in the case of such minorities goes beyond a mere 
representation of their proportional share in society’s resources. It includes 
institutionalising their power in order to guarantee sharing crucial decision-
making that may have an impact on their way of life. This means that 
aggregative democratic systems cannot meet the rights of such minorities for 
sharing power. 
 
The case study of the ethnic Arab minority in Israel who meet the definitions of 
national, indigenous and homeland minority proves the complexity of the 
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existing international mechanisms; neither integration nor accommodation are 
adequate to address the claims of this group. 368 Interestingly, Jamal (2009) 
argues that even Kymlicka’s suggestion to combine integrationist and 
accommodative strategies to meet the needs of homeland minorities is not 
sufficient to regulate the state-minority relations in the context of Israel and its 
Arab minority. This is because Israel’s exclusivist ethnic character allows 
Jewish control over the state institutions and resources, which in turn blocks the 
proposed theoretical solution for diversity (integrationist and accommodative 
policies) towards the Arab minority.369  
 
2.6 Quasi Democratic states models in states with a significant 
minorities 
 
Israel’s self-definition as Jewish and democratic has always been at the centre 
of controversial scholarly debate. Some scholars370 see the state’s ethnic 
character as the main source of tension between the Jewish majority and the 
Arab minority, and claim that a country that defines itself as Jewish must 
advantage Jews. Therefore, it is believed that the Jewish-Zionist identity that 
serves only one ethnic group of its citizens, makes Israel is a unique case when 
compared to Western democracies. 371 Veteran Arab MK Dr. Ahmad Tibi of the 
Joint List Party argues that a Jewish State cannot be a democratic state as this 
combination holds unavoidable political and moral clash with the value of 
equality for the non-Jewish citizens, that is, the Arab-Palestinian citizens. Tibi 
also describes this conflict between the two values (Jewish and democratic) as 
oxymoron.372 
 
The Israeli regime cannot be defined as a classic model of the liberal 
democratic nation-state in the West. Israel identifies itself as ‘a Jewish (first) 
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and democratic state’ and a ‘state for the Jewish people’, with only the Jewish 
people have ‘collective rights’ and the ‘right to self-determination’. The state’s 
ethnic nature as a Jewish state has been clearly evident since its establishment 
(e.g. state symbols and laws); however, in July 19, 2018 the claim that Israel is 
a homeland of Jews only was codified in the so-called ‘Nationality Law’.373 (this 
will be further discussed in Chapter 6). Critics of the law see that anchoring the 
Jewish-national characteristic, without assuring the value of equality promised 
in the Declaration of Independence,374 can violate the delicate balance between 
Jewish and democratic that is as claimed already problematic and negatively 
affects the integration of the Arab citizens. Today the only constitutional 
protection that exists for minorities in Israel is according to the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty.375 But even this law does not explicitly guarantee or 
mention the value of equality. While minority rights to full equality are anchored 
in almost every country in the world, including national states, Israel remains 
one of the only countries in the democratic world that does not have a 
constitution and enshrines the basic rights of minorities.376 In this sense, Israel 
could be seen as deviates from the Western standards of non-ethnic 
democracies by promulgating both the ethnic character and the preservation of 
its purity.377  
 
As a result, in the last two decades many members of the Palestinian Arab elite 
in Israel have developed a political argument that Israel should become ‘a State 
of All Its Citizen’. This argument was again proposed in the Knesset as bill by 
few Arab MKs as in response to the new Basic Nation State Law that passed by 
the Knesset in mid-July 2018. In essence, it suggests altering the character of 
the State of Israel from the nation-state of the Jewish people to a state in which 
there is equal status for Jews and Arabs.378 In unprecedented move, the 
Knesset Presidium disqualified the proposed legislation of ‘a State of All Its 
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Citizens’ before being discussed in the plenum. This decision was supported by 
the Supreme Court in December 2018 by dismissing a petition filed by Adalah – 
The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel on behalf of the Joint List 
MKs.379 
 
In March 2019, only one month before the election, the prime minister 
Netanyahu wrote on Instagram in reference to the country’s Arab minority that: 
‘Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people – and only it.’380 Clearly, Israel is 
illiberal regime and a state, which defines itself politically legally and 
institutionally as a ‘state of the Jewish people’ rather than ‘a liberal democratic 
state of its citizens’ (the Arab citizens included). Giving that, while Israel largely 
seen as a democratic state, some scholars believe that neither democracy nor 
any other kind of democracy can be appropriate to describe the Israeli reality. 
Hence, new quasi or non-democracy models are essential to explain its attitude 
towards the Arab minority. The literature identifies four quasi or non-democratic 
regimes that were specifically crafted to analyse state-minority relations in 
deeply divided societies. These are ‘Control', ‘Herrenvolk democracy’, ‘Ethnic 
democracy’ and ‘Ethnocracy’.381 Apart of ‘Herrenvolk democracy’, these models 
were developed especially in attempt to analyse the Israeli regime. 
 
 
2.6.1 Control 
 
Control presents a general type of political system that designed to promote 
political stability in deeply divided societies, and as an alternative to 
consociational and liberal democracy.382 The control system is based on the 
principle that one racial group dominates the state resources, and imposes 
different political measures on minority group to allow continuity of the status 
quo.383 The control model involves of three linked instruments: firstly, co-option 
in which the state compromises minority leaders by according limited privileges 
such as favours and repayments. Secondly, economic dependency by making 
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members of non-dominant ethnic group relies on the majority group for their 
income to weaken their on-going political struggle. Finally, it is isolation through 
dividing and governing non-dominant group and preventing them from having 
access to the dominant group. 384 
 
Lustick (1980) examined the separation between the state majority and the 
Arab minority in Israel and described the Israeli policies towards Arab citizens 
pre the 1967 War as a control.385 However, by the end of the 1980s, he argued 
that the Arab minority had a pivotal role in Israeli policymaking and that Israel 
was moving towards the model a bi-national state.386 It is important to notice 
that while liberal and consociational democratic systems are seen as stable 
democracies, control is not regarded as such. 387  
 
2.6.2 Herrenvolk Democracy 
 
Herrenvolk democracy is defined as a democracy for the dominant race that 
officially excludes other groups. This model was initially introduced by van den 
Berghe (1967) and applied to apartheid in South Africa and the ante-bellum 
United States. Although it can be used as a useful instrument to analyse 
democracy in deeply divided societies, it is evident that ‘Herrenvolk democracy’ 
is not a type of democracy. Academics do not consider it as a democracy and 
are reluctant to advocate it as a model to deeply divided societies.388  
 
Israel’s regime was sometimes compared with the Apartheid South Africa and 
described as a Herrenvolk democracy. Meron Benvenisti (1987) argued that the 
Arab minority in Israel was treated as second-class citizens as subservient to 
the Master Race.389 Also, Benvenisti (1987) classifies the Israeli policies 
towards Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (OT) after the 1967 War as a 
Herrenvolk democracy. He argues that while Palestinians in the West Bank and 
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the Gaza Strip were in fact annexed to Israel, they were constantly 
disenfranchised.390  
 
2.6.3 Ethnic Democracy 
 
Contrary to the two aforementioned models ‘control’ and ‘Herrenvolk 
democracy’, ‘Ethnic democracy’ suggests that states do provide civil, political, 
and limited collective rights to their minority groups. Yet, institutionalised 
domination of the major ethnic group over minority groups remains prominent. 
As the Israeli sociologist Sammy Smooha (2001) puts it: 
 
‘Ethnic democracy is a democratic political system that combines the 
extension of civil and political rights to permanent residents who wish to 
be citizens with the bestowal of a favoured status on the majority group. 
This is democracy that contains the non-democratic institutionalisation 
of the dominance of one ethnic group. The founding rule of this regime 
is an inherent contradiction between two principles – civil and political 
rights for all and structural subordination of the minority to the majority’391 
 
Smooha first introduced the model of ‘ethnic democracy’ in his work on the 
status of the Arab minority in Israeli in the early 1990s.392 Before that, he saw 
Israel as a Herrenvolk democracy in relation to its Arab citizens.393 Later he 
argued that while the Arab minority are formally eligible to democratic rights, in 
fact they were under the control of the Israeli state, excluded from the national 
power and their civil rights were not meaningful. The model of ‘ethnic 
democracy’ was also applied to another countries such as Estonia and Latvia 
during the 1990s, Malaysia in the 1970s, Northern Ireland until 1972, and 
Canada between 1867 and 1960s.394  
 
Following Smooha’s model, the Israeli scholar Prof. Oren Yiftachel, coined the 
term ‘Ethoncracy’ as a counter-model for ‘Ethnic Democracy’ to analyse the 
Israeli regime and some other deeply divided societies. 
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2.6.4 Ethnocracy 
 
Ethnocracy is a type of political regime that describes the hegemony of one 
ethnic group over the state to serve the majority interests, power and 
resources.395 Ethnocratic regimes usually include thin democratic elements to 
hide the profound ethnic structure of the state, in which citizenship (religion or 
race) and ethnicity are vital to ensure resources and power. Accordingly, 
Ethnocratic regimes enable ethnicisation of the country by the majority group 
through increasing control, and sometimes by conflict with non-dominant groups 
in nearby countries.396 As Yiftachel (1999) puts it: 
 
‘An ethnocracy is a nondemocratic regime that attempts to extend or 
preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic 
territory. Ethnocracy develops chiefly when control over territory is 
challenged and when a dominant group is powerful enough to determine 
unilaterally the nature of the state. Ethnocracy is thus an unstable 
regime, with opposite forces of expansionism and resistance in constant 
conflict’397 
 
The main characteristic of Ethnocracy is that the distribution of the resources 
and power is governed by ethnicity and by citizenship. Citizenship in this case 
represents an envelope, which is quite hollow. The very typical idea of 
ethnocracy is that the state belongs to one group, which in turns harms the right 
for equality to minorities.  
 
The main distinction between ‘Ethnocracy’ and ‘Ethnic democracy’ lays in the 
nature of the regime. While the former is not seen as a democracy, the latter is 
conceptualised as a democracy. The theoretically Israeli internal debate has 
been, therefore, over the question of whether Israel can be described as ‘ethnic 
democracy’ or as a non-democratic ‘ethnocracy’.398 
 
All the aforementioned definitions used to describe the Israeli regime refute the 
claim that Israel is a ‘liberal democratic state’. Its main concern is the Jewish 
citizens rather than all its citizens, in other words, there is not an Israeli civic 
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nation, and basic laws formally make Israel Jewish and democratic and by no 
means liberal or multicultural.399 In fact, Israel's definition as a 'Jewish and 
democratic' is embedded in the legal structure in a manner that highly allows 
the concentration of the political power in the hands of the Jewish citizens while 
excluding the Palestinian Arab citizens from the political process.400 Despite the 
differences in the views in relation to Israel’s regime, it is clear that the Israeli 
regime in relation to its Arab citizens has been a hybrid, mixture or combination 
of different ideas and principles. It is a democratic regime in which rights are 
extended to all citizens but not equally.401 Therefore, the Arab citizens in Israel 
are in theory, entitled to equal citizenship rights as the Jewish citizens. Yet, this 
is not the case in practice and as the previous Chapter showed, distinctions 
between Israeli Jews and Arabs are striking in all walks of life. Despite all the 
progress in the governmental policies towards the Arab citizens, the Israeli state 
still does not live up to the standards of Western civic democracy. According to 
the international indices for quality of governance and the functioning of the 
political system, Israel's rankings as a democracy are at the bottom as 
compared with OECD states.402 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
There is a broad international consensus that minority rights are not anymore, 
an exclusive internal affair of any respective state. The protection of minorities 
is recognised in both European and international law, and the notion of 
internationalisation of minority rights reflects a wider support of the minorities’ 
demands that in fact legitimatise them.  
 
The development of legal frameworks in relation to minority rights is relatively 
recent, and the issue is still unfolding. This improvement is striking as no 
international legal tool that was entirely devoted to the protection of minority 
rights existed prior to the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
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Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
entered into force.403 Although the UN declarations are not legally non-binding, 
yet they are considered an authoritative document setting international 
standards.  
 
The inadequacy of international law framework combined with nationalism; 
affect the ability to protect the rights of minorities.404 One of the substantial 
challenges of the international community is to identify ways of enhancing the 
effectiveness of international human rights law to tackle the complexities of the 
minority question.405 Regulatory mechanisms for state-minority relations proved 
to be inadequate in ways that raise deep questions about the capacity of 
international law to protect homeland minorities such as in the case of the Arab 
minority in Israel. The problem of diversity regulation is strongly connected to 
the ethnic identity of the state that strongly determines the power relations. 
Therefore, the exiting international mechanisms would not be useful in the case 
of the Arab minority as long as the identity and the power structure of the state 
are not transformed to meet universal equality of all citizens.406  
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Third chapter: Theoretical framework 
  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis sets out to critically analyse a number of case studies where Israel’s 
Arab leadership attempted to bring the grievances of their people to 
international attention. The analysis of these events will be through exploring 
the context in which these cases have occurred from the perspectives of the 
actors (e.g. Arab MKs and NGOs) as well as the state. Accordingly, this study is 
constructivist in nature. Constructivist approaches in human rights and foreign 
policy are particularly suitable to serve as theoretical anchor to this thesis 
because of the emphasis on ideational factors, which can include norms.  
 
The first section introduces a brief background about the constructivist 
approach, its main features and limitations. The second section draws attention 
to the concept Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) that will serve as an 
introduction for the two main social constructivist models: the ‘boomerang effect’ 
407and the ‘spiral model’. 408 Then, the models will be discussed in greater detail. 
Finally, the last section focuses on key theoretical concepts that are essential 
for understanding the dynamics of the internationalisation process: 1) 
internationalisation 2) soft power 3) public diplomacy (PD) 4) soft power of 
parliamentary diplomacy 5) soft power of international advocacy NGOs 
(INGOs), and 6) state reputation and legitimacy.  
 
3.2 Constructivism 
 
The relatively tranquil conclusion of the Cold War instigated a novel approach to 
how international relations could be viewed. Neither Neo-realism nor Neo-
liberalism had can anticipate the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, these 
theories appeared to be redundant in the new prevailing international order and 
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gave way to constructivism as providing different lens for viewing international 
relations as witnessed by the abundant literature on the issue.409  
 
As a second- order theory, constructivism was developed during the late 
1980s.410 In essence, constructivism challenges both Neoliberal institutionalism 
and Neorealism by viewing international relations (IRs) as ‘socially constructed’ 
and as a ‘world of our making’ rather than as an anarchic system in which 
states interact according to the distribution of power.411 In other words, the 
interaction of states or other elements of the international system (depending on 
which level of analysis is considered) is not necessarily determined by material 
factors, but by social processes that can include a wide range of human ideas, 
perceptions and priorities.  
 
 Constructivist scholars tend to underline the moral power of ideational factors 
in international relations such as norms, ideas, identity and language,412and 
their impact on changing state’s behaviour.413 Norms in this context are 
understood as ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviour in the area of 
human rights’.414 These norms can be expressed through language and 
argumentation, and as a result, states may become ‘so entangled in their 
justification that their political outcomes may not match their original 
intentions’.415  
 
The fundamental assumption of constructivism is that interests and identities of 
agents are not taken as granted, rather they are constructed by their shared 
ideas. The role of ‘ideas’ is identified as vital in shaping international relations 
even more than the role of states or non- states actors (NSAs). Therefore, 
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defining principal ideas of agents and cooperating to redefine the international 
system is a key interest.  
 
Also, from a constructivist perspective human rights in foreign policy (HRFP) 
are defined as a ‘constructive form of identity politics’.416 This understanding, 
according to Brysk, ‘defies the realist prediction of untrammelled pursuit of 
national interest, and suggests the utility of constructivist approaches that 
investigate the role of ideas, identities, and roles as influences on state 
action’.417 The notion of state identity is used to prove that international human 
rights norms have a vital role in changing the identity of norm-violating states 
through discursive processes of argumentation and persuasion. From a 
constructivist point of view, the critical point of power relies on the agents’ ability 
to convince others to accept their opinions.418 Notably, both shaming and 
disapproval are well known rhetorical instruments that proved to have powerful 
impacts on countries that care about their international reputation and 
identity.419 
 
Therefore, it is important to consider the practices, norms, values, and identity 
to better understand the behaviour of actors and use them effectively in 
processes of persuasion and socialisation of international politics. 420 This is on 
contrary to the traditional interests such as security and survival of states. In this 
sense, unlike rationalist scholars who contend that players are interested only in 
maximising their benefits, constructivists believe that persuasion based on 
arguments can effectively change the original preferences of players.421 Put 
differently, while realists and liberalists that stress the material elements of IR, 
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constructivism pay attention to the social meaning they hold. As a result, the 
main source of power becomes the ability to influence these social meanings.422 
 
Constructivists underscore the social construction of human rights norms, the 
significance of international human rights norms, and how countries socialised 
these norms through international organisations and transnational networks. 
Countries can redefine their identity and start to see themselves as international 
citizens who dedicated to shape universal standards on human rights.423 
Through membership in international organisations and communication 
between liberal and oppressive countries, pressures through ideas and 
arguments can be effective in changing states’ actions in relation to their non- 
compliance with human rights principals.  
 
Critics of constructivism are various. These include the use of the concept 
identity because it lacks consensus and continuously re- articulated by people. 
Therefore, it is argued that it would be problematic to rely on ‘identity’ as 
‘explanatory categories.424 The Constructivist approach was also criticised for 
ignoring the state sovereignty principle as a critical limitation to domestic efforts 
in protecting human rights.425 The non-consideration of other complex nuances 
such as the regime types of states is seen as a weakness of the constructivist 
philosophy.426 Finally, major point appears in the constructivist study refers to 
the issue of foreign affairs. It is argued that foreign relations are shaped through 
a process of communication between agents and the structures. However, 
these agents are by no means only countries. Rather, constructivists emphases 
the role of non-state actors (NSAs) such as TANs, and international 
organisations (INGOs) in leveraging authorities to comply with universal human 
rights norms. For instance, Susan Burgerman (1998) stressed the role of 
transnational networks in the world politics: 
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‘The program on transnational issue networks is designed to capture the 
increasingly complex webs of non- state actors (NSAs) who participate 
in other people’s politics without resorting to the power base of either 
their own government or that of the target state’427 
 
At this point, it is important to explain the concept TANs as it is fundamental for 
the analysis of both the boomerang and spiral models.428 
 
3.3 Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN)  
 
Generally speaking, there are three different categories of transnational networks: (a) 
those who share causal ideas such as epistemic or scientific groups (b) those with 
instrumental aims (e.g. banks and transnational corporations) and (c) those who share 
principled values or ideas (TANs).429 This thesis focuses on the third form of 
transnational network to analyse the behaviour if the main actors who are leading the 
internationalisation process. According to a definition provided by Keck and Sikkink 
(1999:89), transnational advocacy network includes:  
 
‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and services’430 
 
In other words, the notion of TANs based on a mutual believes between the 
members who are highly committed to the success of their mission. TANs are 
seen as main agents for transition international human rights norms and ideas. 
431In their edited volume ‘Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics’, Keck and Sikkink (2014) describe networks as ‘forms of 
organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of 
communication and exchange’, and that ‘advocacy captures what is unique 
about these transnational networks’. 432 They are called advocacy networks due 
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to their work around social justice and rights to defend others’ causes.433 
Activists in TAN similarly to those in social movements, seek to amplify the 
rights and the claims of weak groups to through approaching more powerful 
actors.434 Many scholars acknowledge for the importance of transnational 
pressure in reducing states’ repression.435 These networks consist of various 
actors from different areas such as local and international NGOs, advocacy and 
research organisations, domestic social movements; the media, foundations, 
intellectuals, parliamentary branches of government, group of regional and 
international intergovernmental organisations.436 The fourth and the sixth 
Chapters of this study will account for case studies where international activities 
of Israel’s Arab politicians are very similar to the work of transnational advocacy 
actors. Therefore, this study suggests recognising the role of opposition 
parliamentarians from ethnic background in the literature of TANs.  
 
It is noted that not all of TANs’ actors will necessary take part in every advocacy 
network. Nonetheless, the role of both international and domestic NGOs is 
fundamental and prominent in the majority of these networks. The contribution 
of the civil society to advocacy networks is normally reflected by providing 
information, introducing new ideas and/or initiating actions and pressuring more 
influential players to intervene.437  
Generally speaking, the activity of transnational advocacy networks is most 
likely to appear when channels between domestic groups and their states are 
blocked or cut off and are, consequently, impotent for negotiating solutions to 
conflicts. Furthermore, TANs could increase their activities when they see that 
transnational activism will improve their campaigns and support them. 
Accordingly, activists might take part in global forms and conference that offer 
opportunities to expand their international contacts and strengthen their 
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network. There are four strategies that are frequently used by TANs to influence 
both local and intergovernmental policymakers:438  
 
(1) Information politics 
 
Information politics refers to the capability of TANs to quickly transfer 
credible and meaningful information to influential actors.439 First hand 
stories and testimonies from the people who were involved in abused 
incidents are highly valuable for this strategy. Furthermore, TANs 
critically frame individual evidences and facts in terms of wrong and right, 
as they aim to convince a third powerful party to intervene. The media is 
considered as a vital partner for these networks can help them to reach a 
wider audience. It is noticed that by providing alternative sources of 
information, TANs gain a significant attention.440 
 
(2) Symbolic politics 
 
Symbolic politics is an integral part of the persuasion process that 
highlights the ability of activist groups to use stories, symbols, or actions 
that can attract a foreign audience. Transnational networks make efforts 
to introduce their argument in creative ways at remarkable platforms to 
put their issue on the international agenda. This move in turn can 
contribute to increase the popularity of these groups and empower them. 
441  
 
(3) Leverage politics 
 
Leverage politics reflects the ability to mobilise the support of an external 
influential actors who is capable to affect the domestic policy and bring to 
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its change. Both pressure and persuasion are strategically crucial in 
order to mobilise more powerful actors. The literature of TANs 
acknowledges two vital kinds of leverage that activists in transnational 
campaigns are striving to achieve: (a) material leverage and (b) moral 
leverage. While material leverage involves goods, money or voting 
power, moral leverage relies on what it is known as the mobilisation of 
shame. The latter strategy works by exposing the behaviour of the state 
in question to international scrutiny, which in turn harm its global 
standing. The success of moral leverage is based on the extent the 
target state cares about its reputation; the more it cares about its global 
standing, the more moral leverage is expected to succeed.442 
 
(4) Accountability politics 
At the core of this tactic lays states’ declarations and promises for 
improving their oppressive policies. This allows a room for TANs to 
confront and challenge these countries and questioning them for not 
fulfilling their promises.443 
 
Advocacy networks are not only seeking to change states’ policies, rather, they 
aim to influence the political debate. The success of TANs is more likely to 
increase when they are advocating issues that touch on physical attack of 
civilian people and legal inequality. One of the most prominent successful 
examples of TANs refers to the anti-apartheid campaign. In the same vein, it is 
important to remember that TANs are not vital actors role in the process of norm 
promotion, but also they are playing role in changing the behaviour of the target 
state through pressuring, shaming and condemning non-compliance with these 
standards (norm implementation). Furthermore, Risse et al. (1999) contend that 
the of promotion human rights networks is a critical element in the alteration of 
policy on human rights. These networks help exposing the violation of countries 
to the international community by using the language of moral consciousness. 
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They also have a vital role in bringing the voice of domestic opposition against 
violator regimes.444 
 
To sum, TANs reflect the attempt of scholars to trace how moral and human 
rights activists are working to influence countries to commit to moral action. To 
understand the outcome of the efforts of TANs, the next sections look at two 
theories of norm diffusion: the boomerang effect, and the five-phase spiral 
model. Both models are used as analytical tool for evaluating the 
internationalisation process in the chosen case studies of this thesis (Chapter 
4,5,6).  
 
3.4 The ‘Boomerang effect’  
  
As the post–Cold War world era resulted in to producing massive networks of 
nongovernmental groups, Keck and Sikkink (1998) articulated these 
relationships in the so-called the ‘boomerang effect’.445 Interaction between 
NGOs is vital to the boomerang pattern. This model account for transnational 
advocacy networking that emerge when domestic NGOs from less democratic 
states are blocked from appealing their local regimes so they seek to pass by 
the blockage through links with other external NGOs from more democratic 
countries. In other words, the model postulates that the network between 
domestic NGOs and international NGOs based upon mutual values are created 
via sharing resources to exert pressure on states to change their policy. So, the 
‘boomerang pattern’ exists once the domestic NGOs with the help of their 
external alliances (NGOs), which serve as TANs, succeed to bring international 
pressure on their governments to change policies towards them. 446 The 
boomerang effect is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The ‘boomerang effect‘ model 
 
   
 
The Boomerang Model. Source: Adapted from Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, p. 13. 
 
The figure above shows that in order to alter policy, local NGOs (in State A) link 
with international NGOs or local NGOs in another state (State B) that have a 
better institutional access for their activism. This networking contains creating 
both unidirectional and mutual links between organisations while allowing the 
transfer of various resources such as expertise, information and money.447 
Accordingly, the NGOs in State A transfer information to the NGOs in State B, 
while the NGOs in State B call their sympathetic home country to exert pressure 
on State A to change its oppressive policies. Generally speaking, NGOs prefer 
to change policy and advocate in their home countries, but due to the lack of 
this choice, they tend shift their resources (e.g. material resources and 
information) to NGOs in other countries that are more supportive to their cause. 
When external NGOs (State B) allied with sympathetic foreign governments 
manage to exert pressure on the oppressive state (State A) to change its policy, 
then domestic NGOs (State A) can attain policy change at their home 
countries.448 Hence, the boomerang pattern serves as a typical model for 
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transnational NGO actions.449 Various scholars have presumed that networking 
has consistently positive results for NGOs and confirmed in many case studies 
that effective NGOs had networks.450  
 
It is believed that the boomerang effect was inspired by the constructivist model 
of the norm life cycle proposed that presents the improvement of international 
norms as a process that consists of three stages: emergence, cascade and 
domestic internalisation driven by different sets of actors who use different 
mechanisms to achieve normative change.451 Also the authors of the 
boomerang effect consider it as alternative model of the two-level game, which 
is seen as useful for describing domestic and international issues.452   
 
It is claimed that the boomerang model is the most popular pattern in the study 
of transnational civil society organisations.453 The current research argues that 
TANs must confront the dimension of opposition parliamentarians especially 
those from an ethnic minority background as key player initiating actions and 
pressuring more powerful actors to take positions alongside other NSAs such 
as NGOs. Therefore, the more general boomerang model in figure 1 became a 
template for a graphical representation of the process of internationalisation. 
For that reason, a modification is proposed to the model in figure 1 to 
contextualise the case of the Arab citizens in Israel and to give prominence to 
the role of the Arab and international parliamentarians. This is shown in the 
modified boomerang pattern in figure 2 and 3.  
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Figure 2: Modified boomerang pattern  
 
 Adapted from (Keck and Sikk ink  1998) 
 
 
Figure 3: Modified boomerang pattern for the Arab minority context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historically, the ‘boomerang effect’ had different levels of success. However, it 
is noticed that transnational activities fail more often than it succeeds.454 The 
campaign results are influenced by various elements that might increase the 
state’s susceptibility to pressure. Various conditions refer to the extent that 
targeted states are being responsive to pressure. These include (1) if a state 
has bilateral international agreements (2) is seeking to protect or rise its access 
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to the global market (3) is looking for a recognition as a democratic state; (4) or 
is likely to gain or lose economic chances as a result of its international 
standing.455 
 
3.4.1 Pitfalls and complications  
 
The ‘boomerang effect’ received was mainly criticised due to: 1) the imbalance 
of power between states 2) less effective against superpowers. One of the key 
critics of Keck and Sikkink’s 1998 model refers to the imbalance of power 
between states. That is, the role of the Western countries is central to the 
success of the work of TANs. Bypassing the oppressive state by referring to 
international networks only works if other states or international institutions are 
willing to take up this call.456 As a result, it is argued that the boomerang effect 
can only work against non-Western states. Also, many argue that the 
vulnerability of the target state is thus a key factor in network effectiveness. 
Hence, human rights pressures would not be effective against strong states that 
can impose significant costs on the states that pressure them. For instance, 
network activists admit that they have been less effective against states that 
superpowers consider important to their national security interests: countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, China, and Pakistan.457  
 
The second prominent criticism of the model is that it analyses the power 
relations within and between NGOs and their partners rather than focusing on 
the challenges of NGOs face in their international campaigns. It is argued that 
NGO lobby groups would have less influence on policy-making than that of 
traditional interest groups and mass membership organisations (e.g. trade 
unions).458 NGOs similarly to ‘new’ social movements, are well known for their 
moral authority and include educated minority. However, they lack the capacity 
for popular mobilisation,459 and without a large or concentrated membership, 
which could threaten the electoral prospects of political candidates or the 
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financial resources to affect party financial contributions, it would seem that 
small groups of NGO lobbyists are in a weak position either to influence the 
policy of their own government or that of foreign governments.460 Critics of the 
theory, however, acknowledge its general utility and believe that it should be 
further investigated and developed rather than discarded. Indeed, the spiral 
mode was developed to a more model, that is, the ‘spiral model’. 
 
3.5 The ‘spiral model’ of human rights change461 
 
Over the last two decades, International Relations scholars looked at how 
certain ideas achieve the status of norms altered the behaviour of states and 
other actors in global politics.462  The causal mechanisms that support the 
internalisation of international norms into domestic political arenas and that 
enables us to understand the effects of ‘internationalisation’ have been 
conceptualised firstly by Risse et al. (1999) using the so-called spiral model. 463 
In their well-known edited volume The Power of Human Rights (POHR), Risse 
et al.’s (1999) examine through a constructivist framework the influence that 
international human rights norms embodied in the 1948 UN Declaration of 
Human Rights have had on governments’ behaviour, identity and interests.464 
Risse et al.’s model (1999) helps to explain how transnational networks 
challenge the repression of individual governments in order to change their 
domestic human rights situation. Risse et al.’s (1999) volume synthesise 
rational choice and constructivist approaches and suggest that the contest 
between the two schools of compliance theory is no longer useful.465  
 
The spiral model remains the reference for most studies on multi-level human 
rights politics and compliance with human rights norms”.466 The ‘spiral model’ 
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builds upon previous work of both the ‘boomerang effect’ and TANs.467 The 
spiral model incorporates especially the influence of transnational human rights 
regimes on the normalisation of state policy. The spiral model ascribes great 
magnitude to psychosocial factors in the process of change. Processes of 
shaming and denunciation lead first to strategic concessions. However, later the 
changes acquire a binding status, as governments and people go through 
processes of internalization and habituation to the universal norms. Shaming by 
HROs is crucial to many theoretical models of human rights improvement.468  
 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s (1999) offered a five-stage ‘spiral model’ to explain 
states’ progression from ‘repression’ to ‘rule-consistent behaviour’. This 
transformation from a norm-violating state into a norm-adhering state occurred 
through what the authors label as the ‘socialisation processes’ of human rights 
norms. Three types of socialization processes which are necessary for enduring 
change in the human rights area: adaptation and strategic bargaining, 
processes of moral consciousness-raising, “shaming‟, argumentation, dialogue 
and persuasion;” and processes of institutionalization and habitualization. 
Central to these socialisation processes are transnational human rights 
networks that exert moral pressure on norm-violating states ‘from above’, 
meaning from abroad, and ‘from below’. The different phases of the human 
rights development of an initially norm-violating country are, according to the 
authors of the 5-phase spiral model:469 
 
1. Phase one: ‘repression’ 
 
At this stage, norm-violating governments endorse policies of repression. 
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) are dependent on 
domestic groups (NGOs) to receive information about human rights 
abuses in the country. The role of TANs is crucial in the first stage. If the 
                                                 
467 Thomas Riss, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power Of Human Rights: International Norms And 
Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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469 Rolf Schw arz, "The Paradox Of Sovereignty, Regime Type And Human Rights Compliance", The International 
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links between the to the national and the external parties are too weak 
then repression may last for a long time.470Should these domestic 
advocacy networks succeed in gathering sufficient information on the 
repression bringing attention to their cause, there is a transition to the 
second phase of the spiral model, ‘denial’.471   
 
At this level, it is noticed that the success in the activation of external 
networks is in line with the concepts of both internationalisation and 
‘boomerang effect’. At this level, this thesis suggests modifying the model 
to insert the theoretical concept ‘internationalisation’ by adding a new 
independent phase after the first phase of repression. This would also 
contribute more clarity to the dynamics of the model. 
 
2. Phase two: ‘denial’ 
 
Once the norm-violating state is on the international agenda, its 
assumed that its initial reaction to accusations of undemocratic 
behaviour is usually one of denial. This denial might be either on the 
ground of the sovereignty principal that oppose any international 
intervene in domestic affairs, either based on the state’s rejection of the 
legitimacy of international norms.472  
 
At this level, TANS start to lobby different actors such as policy makers 
in liberal states, public opinion and human rights organisations. The 
lobby process can take discursive form that involves moral persuasion of 
Western countries. By reminding them of their identity and liberal values, 
European countries are called to condemn actions of authoritarian 
regimes. They might be at risk of public shaming should they refuse to 
take a clear stance. The authors of the model suggest that in some 
cases, external pressure might generate some improvement in the 
                                                 
470 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve Chapman Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power Of Human Rights: International 
Norms And Domestic Change (New  York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
471Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve Chapman Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power Of Human Rights: From 
Commitment To Compliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 126. 
472 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve Chapman Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power Of Human Rights: From 
Commitment To Compliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6. 
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target state policies already in this phase of the model. It is noted that 
although most accused states go through denial, this phase is not 
always necessary and some countries might skip it.473 
 
 
3. Phase Three: ‘tactical concessions’  
 
The authors argue that when governments make minor concessions, 
they underestimate the impact of these changes. Leaders of 
authoritarian states tend to believe that ‘talk is cheap’ and they are 
unaware of the fact that they can become ‘entrapped’ in their own 
rhetoric, which in turn allows a room for more criticisms. The importance 
of the third phase lays in strengthening domestic networks whose 
demands are legitimated through international attention. As a result, 
local opposition would increase and be added to external pressure. 
 
This phase is seen as the most significant process of the spiral model, 
as it can move toward changing the target state behaviour, however, it is 
possible that regimes decide to increase oppression.474 
 
 
 
4. Phase four: ‘perspective status’  
 
At this point the states in question is challenged with human rights 
activists and as a result it decides to liberalise its policies, internalise 
human rights norms and later, to a modify its actual behaviour. This 
phase is characterised by acknowledgment of the validity of human 
rights norms and involve actions such as ratification of international 
treaties or enshrining of new norms into domestic law.475 
 
                                                 
473 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve Chapman Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power Of Human Rights: International 
Norms And Domestic Change (New  York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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The authors highlight four cases that help to determine whether 
countries have accepted the legitimacy of human rights norms and 
moved towards ‘prescriptive status’: 1) if the regime is no longer oppose 
international in its domestic affairs and talk with opposition groups 2) if 
there is an authorised body that monitor and address human rights 
violations 3) if the state ratified international human rights covenants 4) if 
the state enshrined human rights norms in its domestic law or 
constitution. 
 
 
5. The final phase: ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ 
 
This final stage occurs when state’s liberal policy is translated into real 
behaviour. Words and conducts of former oppressive states are now 
matched, and human rights norms compliance becomes a part of the 
permanent behaviour of the state.476 Initially, Risse et al., (1999) model 
was proposed for authoritarian states, however, in their book, The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, 
Risse et al., (2013)477 applied their model to Western democracies and 
the US. In their 2013 edited volume, the authors have broadened their 
study in relation to both state actors and non-state armed groups, and 
examined the applicability of the spiral model in ‘limited statehood’ 
areas. The authors also modified their spiral model and included 
conditions for moving from human rights commitment to real compliance 
with them, and account for possible declining in the state’s compliance 
with human rights norms as a reaction for a culturally or security 
deterioration.478  
 
The spiral model is considered as valuable for worldwide empirical research 
due to its explanatory power value of the different levels of human rights 
                                                 
476 Rolf Schw arz, "The Paradox Of Sovereignty, Regime Type And Human Rights Compliance", The International 
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violation, and its general applicability to almost every state. Also, it is believed 
that the Power Of Human Rights (POHR) book has great contributions to the 
leading theoretical approaches constructivism and rationalism.479 In fact, PoHR 
increased the influence of constructivism in IRs, particularly through the study 
on socialisation of norms and international organisations, social sanctions 
strategies (e.g. shaming), compliance, and regime effectiveness.480 The book 
also generated substantial discussion on the terms of argumentation, 
persuasion, and public spheres.481 The spiral model of Risse et al. is illustrated 
in Figure 2 in the next page. 
 
Figure 2. Spiral model of human rights change482 
 
Figure 2: Source: Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 20. 
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481 Anja Jetschke and Andrea Liese, "Paper Presented For The Workshop: The Pow er Of Human Rights: Ten Years 
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482 Thomas Riss, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power Of Human Rights: International Norms And 
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The spiral model as depicted in figure 2, is somewhat visually complicated, 
necessary so was it attempts to incorporate the many issues and 
interrelationships between them that are inherent in the model.  That model is a 
temple, which can cover many different situation and contexts. For the purpose 
of the current research a more simplified (visually) version, which is directly 
applicable for visual representation of the case studies is presented in figure 3. 
Also, it would be necessary to introduce an interim level between ‘repression’ 
and ‘denial’ which would allow for ‘internationalisation’ along similar lines to the 
‘boomerang-effect’. For example, if we start at the first level, ‘repression’ and 
mobilise international support, the model dictates that the next stage would be 
automatically ‘denial’ because the state would deny the legitimacy of external 
intervention. However, if there is no response from the international 
communities which have been approached, according to the model, a lack of 
the internationalisation process being instigated would make it impossible to 
move on to the next level, ‘denial’. This is clearly a weakness. If a new level of 
‘internationalisation’ were to be introduced as an independent and conditional 
transition from phase one ‘repression’ to phase two ‘denial’, the model would  
more accurately reflect the different stages involved in the internationalisation 
process, particularly early on.  
 
Figure 3: Modified spiral model for the case studies 
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3.5.1 Pitfalls and complications 
 
Some of the most striking points of criticism in relation to the spiral model 
highlight its: 1) excessive determinism 2) negligence of security aspects 3) lack 
of explanation of network effectiveness 4) ignorance of geostrategic regimes 5) 
overlook of the domestic dimension 6) ambiguity of the long-term outcomes. 
 
Firstly, the spiral model was widely described as ‘deterministic’ due to the 
unidirectional dynamics between the five phases. That is, once development 
towards human rights compliance has begun, only a positive progress is 
expected or alternatively a stagnant regime.483 It is also claimed that the spiral 
model treats the target state as one block and does not account for the 
relaxation of some oppressive practices that might take place as a response to 
international shaming without a fundamental change of policy. Put differently, 
the model does not leave a room for differences in states’ policies and 
distinction between violating actions.484 Therefore, in order to address this 
shortcoming, and based on the case studies that will be introduced in Chapters, 
4,5, and 6, this research suggests modifying the model by adding new phases 
called ‘tactical concession plus’ to allow explanation for positive development in 
states’ policies while the violation of human rights continues. It is also proposed  
to add ‘repression plus’ to explain further deterioration (backlash) in the 
relations between the targeted state and the oppressed group that is likely to 
emerge after a successful activation of transnational network.  
 
Secondly, the model fails to acknowledge the impact of security threats and 
conflicts in shaping counterterrorism policies that in some places come triumph 
human rights norms.485 This point is critical for this study especially for case 
studies that were chosen from Israel’s first twenty years where the security 
issue was the forefront of the state policies (Chapter 4). Security continues to 
be highly relevant to in relation to the Arab citizens in Israel in light of the 
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unresolved Palestinian question and other geopolitical considerations (Chapter 
5,6).   
 
Thirdly, the effectiveness of the transnational advocacy network as a key 
variable was questioned and claimed to be weak. It is argued that there is a lack 
of relationship between the activities of transnational networks and the 
emergence of an issue on the international agenda. In this sense, meaningful 
changes are not necessary a direct result of the efforts of these networks.486 
This unclear relationship between the agents, processes and outcomes is also 
found in process such as soft power and public diplomacy. This will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
 
Fourthly, it is argued that the spiral model analyses the role of international 
norms in reshaping the state’s identity while ignoring its geostrategic importance 
of the state in question in terms of vulnerability to external pressure. It is agreed 
that some countries are strategically vital for major Western powers. These 
include Israel, Saudi Arabia, China Turkey, and Pakistan. Accordingly, it is 
assumed that they are to a large extent immune to external moral or material 
pressure.487 In other words, the spiral model is applicable only to smaller 
powerful oppressive regimes that are more susceptible to external pressure 
rather than superior ones in the international system.488 Therefore, the model is 
seen as unable to provide a comprehensive explanation for socialisation human 
rights norms among all oppressive countries.489 This is in contrast to its authors 
claim that it ‘is generalizable across cases irrespective of cultural, political, or 
economic differences among countries’.490  
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Fifthly, it is maintained that the spiral model does not account for the role of 
domestic factors in the process of socialising human rights norms.  Internal 
politics and dynamics led by domestic forces and leaders can play a crucial role 
in promoting human rights into policy-making based on calculated 
considerations. However, these dynamics are absent in the spiral model. 491  
 
Lastly, the model was criticised because it does not offer explanation regarding 
the influence that democratic political system has on ‘lasting respect for human 
rights in that state’.492 In other words, there is ambiguity of the long-term 
outcomes brought about through the practices theorised in the spiral model. 
 
3.6 Theoretical concepts  
 
3.6.1  Internationalisation 
 
The concept of internationalisation in the area of human rights is the main 
theme of this research. To this end, the author of this study will abide by the 
definition of Louis Henkin, one of the most prominent U.S. advocates of 
international human rights in the 20th century. Henkin (1977) views the 
internationalisation of rights as ’recognition that the treatment of citizens in one 
country has become the cause of concern in other countries’.493 He adds that: 
 
‘The process of ‘internationalised’ human rights occurs by transforming 
matters that had previously been subject to exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction ‘sovereignty’ into matters of international concern, putting 
them permanently in the international political agenda, and providing the 
foundation for a sturdy edifice of international norms and institutions’494 
 
As such, this definition involves elevating domestic problems to the international 
level and bringing the attention of the international community to bear on issues 
of human rights. It is pertinent to human rights concerns of the Arab minority in 
Israel and a important issue throughout this thesis.  
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A similar definition of the concept internationalisation has given by Doem, Pal 
and Tomlin (1996) described it as ‘a phenomenon where certain facets of policy 
or policymaking are impacted by elements from outside a country's domain’.495 
A brief survey of dictionary definitions is also compatible with Henkin’s definition 
of internationalisation. The first definition from Oxford English Dictionary is: ‘to 
make (something) international or to bring (a place) under the protection or 
control of two or more nations’.496 Merriam-Webster’s dictionary is very similar 
as well: ‘to make international or to place under international control’.497  
 
The notion of internationalisation has brought a consensus at least from 
political- legal and rhetorical perspectives that individual human rights (HRs) are 
of ‘international concern’, and a fair matter for international organisations, 
diplomacy, and international law. 498  In other words, human rights became 
within the responsibilities of the international community. This new situation 
challenged the sacred principle of the state sovereignty that opposes any form 
of external intervention in the internal affairs of countries including the violation 
of human rights.499 Accordingly, it is unlikely that any state would seriously claim 
that the protection of human rights should be treated as its domestic affair.500 
That is to say, ‘the idea of state sovereignty no longer provides an automatic 
and impenetrable shield against international action on issues once regarded as 
essentially domestic’.501 
 
The academic literature highlights two historical periods that gave the rise for 
the internationalisation of human rights in general and those for minorities in 
particular. Firstly, it refers to the aftermath of the Second World War where a 
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post- Holocaust atmosphere increased concern for such rights through United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN intervention in protracted 
conflicts and discrimination of human rights in different states. For example, in 
early 1950s, the issue of the Apartheid in South Africa was on the agenda of the 
General Assembly. This was despite the strong opposition of the South African 
delegation that accused the UN in breaching the non- intervention and state 
sovereignty principle.502  
 
The second turning point in the history of internationalisation refers to the period 
of the end of the Cold War where the collapse of the communist block served as 
catalysed for the internationalisation of minority rights. It is argued that as a 
response to the 1980s ethnic conflicts, Western countries came to the 
conclusion that it is necessary to internationalise the treatment of national 
minorities in post-communist nations. 503 Accordingly, in his scholarly work, 
‘internationalisation of minority rights’ ‘Multiculturalism and Minority Rights: 
West and East’, Kymlicka (2002) argues ‘How states treat their minorities is now 
seen as a matter of legitimate international concern, monitoring and 
intervention’.504  More details about the advantages and the limitation of the 
existing international mechanisms for minority rights will be discussed further in 
the next Chapter. 
 
The processes of internationalisation whereby human rights and minority rights 
were brought to international evolved considerably during the period after the 
Second World War and the growth of NGOs and TANs created networks of 
channels for the internationalisation of human rights issues. However, even 
prior to the development of such networks, there was scope for 
internationalisation by other actors due to the manner in which commitment to 
the observance and safeguarding of human rights and minority rights had been 
embedded in the institutions of global governance. For this reason, it can be 
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argued that the spiral model is a useful analytical approach even for the time 
period before NGOs and TNAs became more widespread and effective. 
 
 
3.6.2 Soft Power 
 
The concept of soft power has risen significantly in scholarly and public debates 
on foreign affairs in recent years. It is claimed that soft power is based on a 
combination of a constructivist (e.g. identity, culture and norms) 505 and neo- 
liberal attitudes506 in the utility of power.507 While the classic realist vision of 
power that has seen influence as a direct function of material resources, soft 
power holds a great potential to convince others to share your aspiration and 
preferences through the attraction of intangible universal resources such as 
ideology and culture. Nye (1990)508 introduced the concept of soft power as the 
second face of power, which is intangible: 
‘a co- optive power or indirect power which can help in receiving others 
to want what you want and it shapes preferences of others by attraction 
of intangible resources such as universalistic popular culture or political 
cohesion’509  
 
The notion of soft power relies on three sources: values, culture, political, and 
foreign policy culture can be high culture such as literature, art, and education, 
and popular culture. If a country’s culture includes universal values and 
promotes interests and values, which other countries share, it can produce soft 
power based on attraction.510  
The literature highlights two main weaknesses in relation to soft power. Firstly, it 
has a measurability problem. Put differently, it is hard to prove that one state’s 
behaviour is a direct outcome of other states’ soft power.511 Secondly, the soft 
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power process suffers from a lack of clarity in relation to the main agents of this 
conception. That is, countries are not the only actors who own soft power; 
rather there are additional agents such as celebrities, businesses, and civil 
society groups. Yet, while these actors are not subjected to the control of the 
state, the links between them and their states are not explained. 512  
 
Some authors point indirectly to the feasibility of NGOs513 and TANs514 as 
potential agents of soft power. This thesis shows how the concept of soft power 
is in line with both the ‘boomerang effect’, and the concept of 
‘internationalisation’ that are the initial desired outcome, and a vital condition for 
the progress of the spiral model. Also, it shows how both Arab MKs and NGOs 
use the internationalisation as a strategy to generate a soft power (see case 
studies in Chapters 4,5,6). 
 
3.6.3 Public diplomacy (PD) 
 
Public diplomacy (PD) is evaluated in the academic literature as a means of a 
state's soft power, and as the most significant instruments of foreign policy515 
that was vital in determining the cold war.516 The term of public diplomacy has 
been developed over the years; while it was commonly used as an exclusive 
tool infer the state control, some studies show that it is now in the use of other 
groups such as private individuals, NGOs.517 As Murrow (1963) puts it: 
 
‘interactions not only with foreign governments but primarily with 
nongovernmental individuals and organizations, and often presenting a 
variety of private views in addition to government views’518  
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The most prominent contribution of constructivism to PD refers to its 
acknowledgment of the power of sociological attitudes such as identity- building 
and socialisation. For example, political socialisation can be achieved as a 
result of close interaction between states that share mutual interests and 
identities.519In this sense, it is argued that constructivism tackles international 
politics through aspects that were ignored by others (e.g. liberalism and neo-
realism), and introduced new promising attitude to field of PD. 520 That is to say, 
it treats social constructs such as values, norms and identities as the main 
source of power,521 that can serve PD in formulating country’s international 
image, and contribute to the foreign public debate.522  
 
Similar definitions to PD also described it as ‘direct communication with foreign 
peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking, and ultimately, that of their 
governments’,523 or as ‘the process by which direct relations are pursued with a 
country’s people to advance the interests and extend the values of those being 
represented’.524 In this sense, PD relies on constructivist principles that offer 
alternative model for the supremacy of material power in attaining results based 
on social interaction and understanding the power of ideational and normative 
structures. As Peter van Ham (2010) puts it:  
 
 ‘the means by which states, associates of states and non-state actors 
understand cultures, attitudes and behaviour, build and manage 
relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their 
interests and values’525 
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It is noted that both media526 and communication technologies such as the 
Internet are also play a significant role in public diplomacy. They facilitate 
reaching wide range of foreign publics, states and NGOs, and provide 
opportunities for all to exchange ideas about international affairs.527 These 
dynamics is acknowledged in the literature as New Public Diplomacy (NPD) and 
has been articulated by a number of notable authors.528 In essence, NPD refers 
to activities that aim to promote cooperation and mutual understanding with 
foreign people through civil society channels rather than state officials.529 It is 
even claimed that this new approach was inspired by the work of NGOs 
advocacy.530 NPD also highlights a strategic shift in delivering messages. It 
pays more attention to social relations that become an aim by itself, and less 
focuses on changing behaviour or beliefs of foreign nations.531  
 
Constructivist approaches are also helpful to explain the legitimacy of strategies 
that actors pursue in policy-making processes. For example, public policy in this 
case is understood as a result of communication between who actors share 
common norms and values rather than of mutual interest. General constructivist 
approaches in public policy aim to clarify why some proposals have more 
legitimacy in a discussion than others: 
 
‘Politicians, officials, the spokesmen for societal interests, and policy 
experts all operate within the terms of political discourse that are current 
in the nation at a given time, and the terms of political discourse 
generally have a specific configuration that lends representative 
legitimacy to some social interests more than others, delineates the 
accepted boundaries of state action, associates contemporary political 
developments with particular interpretations of national history, and 
defines the context in which many issues will be understood’532 
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It is worth mentioning that another new concept called ‘nation branding’ has 
evolved in the context of public diplomacy. Nation branding is also used as 
another tool for altering perceptions of a target society. However, despite its 
similarity to public relations, nation branding is closer to the idea of soft power 
rather than PD. It differs from the latter it in terms of purposes and results. While 
the concept of nation branding is primarily focuses on ‘image and symbols 
management, relationship building, and extensive use of the mass media’, 533 
the role of public diplomacy cannot be limited to only images and slogans. 534  
 
3.6.4 Soft power of parliamentary diplomacy 
 
 ‘Parliamentary diplomacy’ is mostly used by politicians,535 but as an academic 
term it has been almost invisible for years.536 It is argued that one of the 
reasons why this term has not widely discussed by scholars refers to its inability 
to simply present the conventional elements of IR theory as desired by allegedly 
‘Institutionalist’ or ‘Realist’ approaches.537 This resulted in ambiguity of the term 
and in evolving of various definitions of the concept.538 One valid definition of 
parliamentary diplomacy is offered by Weiglas and de Boer (2007): 
 
‘the full range of international activities undertaken by parliamentarians 
in order to increase mutual understanding between countries, to assist 
each other in improving the control of governments and the 
representation of a people and to increase the democratic legitimacy of 
inter-governmental institutions’ 539 
 
Generally speaking, parliamentary diplomacy as described in the quote above is 
widely used to endorse discussion, common understanding and trust building 
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between states. It is also argued that parliamentary diplomacy can be used as 
part of international efforts to tackle worldwide challenges, and its role its role in 
promoting global peace and development was previously acknowledged by the 
UN.540  
 
Parliamentary diplomacy works on several levels. For example, some 
parliaments can be involved in international affairs either directly or indirectly. 
This involvement can be official or unofficial, led by individuals or parties openly 
or covertly, and conducted regardless of domestic executives’ approval.541 
Parliamentary diplomacy includes foreign affairs actions of individual legislators 
(e.g. chairpersons and speakers), groups of MPs (e.g. friendship groups, 
committees, delegations), international parliamentary organisations, or bilateral 
inter-parliamentary forums. 542 
 
It is believed that one of the main disadvantages of parliamentary diplomacy is 
the limited power of legislators in international (e.g. lack of financial resources) 
arena compared with businesses, governments, and NGOs. 543Another key 
problem of parliamentary diplomacy is that its effectiveness is highly related to 
the availability of lawmakers in terms of time and expertise. In addition, both 
power and availability are most likely to be interrupted due to the instable nature 
of the work of MPs that does not guarantee continuous membership. 544 The 
fact that mandates can differ greatly between delegations could lead to drawing 
vague and noncommittal conclusions or statements.545 As a result, it has been 
argued that parliamentary diplomacy is nothing more than ‘parliamentary 
tourism’.546 
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In this study, the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ cannot reflect the 
internationalisation attempts led by of Israel’s Arab MKs. Their role in 
international spheres seems to contradict Israel’s foreign policy. Not only that 
they are not taking part in increasing mutual understanding between Israel and 
other countries,547 in fact, their cross-borders activities aim to increase criticism 
and pressure on the Israeli government to change its ‘unfair’ polices towards 
their constituencies as will be further discussed in Chapter 6. Therefore, this 
study suggests inserting the concept ‘personal diplomacy’ to describe the 
exceptional role of opposition members of parliament especially those from 
minority ethnic groups as significant forces in the process of the 
internationalisation process, or as part of local transnational advocacy network 
in the language of the spiral model. 
 
3.6.5 Soft power of International advocacy NGOs (INGOs) 
 
Many scholars acknowledge the increasingly significant actors of the advocacy 
campaigns led by transnational civil society548 that also known as international 
advocacy NGOs (IANGOs).549 IANGOs have risen as critical agents in 
identifying and articulating universal norms, advocating them and scrutinising 
their amenability with international agreements.550 Notably, IANGOs use various 
advocacy strategies to influence transnational targets. These include both 
cooperative and adversarial tactics. While cooperative methods such as 
education and research could be used to enhance the way policy makers are 
informed, incentives and persuasion serve as alternatives. Adversarial 
techniques include litigation and mobilising public pressure through the 
mechanism of naming and shaming.551  
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Main critics of IANGOs refer to their legitimacy as ‘unrepresentative’ or 
‘unelected’ organisations, suggesting that political legitimacy is the merely 
source for real effect on policy-making. 552 In this respect, one might argue that 
compared with politicians who are interested in promoting their own political 
agenda; it is expected that INGOs would have more credibility and expertise. 
Chapter 5 will introduce cases in relation to the international advocacy of Arab 
NGOs. 
 
 
3.7.6 State reputation and legitimacy 
 
Some scholars argue that States’ reputation is a vital motive for compliance with 
international law.553 The significance of reputation in the global system derived 
from the absence of a central mechanism that is capable to monitor the 
applicability of international agreements, and which can impose sanctions on 
states that violate international law. As a result, it is believed that without a good 
reputation, countries will not be considered as potential partners for signing 
international agreements. Therefore, it would be assumed that these 
agreements would be misused by states, which has a poor image.554 
 
According to the constructivist school of reputation, states seek to preserve their 
reputation as trustworthy partners in negotiations,555 and as global members of 
international society556 (i.e. norm compliant). Opposed to scholarship held by 
rationalists, the overwhelming volume of constructivist international relations 
literature557 view reputation as an inter-subjective quality that makes it a ‘social 
fact’ rather than just a sum of individual beliefs.558 This philosophical distinction 
between the rationalists and the constructivist in relation to the reputation 
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concept559 also affects the way in which countries can be sanctioned. In other 
words, while rationalists stress the issue of sanctions, which have a bad 
influence on power sources such as trade restrictions, Constructivist emphasise 
symbolic sanctions that negatively affect the legitimacy of states in the 
international society such as stopping of diplomatic relations, sports or cultural 
exchanges.560 Furthermore, similarly to neo- institutionalise views; social 
constructivist scholars561 underscore the quest for legitimacy as a key factor 
that guides governments’ discourse and actions. In this sense, constructivism is 
mainly influenced by sociological studies and emphasise the role of social 
organisations, legitimacy, and norms. Its main point of departure is that states 
like individuals, look for acknowledgment and legitimacy for their activities. They 
also seek to meet the normative standards of the world system including human 
rights norms to avoid global criticism and shaming. 
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
The traditional notion that human rights are meant to regulate certain relations 
between individuals and nation-states has changed significantly as the 
distinction between local and global issues has become blurred.562 Accordingly, 
it is difficult to analyse international politics and behaviours of nation-states 
without attaching great importance to the transnational activity of NSAs. 
Constructivists recognise the central role of both international institutions and 
NSAs such as nongovernmental actors in influencing states’ decisions to 
comply with universal human rights norms. The ‘spiral’ model explains the 
interaction between domestic actors, TANs, cross borders actors, repressive 
states, may be able to influence a target state’s behaviour, identity, interests 
through specific ‘socialisation’ processes. The principal characteristics of these 
models are highly helpful in analysing the internationalisation process. 
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Therefore, they will be used as analytical tool for the case studies (Chapters 
4,5,6).   
 
Both the boomerang effect and the spiral model demonstrate that unlike the 
greatest IRs’ views focusing almost exclusively on states as the sole 
determinants of sovereignty, NSAs are able to undermine state authority. Yet, 
much of this existing literature ignores the role of opposition parliamentarians in 
general and those from ethnic- minorities backgrounds. On this basis, this 
research aims to fill this void by investigating the role they that parliamentarians 
can play in the international public spheres to address domestic struggle. It will 
argue that one should consider a comprehensive insight as to the role of ethnic-
minority opposition MPs as transnational actors.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the original spiral model was intended for authoritarian 
and repressive regimes. However, Risse et.al 2013 have tested it in Western 
democracies alongside the USA.563 In relation to Israel, Laursen 2000,564 Liese 
2006,565 and Shor 2008566 tested the spiral model but it is used with respect to 
the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as a whole, and did not focus on Arab citizens of 
Israel. So, this thesis tests for the first time the spiral model in relation to Israel 
and its Arab minority.  Also, it is the first time that the spiral model has been 
tested to a hybrid regime.  
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Section 2: Case studies 
 
Chapter 4: The Use of Memoranda as a Means of 
Internationalisation (1948-1979) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter and the subsequent two chapters consist of case studies 
investigating different mechanisms whereby the Arab minority in Israel, 
represented by their elite, sought to internationalise their fight against 
discrimination and the denial of their human rights. These case studies are 
grouped chronologically according to different modalities of internationalisation 
used. Chapter 4 considers the use of ‘public memoranda’ sent to international 
organisations to highlight the relevant issues (1948-1979). Chapter 5 examines 
cases involving the use of ‘legal and civil Advocacy’ approaches to compel the 
Israeli state to change its behaviour (1992-2013). Chapter 6 considers the use 
of ‘personal diplomacy’ and interaction with key foreign figures and international 
organisations (2015-2017).  
 
In 1948 the State of Israel came into existence purportedly as a solution to the 
stateless position of the Jewish people worldwide. The creation of Israel 
resulted in resentment among Palestinian people as a significant proportion of 
the land they occupied was taken over. The new state was surrounded by other 
Arab nations, which were hostile to it. Additionally, within its borders was a 
significant Arab minority group, which was generally viewed by the government 
as an enemy within. Hence, the military regime that lasted between 1948-1966 
was seen as a necessary measure of control particularly of the Arab minority 
group. However, due to the partisan nature of this military control, the Arab 
minority was bound to feel disadvantaged and discriminated against and elites 
among them sought out means of internationalising their issues as they had 
little voice within the state. 
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Generally speaking, there are two broad categories of norms that appear most 
frequently in these endeavours to internationalise their grievances. This is 
because referencing these norms was seen to increase the likelihood of 
effective transnational campaigns than other kinds of issue. These are:  1) the 
prohibition of gratuitous bodily harm and 2) the equality of opportunity in 
domestic law. 567 These two elements were crucial during the military 
government period and its aftermath. However, some of the literature related to 
TANs points out that the success of international campaigns is conditional on 
whether the targeted state is highly likely to be responsive to pressure. Certain 
conditions could increase vulnerability, for example, if a state is a signatory to 
international agreements. Another factor for the success of TANs is whether the 
targeted state wishes to be internationally accepted as a democratic nation. 
Most importantly, the effectiveness of TANs could also hinge on the economic 
outcome for the state as a consequence of its international reputation. In other 
words, ‘vulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target’s 
sensitivity to leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail’.568  
 
Indeed, it is argued that in the early years of the Israeli state, its international 
reputation was rather poor. For example, in 1956, Israel had only seven 
embassies and these were only in the US and in some European countries. 
Following its reprisals in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel received several 
censures from the UN, which impacted negatively on its international reputation. 
This was because of the disproportionate number of Palestinian and other Arab 
civilians who were killed or injured during these raids. Consequently, a number 
of countries, including the Soviet Union began to distance themselves from the 
Jewish state. Another setback to Israel’s reputation was its exclusion from the 
Asian- African Conference, which took place in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. 
That conference called on all nations to end racialism and imperialism in all its 
forms. 569 
 
                                                 
567 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
568 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 1998.  
569 Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers (Stanford (Calif.): Stanford University Press, 2013). 
  124 
Yet, some authors570 have argued that Israel portrayed a positive image 
internationally from 1948-1967 especially by moving forward with Arab Israeli 
relationships as happened in the 1977 Israeli- Egyptian peace process. This 
reflects the tension between the need to be a legitimate state committed to the 
rule of law, the challenges to Israel especially from actions by the United 
Nations General Assembly, and the perceived threats to national security which 
were deemed to legitimise any action that Israel considered necessary, whether 
compatible with international rules or not. 
 
In any case, the new state of Israel appeared to be impervious to international 
criticism. Despite being a UN member, it was seen to frequently ignore 
international law.571 In fact, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, in 1955 
made reference to ‘Um Shmum’ which in English means the UN is nothing, and 
stated that ‘it doesn’t matter what the gentiles say; what matters is what the 
Jews do.’572 This remark has often been quoted as typical of Israel’s attitude to 
international law at this period.573 Such disregard for international law was 
evident in the nation’s indifference to UN criticism following the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign, which violated the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreements. 
Another example of their contempt of international agreements was seen in 
Israel’s attitude towards the protest of Argentina following the illegal abduction 
in 1960 of Eichmann, a former Nazi, from their country. A formal complaint by 
Argentina to UN Security Council had little effect. 574   
 
Relations between Israel and the UN declined further during the 1970s.
 
Two 
main events had a negative impact on relationships: first, international 
recognition of the PLO in 1974 by the invitation of Yasser Arafat to address the 
General Assembly which was followed by the PLO being granted observer 
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status at the UN General Assembly.575 The second was when the General 
Assembly resolution in 1975 labelled Zionism as a ‘form of racism and racial 
discrimination’.576 Both of these events served to fuel Israel’s negative attitudes 
toward the UN, attitudes that did not change over the years. Thus, it might be 
assumed that efforts to internationalise the grievances of the Arab minority were 
unlikely to enjoy much success in the 1950s.  
 
The current chapter analyses three different events that triggered the attempts 
to draw international attention to the mistreatment of the Arab minority in Israel 
between 1948-1979. The first two events relate to the Military Government 
period that ruled over Arabs in many if not all spheres of their life from 1949-
1966. Particular attention is paid to the Kufr-Qassim massacre in 1956 with 
some mention of the subsequent suppression of the al-Ard organisation. This 
provides a framework for considering the effect of the process of 
internationalisation on the Military Government overall.  
 
The third case study refers to the post Military Government period until 1979, 
which considers the implications of ‘The Galilee [Judaising] Development’ Plan’. 
The cases were chosen as they underscore the ways in which Israel’s Arab elite 
chose to resist the violation of human rights by turning to the existing 
international platforms. Also, these events are key dates on the calendar of 
anniversaries for the Arab citizens inside Israel and considered as defining 
moments that triggered the use of memoranda as a means of 
internationalisation. All activities will be analysed using the social constructivist 
spiral model, and empirical data from the interviews conducted with key 
participants who had an intimate knowledge of the defining moments in these 
case studies.  
 
In this chapter, I adopt a procedural definition of hybrid regime,577 focusing on 
the first two decades of Israel’s existence (1948-66). The Palestinian minority, 
which remained within the state’s borders was controlled by a restrictive military 
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administration and, in relation to this minority group, Israeli rule cannot be 
described as democratic.  
 
The classes of actors relevant in the case studies go beyond those referred to 
in the literature on the boomerang- spiral model.578 In particular, in the cases 
discussed, Arab parliamentarian and extra-parliamentarian movements were 
involved in the process of internationalisation of alleged human rights violations 
in a similar manner as TANs referred to in the literature on the spiral model. For 
this reason, the analysis of their internalisation efforts within the framework of 
the boomerang- spiral model seems appropriate.  
 
 
4.2 The Military Government in 1949- 66 
’Repression’ (first phase).  
 
Although most Palestinians that remained in 1949 were granted Israeli 
citizenship, Israel’s official policy towards its Arab citizens was based on the 
belief that they were potentially disloyal and a security threat that required a 
control mechanism.579 Accordingly, the first phase of the spiral model, namely 
repression, started on 21 October 1948.580 It was characterised by the enacting 
of policies of oppression by the state under a coercive Military Government 
established in areas populated only by the Arab population.581 It was based on 
British emergency regulations that provided a framework for a control 
apparatus, which greatly restricted almost every aspect of Palestinian life in 
Israel. For example, restriction of movement impeded the Arab citizens freedom 
to travel to nearby towns to visit family or to go to work. Additionally, the lands 
of Arab citizens were expropriated and fell into state ownership.582 Travel 
permits, curfews, administrative detentions, and expulsions were part of life.  
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As a result of this harsh system of control and oppression, Arab citizens 
petitioned the Israeli High Court several times but their appeals were dismissed 
on grounds of ‘security reasons’.583 Thus, the Israeli Supreme Court allowed 
Israel to enjoy two worlds: preserving a military administration on the one hand, 
while avoiding basic standards expected from a democratic state on the other. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Kufr- Qassim Massacre in (1956) 
 
The Kufr- Qassim Arab village is located in territory that was annexed by Israel 
after signing the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, and like 
many Arab villages; it was subjected strict military rule until 1966.584  
 
The Kufr-Qassim Massacre in (1956) was the most prominent episode that 
occurred during the Military Administration and demonstrates repression in line 
with phase one of the spiral model. It arose on the eve of Britain, France and 
Israel’s offensive on Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956. The Israeli 
authorities imposed a sudden curfew on a number of Arab villages in the 
Triangle, an area consisting of a concentration of Arab towns and villages 
located in central Israel. A curfew between 5 P.M. and 6 A.M had been imposed 
but on the 29 of October 1956, a group of Arab citizens were returning home 
from their fields after the curfew had begun. In the course of two hours forty-
eight Palestinian Arab citizens were shot and killed by Israeli Border Guards, in 
what became known as the Kufr-Qassim massacre.585 The victims were 
civilians who had been unaware of the suddenly imposed curfew restrictions 
and they include nineteen men, six women, ten teenage boys (ages fourteen to 
seventeen), six girls (ages twelve to fifteen), and seven young boys (ages eight 
to thirteen).586 Some reports give the total killed as fifty-one.587 All but four of 
whom were residents of Kufr-Qassim. This event acquired great symbolic 
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significance in the psyche of the Arab minority in Israel as exemplifying the 
brutal nature of the repression and the denial of human rights practiced during 
the military regime.588 Additionally, the commemoration of the massacre has 
become the most significant date on the Arab’s political calendar in Israel over 
the last two decades.589 
 
Applying the spiral model to analyse atrocities carried out by authoritarian 
regimes, the systematic violation of human rights should be followed by the 
initial activation of the transnational network to pressurise the oppressive 
government (attempts to internationalise the case), and only then the process 
followed by the denial phase in the spiral model.590 Yet, in a situation where the 
oppressive regime takes the form of a hybrid government, as in this case, the 
dynamic seems to a slightly different.  
 
At the beginning the government made enormous efforts to hide the evidence of 
the massacre from the Jewish public and the international press.591 Apparently, 
this tactic was successful for about two weeks as on November 11, 1956, Ben-
Gurion released for the first time a statement about the massacre and described 
it as disgraceful and unfortunate. 592 In the statement Ben-Gurion also claimed 
that innocent Arab citizens were killed by mistake as a result of a curfew that 
initially was imposed to save their lives from extraterritorial raids.593 The 
government statement read as follows: 
 
‘Increased Fidayi [volunteer] action on 29 October 1956 led to the 
imposition of military rule on the villages adjacent to Jordan in order to 
protect them’594 
 
Clearly, it was not a ‘literal denial’ (‘nothing is happening’), which is less 
common in democracies where the media have less restricted access to 
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information and can report on scenes of violations in a manner that usually 
makes literal denial ineffective.595 Rather, the Israeli military government 
provided a ‘utilitarian justification’ (‘we should do it to prevent the vulnerability of 
more people). Following the ‘utilitarian justification’, the Israeli government 
moved to ‘tactical concession’. It did so by establishing an inquiry commission 
that focused on blaming individuals rather than government policy. The 
commission concluded that the commander of the battalion (Melinki) and 
number of his subordinates must be judged596 for applying ‘illegal’ command, 
and recommended to compensate the each family of the victims with 1,000 
Israeli pounds.597 Both the initial justification and tactical concession, shows the 
government’s intention of pre-empting possible reactions and to divert any 
attention from the atrocity. It is also believed that the publication of the first 
official Israeli statement seems to be much more a pre-emptive attempt to 
provide protection to the committers of the massacre, rather than less 
acknowledgment of the facts. 598 In any case, this meant that attempts by Ben-
Gurion' government to hide the atrocity were not successful. 
 
Breaking the silence: Attempted internationalisation [network activation in 
the language of the spiral model] 
This process is characterised by the production and diffusion of information 
about human rights abuse in the norm violating state with TANs.599 In this study, 
I treat this act of activation of a network as an attempt to internationalise as it is 
shares the same aim of the internationalisation process, and for the sake of 
clarity, I characterise it as an independent phase. Commonly, it belongs to the 
after the first phase (repression) as a vital condition for the transition to the 
second phase (denial). However, in the case study of the Kufr- Qassim 
massacre, it emerged after the third phase (tactical concession). This might be 
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explaining by the fact that the Israeli regime was hybrid in nature and not 
democratic or authoritarian pe rse as the spiral model suggests. These efforts 
are now discussed although they normally precede both the ‘denial’ and ‘tactical 
concession’ phases and brought to attention following activation of network of 
domestic political opposition in the classical spiral model analysis. 
Both the academic literature600 and contemporary Palestinian activists and 
politicians who are identified with the Israeli Communist Party, unanimously 
acknowledge the prominent role and the leadership of the Palestinian member 
of the Knesset (MKs), Tawfiq Tubi in revealing the 1956 massacre. MK Tubi 
was an outstanding Arab leader of the Communist Party originated mostly from 
the Greek Orthodox Christian community.601 MK Aydah Toma– Suliman number 
five in the Joint List on behalf the Communist Party refer to the 1950s as a 
starting point for the involvement of Arab politicians in international activities, 
and draw attention to the role of MK Tubi in appealing the international 
community to ameliorate the discrimination against the Arab minority in Israel:  
 
‘The Communist party from its beginning had worked on this issue 
although it did not clearly call it internationalization. The issue of the 
Arab citizens of Israel and the injustice they have faced has been raised 
on various levels; either through participation in international platforms 
such as special committees of the UN, or by meetings with international 
forums such as The Peace Council and the World Social Forum. The 
Kufr- Qassim massacre in 1956 triggered the Communist Arab politician 
Tawfik Tubi to send a letter to the UN about the event. It means that we 
were well aware of the use of the internationalisation as a strategy even 
at that time’602 
 
Similarly, Jaa’far Farah, CEO of Mossawa, the Advocacy Centre for Arabs in 
Israel, who views the process of ‘internationalisation’ as ‘international advocacy’ 
argues that: 
  
‘There is a feeling that in light of the absence of a national archive, your 
generation is thinking that the internationalisation phenomenon has 
started today. It didn’t start today, if you look at the 1950s, there were 
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forces that called for international advocacy and for raising the issues of 
the Palestinian society in Israel in international arenas. Take for 
example the Kufr- Qassim massacre, where both MK Tubi and MK 
Velner went to Kufr- Qassim village, and collected testimonies from 
people although nobody was allowed to enter the village. Eventually, 
Tubi published a memorandum, which was distributed internationally 
through the Soviet Union and the communist countries in Eastern 
Europe.’603 
 
It could be argued that having recourse to the Soviet Union was a questionable 
strategy as it was itself an oppressive regime having in the same year (1956) 
sent in its tanks to Budapest to crush insurgence there. However, Tubi was a 
member of a communist party and would therefore for ideological reasons 
looked to the Soviet Union rather than the US and would certainly have not 
considered either Britain or France as potential advocates given their recent 
interventions in the Suez War. Given this international political picture, the 
Soviet Union was more likely to espouse the Arab Israeli cause than the 
Western countries. This very point was made by one of the interviewees.  
 
MK Odeh, the Head of the Joint (Arab) List in the Israeli parliament,604 and the 
leader the Israeli Communist Party (Hadash) explains the relations of the Arab 
communists in Israel with Eastern Europe: 
 
‘At that time the world was sharply divided between the Eastern and 
Western camp, and here I’d like to mention a very important point that in 
my point of view affected our international behaviour; we had hostility 
towards the West as it was Israel’s ally and because it was subjected to 
the Cold War, therefore, Israel’s Arabs had relations with Eastern 
Europe and especially the Soviet Union. In May 1958 Pravda605 wrote 
about the Kufr- Qassim massacre on its first page, thanks to Tawik 
Zayad who made it happen. The interest of the Eastern world in relation 
to the issue of the Arabs within Israel has existed in one way or another, 
but there is no doubt that there was a severe weakness in the relations 
with the Western world and America due to the ideological enmity 
towards them’.606  [Communist Tawik Zayad was the mayor of 
Nazareth city] 
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The specific claims made by MK Odeh in his quote about the Cold War are 
verified by the rich story told by Maha Nassar (2014) about the role of the Cold 
War in Palestinian activism.607 According to Nassar, The Soviet Union's 
ideology of social justice and liberation by working-class rebellion resonated in 
many colonised countries. In relation to the Arab minority to Israel, Al-Ittihad 
(the union) Communist newspaper played a central role in spreading this 
ideology through focusing on global anticolonial activities that showed Western 
powers in a negative light.  
 
Following Ben Gurion’s efforts to cover up the massacre, and similar to the role 
of TANs, MK Tubi, did not give up and attempted to document the Kufr- Qassim 
massacre and to bring it to the attention of the world, in other words, to 
internationalise it. Both MKs Tubi alongside the Israeli Jewish MK Meir Vilner, 
who was also a member of the bi-national Arab–Jewish Israeli Communist Party 
(MAQI) managed to visit Kufr-Qassim village to investigate the matter despite 
the police barriers that prevented any access to the entrances. They succeeded 
in collecting evidence from the traumatised and grieving people and later tried 
to publicise their testimonies in the local press.608  
 
On November 23, 1956 Tubi published a memo of the incident in three 
languages; Hebrew, Arabic,609 and English, and disseminated it to hundreds of 
renowned public figures in Israel, as well as to the Soviet Union and East 
European countries where the Israeli communist party had strong links.610 This 
account is well known in Arabic as ‘Mothakart Tubi’611 (Tubi’s memorandum). 
Tubi blamed the government for producing the atmosphere, which encouraged 
the border police to perpetrate the massacre. His language was a clear 
expression of the sense of injustice and compared the 1956 atrocity with that of 
the 1942 Czech village Lidice that was committed by the Nazis.612 The 
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memorandum included description of the massacre and all the names of the 
dead and wounded citizens:613 
 
‘The worker Samir Bder from Kufr- Qassim said: I’ve arrived the village’s 
entrance near the school along with three other workers on our bicycles 
at 16:55 (before the curfew) twelve border police men along with officer 
stopped us. The workers said ‘shalom to the officer’ who asked them: 
‘are you happy’? they answered: ‘yes’ and then the police left their car 
and asked the workers to stop, and the officer gave his order ‘crop 
them’…’614 [translated from Tubi’s letter in Arabic] 
 
Tubi’s memorandum also referred to the committee’s recommendations to 
compensate the victims’ families with 1,000 Israeli pounds each as a 
‘whitewash and cover-up exercise’. Tubi described Israel’s policy towards its 
Arab citizens as a ‘national persecution’, referred to the military government and 
called for a public trial and accountability of the officers who gave the order to 
shot: 
‘…I see my humanitarian duty, my duty as an elected from the people, 
duty towards the people of Israel, and towards the inhabitants of Kufr-
Qassim who asked to make their shout heard in the public opinion, to 
send this letter asking every descent person with a living conscience to 
work against this crime of murder and to raise his voice against the 
government’s policy towards the Arab citizens in the country, the policy 
of national persecution and military government, policy that develops a 
feeling of disrespect of the Arab citizens and that everything is allowed 
against them …..I hope that descent people, equality advocators, the 
brothers of people and peace will not allow the success of the 
conspiracy of blurring the crime. So they have to struggle with all their 
power to expose all the responsible officials and to bring them to a 
public trial’615 [translated from Tubi’s letter in Arabic] 
 
Although the boomerang effect and the spiral model as developed in the 
literature do not explicitly incorporate the role of domestic parliamentarians, this 
study uses an adaptation of the model as it provides a good tool to analyse the 
internationalisation behaviour of minority politicians in Israel. There is no 
inherent reason why the effects of internationalisation should only be 
observable if carried out by TANs. Accordingly, MK Tubi’s act has been more 
recently described in the literature of the transnational advocacy networks 
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(TANs) as ‘information politics tactics’.616 This tactic relies on the fast and 
efficient dissemination of knowledge of atrocities to targeted agencies, which 
are perceived to raise the matters to the to more influential actors in the 
international arena who can ensure that it will have much greater impact with 
the intention of exposing violation of human rights by means of credible 
testimonies by survivors. These personal testimonies from survivors whose 
lives been affected by the events are most important in having an influence 
internationally. Here, the influences of mass media are important alternative 
channels for ensuring that these stories reach a wide international audience. 
But there is another dimension to the actions of Tubi. By disseminating the 
memorandum to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, Tubi can be 
viewed as engaging in ‘leverage politics’. ‘Leverage politics’ is a term used to 
describe a tactic of bringing about change by mobilising the support of other 
more influential players by persuading them or by bringing pressurise to bear on 
them.617 
 
 To be successful as a strategy depends on the ability of the transitional actor in 
correctly assessing points of leverage. There are two different types of leverage 
points namely material and moral. Material leverage implies some form of 
advantage for the advocate whether this is financial or political. Moral leverage 
has sometimes been referred to as the ‘mobilisation of shame’ because the 
action of the target advocate can portray a favourable image as being a 
custodian of human rights. 618 The advantage here is in terms of the image 
internationally of the helping country or agency.619 In this situation it was 
unlikely that MK Tubi could have exerted any form of material leverage on the 
Soviet Union as materially the communist regime would have little to gain in a 
material sense except perhaps some longer term advantage with other Arab 
states favourable to the Arab Israeli cause. More likely Tubi’s actions did have 
powerful moral leverage as it presented an ideological advantage for the Soviet 
Union to castigate the perpetrators of the Kufr-Qassim incident and their 
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international allies for their capitalist exploitation. Accordingly, the communist 
MK Tubi succeeded in drawing attention to the massacre as a flagrant violation 
of human rights, and to the plight of his community in the hopes that it would 
find relief. Both the Soviet delegate and Radio Moscow called for an 
investigation of the crime and that the perpetrators should be called to account. 
 
In this period (1950s-1960s) TANs were not yet highly developed. The 
conceptual framework of this historical period predated the time period that 
Sikkink/Risse Kappen ‘spiral’ model was developed, that is, towards the end of 
1990s. Clearly, the 1956 massacre occurs before basic human rights 
resolutions and treaties such as the ICCPR and ICERD that were signed in the 
early 1960s, entered into force. Also, at that time states did not implement yet 
bilateral human rights policies, international institutions did not have much 
power, and human rights NGOs rarely existed.620 However, there were the 
international media, churches, trade union and parliamentarians who had the 
capacity to impact on international discourses and who are elements of what 
later came to be characterised as TANs. So, even in the absence of TANs there 
were efforts to internationalise the violation of human rights and minority rights 
and the spiral model is useful to analyse these efforts.  
 
Tubi’s memo provided evidence of the massacre of innocent Arab citizens, an 
act in which Ben- Gurion was deemed to be complicit, and became a focal issue 
in domestic and international discourse.621 The Soviet Union and its satellites in 
Eastern Europe were not alone in raising the plight of the Israeli Arabs. 
Delegates from eleven different Arab nations complained to the President of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1956 about the treatment 
of the Arabs citizens of Israel in the overall context of the treatment of the Arabs 
in the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. They complained about the 
‘inhuman treatment of the Arabs who live in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai 
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Peninsula. Hundreds of Arab men, women, and children have been ruthlessly 
murdered in cold blood.’622  
 
The key action leading to the internationalisation of the Kufr- Qassim atrocity 
was Tubi’s memo to the Soviet Union, a world power with significant sway in the 
UN. In terms of leverage, the Soviet Union represented the best chance for Tubi 
to have the Kufr- Qassim incident internationalised. Neither the United States 
nor Britain and France were likely to raise the incident with the same insistence 
the Soviet Union would have done as their international policies involved 
supporting Israel and in minimising reports of violations of human rights. Thus, 
exerting moral leverage by the Soviet Union and with support of other Arab 
nations was the ultimate strategy for internationalising the Kufr- Qassim 
incident. In the language of constructivists, this attempt would seem as an 
attempt to shame Israel in the international arena. Yet, it would be more 
reasonable to look at Tubi’s attempt of internationalisation as a modest attempt 
to help the Arab citizens to survive.   
 
Denial (second phase). 
 
According the literature of TAN, Tubi’s links with the Soviet Union expected to 
be followed by human rights talk between foreign States and the State of Israel. 
The literature however fails to provide such information. Yet authors 
acknowledge the fact that Tubi’s memorandum has attracted national and 
international attention to 1956 massacre, which pressurised the Israeli 
government to investigate the matter.623 Thus, following, the local and 
international attention, which was paid to the Kufr- Qassim incident, on 
December 12, 1956, the government, released a statement similar to the one 
that was released a few days after the massacre (initial denial), which again 
took the form of a ‘utilitarian justification’.624 While considerable section of the 
Jewish public was outraged that the authorities would prosecute rank-and-file 
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troops for merely following their orders, others, however, viewed the eve of the 
1956 as a gruesome negation of their humanist self- image and supported the 
trial of the accused as an affirmation of Israeli democracy.625 This was the next 
move of the Israeli government. 
 
Tactical concession (third phase). 
 According to Keck spiral model, ‘tactical concessions’ occurs when the 
governments stop denying the legitimacy of human rights, and specific changes 
are made in order to pacify international criticism. The government then 
engages in public debates with national and international critics about 
accusations. An important aspect of this stage is that it can create room for 
domestic opposition as these concessions then permit criticism when the state 
does not keep to its commitments.626 At this level, it is important to notice there 
were no attempts from the Israeli government to deny the validity of human 
rights. On the contrary, protecting lives of civilians was a significant theme of its 
official statements. At this level, the Israeli government moved to tactical 
concessions to appease national and international criticisms. This time ‘tactical 
concession’ took the form of Sulha (Bedouin reconciliation ceremonial), and 
military trial.627  
The first move of the Israeli tactical concession took a form of a Sulha (Bedouin 
reconciliation ceremony) that held between representatives of the Israeli state 
and the victims’ families. Essentially, the term Sulha reflects the Bedouin 
tradition of reaching an agreement over a dispute between two tribes over salt 
and bread. The Sulha took place in the same date of the memorial of the 
massacre’s first anniversary in October 1957.628 The fact that the Sulha was 
proposed in parallel to the on-going military trial of the eleven border guards 
alleged of committing the crime, raised questions about the government’s 
intention to cancel the trial. There were attempts to bring the accused guards to 
the ceremony but the villagers successfully opposed it. This move strengthened 
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the assumption that the government was planning to prepare the ground to 
ease the judges of the soldiers.629 
 
The second tactical concession move occurred on October 16, 1958, (few 
months after the Sulha) through a military trial in which the eleven border police 
officers in charge were called to account.630 However the penalties imposed 
were purely token in nature that sought to protect military and political elites. In 
fact, many of those charged were freed after less than a year later following a 
presidential amnesty631 and received promotions within the armed forces. 632 
For example, the Brigadier Yshishkar Shadmi, the battalion commander who 
was responsible for changing the curfew’s hours, was initially accused of 
murder but later he was charged only with ‘technical error’ for extending the 
hours of curfew without any authority to do so. Eventually, Shadmi was fined 
one Israeli grush, which is equal to penny.633 Such an insignificant penalty that it 
became a humorous metaphor in the Israeli discourse. Significantly, he was not 
charged with murder, but with a rather trivial bureaucratic offence, and later 
became a government official with responsibility for the relationships with the 
Palestinian minority.634  
The fact that the literature does not provide any clear evidence of any direct 
engagement in human rights talk between MK Tubi or even the Communist 
Party and other external transnational networks combined with the lack of 
official record of any direct response to Tubi’s letter, might raise questions about 
the perceived success of the internationalisation process. Yet, interviewees and 
scholars clearly supported the argument that the Israeli state moved to another 
phase of ‘tactical concession’ to pacify international criticism that emerged 
following this memorandum. For example, according to the Israeli Historian Raz 
(2018), Ben-Gurion’s response to the atrocity of Kufr- Qassim reflected the 
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Israeli leadership concerns about the international public opinion.635 Another 
strong evidence emerged in October 2018 in the Israeli Journal Haaretz that 
revealed Shadmi’s confession of the real intention of the1958 trial. One year 
before his death, Shadmi openly stated in an interview with him that this trial 
intended to mislead the international community with regard to Israel’s alleged 
pursuit of justice, and that he was well rewarded for cooperating with the staged 
trial:  
‘They explained to me that they needed to put me on trial, because if I 
had tried in my own country and convicted, even if I was fined only a 
penny, I wouldn’t go to The Hague…. If they didn’t prosecute me… I 
would be tried at The Hague and that is something that neither I nor the 
country were interested in…’636 
Shadmi’s confession does not leave any room for hesitation about the impact of 
international norms on Israel’s behaviour and supports the argument about the 
occurrence of the internationalisation. The fact that much of the documentation 
of the massacre still classified in the IDF archive637 might be the reason for the 
lack of more evidences about international criticisms and intervention. It is also 
believed that the apparently staging trial aimed also to conceal a secret plan 
called ‘Operation Mole’ (Hafarperet in Hebrew), to expel to Jordan the Arab 
citizens of villages located in the so-called Triangle area in southeast of 
Haifa.638  
 
The case study of Kufr- Qassim demonstrates that the spiral model is helpful in 
understanding that both internal and the external pressure and criticism had a 
major role in pushing the state to respond with tactical concessions (third 
stage). It did not lead to compliance with human rights legislation. It consisted 
merely of some legal and political manoeuvres, which protected the alleged 
perpetrators from a harsh punishment. More importantly, the state refused to 
accept that it was its policy that gave rise to these crimes and instead meted out 
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minor punishment to officials who became the scapegoats for events that were 
the consequence of state policy.  
Today, sixty-two years later, the memory of the Kufr- Qassim massacre still 
powerfully exists on the national agenda of the Arab citizens.639 In recent years 
some gestures on behalf the state has been made by way of acknowledging the 
tragic events with apologies but without a forthright admission of responsibility. 
In unprecedented conciliatory move, Shimon Peres, Former Israeli President 
apologised for the massacre as he visited the village during the Muslims festival 
of Eid al- Adha in December 2007. 640 Another apology expressed in 2014 by 
Reuven Rivlin, who also was in office as a President of Israel, when he took 
part in the annual memorial ceremony of the massacre, and described the 
massacre s a ‘terrible crime’.641 Yet, the apologies of Peres in 2007, and of 
Rivlin in 2014 were not expressed in any official State papers, and attempts to 
achieve a formal acknowledgment for the state’s responsibility for the massacre 
were failed.642 These results seem to move the spiral model towards ‘tactical 
concession plus’. Although the term ‘tactical concession plus’ is not strictly a 
terminology in the spiral model literature, the term seemed to be most 
appropriate to express the results of internationalisation on the spiral model in 
relation to the Kufr-Qassim case study and allow explanation for the state’s 
actions that move beyond cosmetic change. 
 
Accordingly, still awaiting some semblance of ‘prescriptive status’ on July 15, 
2018 residents of Arab village demanded that Israel open the archives on 1956 
Massacre.643 It remains to be seen whether the behaviour of the Israeli state, in 
response to this renewed challenge, will finally move towards the fourth and the 
fifth stages of ‘prescriptive status’, and ‘rule consistent behaviour’. 
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It should be noted that while MK Tubi was the first Arab political figure who 
attempted to draw international attention to the mistreatment of the Arab 
minority in Israel in regard to the Kufr- Qassim massacre in 1956, another 
historical event where another Arab intellectuals pleaded for outside help. To 
take few examples: in May 1953 Elias Kusa, an independent Christian Attorney 
wrote to the US Charges D’Affaires to express his concern that Dulles would not 
meet with a delegation of Arab citizens during his visit. In 1955 the New York-
based Arab Information Office circulated a report to diplomats about the 
conditions of military rule in Israel.644  
 
 
Figure 2: The Kufr-Qassim Massacre in 1956 
 
 
 
It could be argued however that in some respects a fourth stage and the fifth 
stage of the spiral model has been reached if one considers the removal of the 
martial rule as definite end to conditions which could give rise to events like 
Kufr- Qassim. In this sense, the massacre was a catalyst for many Palestinians 
to protest the existence of military rule. In 1957 there was a protest against 
military government and the discrimination against Arab citizens. This public 
campaign arose in response to the memory of Kufr- Qassim whereby renewed 
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and intensified calls were made for a more egalitarian society. One year later, in 
the summer of 1958, hundreds of Jewish artists, academics, and even 
settlement leaders appealed the government to end the ‘ten years of 
discrimination’ and the clear repression of the military government.645 In early 
1960s, Ben- Gurion’s government confronted with more, conferences, 
demonstrations, petitions and establishment of Jewish-Arab organisations 
against the military administration asking it to liberalise its policies towards the 
Palestinian citizens.646 It should be noticed that apart from the Communist Party 
and the Arab citizens activism, both the Jewish left-wing Mapam (United 
Workers Party),647 and the ultranationalist Herut led by Menachem Begin, 
played a pivotal role in protesting against the military government.648 It was not 
easy to counter the Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and his policies as the Jewish 
‘public opinion’ was on his side, and the local Jewish press was unanimous 
supportive to his policies.649 Yet, sustained local and international criticisms of 
the military government resulted in removing in mid 1960s as will be detailed 
below.  
 
‘Prescriptive status’ (Fourth Phase). 
 
‘Prescriptive status’ as defined is a stage when states accept international 
norms through international signing human rights agreements and incorporate 
language of human rights in their discourse.650 The first sign of change that 
reflects Israel’s progress towards ‘prescriptive status’ was in 1963 when Levi 
Eshkol who replaced Ben-Gurion as a Prime Minister, declared his intention of 
ending the military government in 1966 as he believed it was unsustainable; 
politically, practically, and morally. 651 Following Eshkol’s declaration, the Israeli 
government signed three International human rights agreements. These 
include: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
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treaty (ICERD) in 1965,652 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),653 and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).654 While some of these international covenants 
are not enforceable laws, states concerned about their international image were 
influenced by them including Israel that sought to be accepted as an integral 
member of the international community and therefore.655  
 
 ‘Rule-consistent behaviour’ (The final phase of the spiral model).  
 
The move to the fifth phase ‘rule consistent behaviour’ was around the same 
years where Israel’s conduct was characterised by the ‘prescriptive status'. 
According to the authors of the spiral model,656 the final phase of the spiral 
phase exists when human rights violations decrease, and norm acquiescence 
becomes a regular practice of actors. Clearly human rights norms in Israel 
achieved ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ status with the end of the military 
government in 1966. The fundamental change came following the Six Day War, 
in October 1968 when all movement limitations on Israel’s Arab citizens formally 
ended.657  
 
The spiral model suggests that in order for domestic and international pressures 
to have an impact, governments must have some form of vulnerability to 
internal and external pressures.658 ‘Moral vulnerability’ requires that 
governments must be sensitive to the pressures and that they care about their 
image.659 In this sense, Bauml (2002) argues that there was international 
criticism against Israel especially from South Africa and Asia and as Ben-Gurion 
considered the relations with these continents as important for Israel, he was 
advised in late 1950s that ending the military government would challenge the 
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pan-Arab propaganda that Israel is a foreign body in the Middle- East, and 
prove to the world that Jews and Arabs can live together.660 At this point even 
though continued to believe in the necessity of the military administration his 
government started to gradually relax policies towards the Arab citizens. 
Eventually, when Ben-Gurion, the champion of the Military Government retired 
(due to personal reasons as he declared and was replaced) and he was by Levi 
Eshkol in June 1963.661 The Eshkol’s government has moved Israel to the final 
phase of the spiral mode, ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ with regard to the military 
rule.  
 
Figure (6): The military government (1948-66) on the spiral model  
 
Alternative Explanations 
  
It is noted earlier (phase one, repression) that Israel’s official policy was based 
on the fear of Arab disloyalty. However, some sources in the academic literature 
challenge this claim and argues that it is only partially true. The literature 
suggests different explanations for the end of military rule that are largely 
external to human rights discourse. It supports the argument that the military 
administration was designed to achieve state goals, which had a minor relation 
with the immediate security threat. Simply put, the main reason that the state 
imposed the regime on the Palestinians who remained in Israel was to ban 
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them from reaching their lands by declaring them ‘closed zones’.  This move 
aimed to the confiscate of Arab-owned land as directly following the 
establishment of the state of Israel, the Israeli government took over an area of 
more than 3,250,000 dunums.662  It is also believed that the military government 
meant to marginalise the Arab minority politically so that they would not protest 
their dispossession, and to create a mechanism that would suspend the 
democratic rule of law enjoyed by Jews.663 Therefore, the fact that the Zionist 
movement has achieved its demographic and economic plans in the 1960s, the 
state’s top elite decided at that point of time to adopt new democratic strategies 
to maintain the privileges of Israel as a liberal country.664  
 
Another explanation refers to the events of 1960s at the international level that 
witnessed a global wave of increasing human rights and decolonisation 
discourse. For example, in 1961 the UN General Assembly voted in favour of 
imposing sanctions against the Apartheid regime in South Africa.665 So, it is 
believed that international norms played a pivotal role in compelling the Israeli 
government to meet the new human rights standards, even though this matter 
was not at top priorities of the Israeli policy makers.666  
 
There is a significant gap in the literature because it does not establish a clear 
causal hierarchy. Thus, it remains unclear from the academic discourse whether 
or not the change in the international consensus on human rights or the 
domestic political pressure from both Arab and Jewish citizens alongside 
international critics would have been effective if the Zionists had not achieved 
the goals that are ascribed to them. In any case, according Risse 2016, stable 
improvement in human rights conditions usually require some measure of 
political transformation and can be regarded as one aspect of liberalisation 
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processes. Enduring human rights changes, therefore, go hand in hand with 
domestic structural changes.667 All of the aforementioned explanations refer to 
factors that were relevant. 
 
Ending military rule in 1966 marked a significant change in the pattern of the 
violation of Arab rights in Israel. It is significantly reduced the control of the 
Israeli government over the Arab minority and authority gradually decentralised 
in the civic sphere over time. The security policies in relation to the Arab citizens 
became more sophisticated and realistic and the control of the police, general 
security service, and other security agents has become more flexible.668 
However, the patterns of control that were developed during the period of the 
military government have determined, to a large extent, the nature of the 
relationship between Israel and its Arab minority.669 Some authors believe that 
the termination of the military government came to allow Israel to remove the 
appearance of discrimination and thus to enhance its global image, while 
keeping the emergency regulations; moving the powers of the regime to the 
civilian police; and inaugurating a new plan to settle the Galilee.670 
 
Indeed, the state of emergency has never been lifted completely; the 
emergency regulations subject to certain adjustments have remained in effect 
until the current day. Israeli governments have continued judicial and 
administrative measures designed to seize lands of the demolished villages to 
prevent the return of the internally displaced.671 Few months after that Israel 
ended its Military Government in 1966, it started a new Military rule in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1964, eight years after the distribution of Tubi’s 
memorandum, and two years before the end of the military government, another 
petition was forwarded to the UN by the al- Ard movement. This will be the next 
case study. 
 
                                                 
667 Thomas Risse, Domestic Politics And Norm Diffusion In International Relations: Ideas Do Not Floats Freely (London 
and New  York: Rutledge, 2017). 
668 Alina Korn, "Military Government, Political Control And Crime: The Case Of Israeli Arabs", Crime, Law And Social 
Change 34, no. 2 (2000): 159-182. 
669 Korn, "Military Government, Political Control And Crime: The Case Of Israeli Arabs", 159-182. 
670 Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers (Stanford (Calif.): Stanford University Press, 2013). 
671 Nur Masalha, Catastrophe Remembered: Palestine, Israel, And The Internal Refugees  (New York: Zed Books LTD, 
2005). 
  147 
4.2.2 Al- ard (the land) movement in 1964 
 
The second key prominent event through which the spiral model can be applied 
as an analytical tool is in relation to al- Ard movement that evolved during the 
military rule and aimed to internationalise the ‘question of the Arab citizens’. 
According to Mohammed Zeidan, the Head of the Arab Association for Human 
Rights (HRA), al-Ard was the first Arab extra- parliamentary body in Israel that 
aimed to draw incarnational attention to the tribulations of the Arab citizens 
through the UN. Zeidan also stressed the role of Mansur Kardosh who was the 
prominent leader of the al- Ard activities and argued that the 1964 letter to the 
UN resulted in deterioration of the situation between the state of Israel and the 
outlawed al- Ard Movement:672 
 
‘During the military rule period, Mansur Kardosh established al- Ard 
movement, which was outlawed following a memorandum that was sent 
to the UN. Al- Ard was the first extra- parliamentarian movement that 
aimed to internationalise the grievance of the Arab citizens from an early 
stage. The UN memorandum was one of its most prominent 
international activities. It raised the complaints of the Arab citizens about 
Israel’s military rule and policies of discrimination such as lands 
expropriation, and freedom of movement’673 
 
The new political movement called in Arabic al- Ard (The Land) established in 
1959 by an intellectual group of the Arab community in Israel.674 This movement 
aimed to form a political Arab party that identified with the Pan-Arab ideology of 
the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. It was the first Arab Movement 
that openly denied Israel’s right to exist, therefore it was security threat to the 
State.675 Edward Said described al-Ards' as ‘the first resurgence of Palestinian 
national consciousness after 1948’.676  
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Like to the Arab Communist Arab leaders of MAQI, al- Ard leaders were more 
educated than the average leaders of the Arab population.677 However, unlike 
Communist leaders who emphasised a civil worldview, al- Ard members spoke 
the language of collective rights based on national and cultural grounds.678 
Moreover, the movement operated without relying on any internal Jewish or 
external Soviet support as opposed to Arab communists that cooperated in 
parliament with Israeli Jews. This separatism from ‘legitimate’ activists (from the 
Israeli state's point of view) weakened its chances to be accepted in the Israeli 
mainstream, and develop as a challenging party to Maki for advocating the Arab 
citizens. 679 Due to its orientation, the al-Ard movement was security threat to 
Israel and much attention was directed to its activity.680 
 
’Repression’ (first phase) 
 
In late 1963, al-Ard group sought to achieve a license to publish a newspaper. 
Its request was rejected on the ploy that the editor, Saleh Baransi, did not have 
adequate education. The movement’s second request after appointing another 
editor was again declined by relying on the Emergency Regulations. 681 As a 
result, the group appealed to the Israeli High Court of Justice against this 
decision but also the Court refused a permission to publish a newspaper by 
depending on emergency regulations, and using security discourse claiming 
that al-Ard’s newspaper posed a danger to the state security.682  
 
 
Attempted internationalisation. 
 
Following the legal ruling preventing them from spreading their message locally, 
the al-Ard group sought to publicise its grievances internationally.683 In June 
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1964, the movement sent a detailed memorandum to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations about the situation of the Arabs in Israel. 684 The letter was 
framed in legal language highlighting court decisions and Israeli laws to support 
its claims of inequality. Al-Ard’s cause was presented to illustrate the unfair 
treatment Arabs in Israel receive and the lack of trust in the Israeli Supreme 
Court:685  
 
‘The slight hope which cherished our minds and faith in the courts of 
justice vanished just after the High Court of Justice gave its judgment 
against the cause of al-Ard Co. LTD. That judgment, which aroused the 
indignation of all free-conscious citizens, was a deadly blow to the 
freedom of the individual and of the press’686  
 
The letter also protested the legal tools that the Israeli government used to 
seize Arab lands and limit the freedoms and rights of Arab citizens under the 
military rule. It claimed that Israel treated the Arab minority as second-class 
citizens and did not provide them equal political rights, opportunities in public 
services and health, public employment, and distribution of funds to local 
authorities.687 Notably, the 1964 memorandum stressed that the Arabs in Israel 
are integral part of Palestinians who are part of the Arab Nation worldwide and 
claimed that: 
 
‘The Israeli Government keenly hopes to extinguish the Arab national 
feelings and to liquidate completely the Arab national entity in Israel… 
The al- Ard Group believes that’ 688 
 
The letter finished by demanding that the United Nations interfere to protect the 
rights of Arab citizens of Israel: 
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‘...The indifference of the Jews to the plight of the Arab citizens who 
suffer the consequences of the Emergency Regulations and the Military 
Rule, emphatically urge the effective interference of the United 
Nations…The UN is urgently requested to take into good consideration 
the complaints of Israeli Arab citizens and to safeguard their rights’689 
 
It is supposed that copies from the memo were forwarded to foreign embassies 
in Israel, editors of leading newspapers abroad and internationally known 
personalities.690 Similarly to Tubi’s letter, Al -Ard’s memorandum exemplifies 
another endeavour of the Arab leadership in Israel to raise international 
awareness in relation to their political status and to resist their marginalisation, 
by turning to international institutions. Yet, in this case, the Palestine National 
Liberation Movement (PLO), which distributed copies of this memo, and thereby 
acted as a transnational advocacy network for the Arab minority in Israel was 
undertaking armed attacks on Israel. This was not the first memorandum that al- 
Ard sent to the UN. A previous appeal was sent to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations in 1961 through telegram in relation to Arab youths who had 
tried to move from Israel to the Gaza Strip.691 Eventually, Al- Ard’s 1964 memo 
was denounced by all factions of the Jewish public, on the left and on the right, 
692 and international appeals were not followed up for fifteen years.  
 
 The literature acknowledges the fact that the 1964 al- Ard’s letter received a 
great interest by some groups in the Arab nations including the Arab press 
outside Israel.693 It was also noticed that it received much attention in the Israeli 
mainstream newspapers that reported about the government’s intention of 
considering undertaking ‘strict measures’ against the movement to stop its 
subversive activities against the Israeli State. 694 
 
Backlash.‘Repression plus’. 
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Like Tubi’s memorandum, there is no account in the literature of any UN 
response related to al- Ard memo. Yet, in this case, the Israeli government 
viewed al- Ard’s appeal as a subversive activity that extremely hurt the state,695 
and reacted in an extreme manner. In November 11, 1964, the Israeli Minister 
of Defence outlawed the movement.696 In this context, this study suggests to 
describes this move as ‘repression plus’ to allow a room for further deterioration 
in the state’s reaction as in this case. In the following year, in September 1965, 
the Central Elections Committee declined the party’s demand to run for 
elections based on the claim that its members ‘denied Israel’s territorial integrity 
and its very existence’. The Supreme Court supported this decision, and on 
November 19, 1964, the movement’s leading activists were detained and 
accused with endangering state security by contacting hostile Arab countries 
and the PLO, and establishing an illegal organisation. 697 after a five-year legal 
battle including three petitions to the Israeli High Court.698 
 
Clearly the backlash occurred following al-Ard’s attempts to internationalise the 
military government cause including its cause refers to the group’s nationalist 
ideology that was not compatible with the state’s political agenda, and therefore 
drew to them the limitation of their political aspirtions and ctivities. However, this 
backlash’ ‘repression plus’ could be also explained by its lack of an appropriate 
political status and of legitimacy compared with an elected parliamentarian such 
as in the case of MK Tubi.  
 
It should be noted that outlawing al-Ard movement occurred in the same period 
when Eshkol’s government was about ending the military government. These 
dynamics show that that the spiral model is incapable of reflecting the wider 
approach of the state towards human rights; rather it focuses only on individual 
cases. 
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Figure 3: Al- Ard Movement in 1964 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 The Galilee Development (Judaising) Plan (1975) 
The end of the military government that lasted almost eighteen years may 
illustrates the very success of both the international and the local struggle of the 
Arab minority for their civil equality and liberty. However, while it may be 
claimed that internationalisation contributed to finally compelled the government 
to end the military rule, and thereby eliminating the symbolism of Arab 
subjugation, it was still ineffective in changing the Zionist ideology. The 
confiscation of Arab- owned lands continued, and this had implications for 
security policies aimed at the Arab minority. In other words, although Israel 
accepted the validity of human rights norms (e.g. the UN 1965,1966 
agreements), the commitment of its top political leaders to equality was still 
weak. 
It is believed that confiscation of Arab lands remains to a large extent the most 
pressing issue following the end of the military government. 699 The Israeli 
governments allowed continuing land expropriation in Galilee. The term 
‘Judaising’ was widely understood as a racist policy that aimed at seizing Arab 
lands for Jewish settlement and purportedly for security purposes.700 It was 
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seen to have its roots in pre-1948 Zionist ideology, which created a narrative of 
a claim to Arab lands based on the need to unify geographically separated 
Jewish localities, especially where Arabs were in the majority in regions such as 
Galilee and the north- eastern Negev. Jewish settlements in such regions were 
regarded as the ultimate goal of Zionism.701 These Zionist aspirations began to 
become reality between 1948 and 1972 when vast swathes of land were taken 
over through Israeli laws. Overall, successive Israeli governments confiscated 
more than 250,000 acres of Arab lands in Galilee and in the Triangle. This was 
in addition to the millions of acres of land from which its owners had already 
been evicted in 1948.702 Naturally, such expropriation of land resulted in much 
resentment among the dispossessed Arab citizens.  However, there were no 
concerted efforts to protest or even repossess lost lands because a military 
government was in place specifically to control the Arab citizens. However, 
active protests Israel’s policies of lands confiscations took place for the first time 
in 1976, and it was followed by internationalisation attempts through various a 
means of ‘Public Memoranda’ (and local protest+ land day book). This will be 
further discussed in the following sections.  
 
‘Repression’ (first phase).  
 
Resentment about Arab land confiscations continued to foment and on March 
30, 1976, known as the ‘Land Day’ events, there were widespread protests, 
which erupted in response to the revealing of the government’s plan to take 
over a vast area of land which belonged to Arab citizens. This plan was first 
devised in October 1975 when the Israeli Minister of Agriculture proposed ‘The 
Galilee Development [judaisation] Plan’.703 However, this proposal remained 
secret and only became public knowledge in 1976.704  
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One explanation for the seizure of Arab lands in Galilee was its proximity to 
Lebanon, which was perceived to be hostile to the state of Israel and because 
this land was extensively inhabited by Arab citizens the region was considered 
to be a security risk. 705 It was planned to confiscate over 5000 acres of land, 
which had high proportions of Arab population in Galilee, the Negev and the 
Triangle. Arab citizens believed that the Israeli government used the term 
‘development plan’ as a rhetorical pretext for seizing the lands but, in reality, the 
ulterior motive was the policy of Judaisation. This was clearly stated in the 
following statement from the project of the ‘Judaisation of the Galilee’: 
 
 ‘The special issue of Galilee is the lack of Jewish citizens compared 
with non-Jews who constitute 70% of the total population’706 
 
The plan clearly reveals the Jewish government’s perception that the heavily 
populated Arab constituency of Galilee posed a serious threat to security 
especially in view of its proximity to Lebanon. Most of the confiscated land was 
earmarked for future development as military training camps and industrial 
estates.707 Evidence of the government’s plan is to be found in a document 
leaked to the Israeli media and published on September 7, 1976. This was the 
first publicly available document that refers to the Arab citizens as a 
‘demographic threat’ and which laid out a plan for reducing the influence of Arab 
citizens of Israel in the Galilee region. This document became known as the 
‘Koenig Memorandum’708 after its principle author Yisrael Koenig who was at 
that time the North District’s Governor in the Ministry of Interior. It highlighted 
what he termed as the anomalous situation of the Arab minority in Israel and 
spelled out the state’s policy towards the minority. Koenig argued in favour of 
limiting the number of Arab citizens living in Galilee and the Negev region by 
confiscating their lands. 709 
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‘Attempted internationalisation’ 
 
The Galilee (Judaising) Development Plan was met with stiff opposition from the 
Arab community strengthened by some support from democratically minded 
Jewish citizens. Undeterred, the government decided to continue with land 
confiscation and Judaisation. The response of the Arab leadership to the 
government’s obstinacy took three forms. One response took place in the form 
of the ‘Land Day’ public protests on 30 March 1976. Locally, protests were 
organised in villages throughout Galilee by the National Committee for the 
Defence of the Arab Lands (NCDAL), which advocated on behalf of Arab 
citizens whose lands were at risk of being expropriated. This committee was 
extra- parliamentary but was inspired by the new Arab- dominated Communist 
Party (Rakah). Tension escalated when six Palestinians from the Galilee were 
shot dead by Israeli security forces during the strike. About 100 others Arab 
protesters were wounded and hundreds were arrested during the March 30 
protest.710 
 
Land Day marked a turning point in the history of the Arab citizens in Israel as it 
was the first time that they held a region wide demonstration of such magnitude. 
It signalled a new era in relations between the minority Arab population and the 
Israeli government in which it became clear that the minority were no longer 
content to remain passive in the face of policies, which were inimical to their 
interests. Such widespread protest prompted Tawfik Zayad, Former Mayor of 
Nazareth to comment: 
 
‘The general strike on Land Day was a turning point in the struggle, 
marking a qualitative change in it. The strike caused an earthquake that 
shook the state from end to end, and overturned its policies and 
expectation'711 
 
The ‘Land Day’ protests, marked by fatalities and injuries became the focus not 
only of national news coverage but also international commentary.712 Even 
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though six Arab citizens lost their lives and many others were injured, there was 
no investigation carried out after the event nor was any Israeli government 
official held to account and no member of the security forces who was ever 
prosecuted. On numerous occasions the politicians and families of the victims 
called for an independent inquiry into the events of that day but their request 
was rejected on the grounds that this was an isolated incident in which security 
forces were being threatened by hostile forces.713 This response is in stark 
contrast with the government’s reaction to the 1956 Kufr-Qassim massacre, 
where responsibility was accepted and explained as a mistake rather than 
laying the blame on the Arab victims as in this case. In the Kufr-Qassim incident 
there was an investigation and at least token punishment meted out to those 
found to have been guilty. A possible explanation for the refusal of an inquiry 
was the widespread publicity of the incident at the time and an inquiry at a later 
date would have rekindled a more media or international attention.   
 
The difference in the strategy of Israeli government’s reaction toward the two 
events is clear. It is noticeable that in the 1976 ‘Land Day’ event, the Israeli 
government did not try to prevent any possible domestic and international 
criticism. In another words, it did not give any ‘utilitarian justification' for the 
killing of civilians rather it portrayed them as a real security threat to the state. 
However, since 1976 The Land Day has become etched in the Arab minority 
consciousness as a symbolic memorial of their struggles for justice while the 
victims have been elevated to the status of martyrs for the cause. The 31st of 
March has become a key date in the calendar of Arab citizens and Palestinians 
throughout historic Palestine,714 and for Palestinians in exile throughout the 
world. 
 
The second attempt to draw international attempts to the ‘Land Day’ events was 
by publishing the ‘the publication of the ‘Black Book’,715 which took place in the 
immediate aftermath of the ‘Land Day’ events to record the history of Land Day, 
to present the facts on that day and to refute the Israeli narrative about the 
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civilians who were killed.716 Similarly to Tubi’s memorandum, and his work as 
local TAN in documenting evidences about the Kufr-Qassim massacre, NCDAL 
produced the ‘Black Book’ to record significant evidence of the struggle for the 
land rights of the Arab minority, and the lack of response from the government 
was recounted. According the interview with MK Odeh the book was distributed 
to foreign networks but no further details were provided.717  
 
Another attempt to internationalise the Arab minority cause took the form of 
Memorandum sent to the UN 1979.718 The existence of this memorandum was 
brought to the attention of the researcher during an interview with Jaafar Farah, 
COE, Mossawa Centre: 
 
 
‘…the National Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands sent a 
memorandum to the UN in late 1970s in relation to Israel’s policies 
towards the Palestinian minority. We [Mossawa Centre] have published 
a book about the priest Shehadeh Shehadeh who was the secretary of 
the NCDAL and we included this memorandum in the book’719 
 
 On the 27th February 1979, a date celebrating the 30th anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the National Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Lands (NCDAL) sent the memorandum outlining the various 
violations of human rights of the Arab minority in Israel. In the li terature of TAN, 
this deliberate timing of action to coincide with important landmark dates is 
defined as ‘symbolic politics’.720 This is a strategy, which relies on having 
recourse to the power of actions, symbols or narratives that resonate with the 
sensibility of the intended audience. 721 The political symbolism of the date and 
its force is emphasised at the beginning of the memorandum:  
 
‘On the occasion of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Rights of Man, we place before you our public protest 
against the repeated violations of Arab human rights by successive 
Israeli government. Since our purpose in this document is confined to 
protesting against the systematic governmental policy of expropriation of 
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Arab land, we will not list here the various violations of human rights 
perpetrated by the Israeli government against the Arab citizens in all 
walks of life, social, economic and political particularly in the field 
employment, education, housing, municipal services and requisitioning 
of land in particular. Governmental policy of expropriation of Arab land, 
the eviction of Arab citizens from their villages and homes particularly 
during the early years after the formation of Israel, and now practiced 
against the Arab Bedouin population in the south (the Negev), is carried 
out under various pretext such as security, development, public interest, 
etc.…. under whatever pretext it is done, this carefully planned scheme 
aims at depriving us of our rights, both as national minority and as 
individual citizens’722 
 
This was a clear attempt to internationalise the plight of the Arab minority and 
the confiscation of their lands. The memorandum brought to the attention of the 
committee members the unfair policies and practices of the Israeli government. 
Particular reference was made in the memorandum of the events of the ‘Land 
Day’: 
 
‘The police attacked the striking citizens inside their villages, shot to 
death five innocent people in the villages of Sakhnin, Arraba, Kufr-
Kanna and Taybeh, wounded tens more and arrested hundreds of 
others. Those arrested were taken to police stations where they were 
brutally tortured and humiliated. This, in short, was the government’s 
reply to the Arab citizens’ daring to exercise their human right of 
declaring a peaceful strike!... We are certain that your honorable 
committee, whose main task is to defend human rights, will also 
condemn these actions and procedures of the Israeli government which 
flagrantly violate basic human rights’  
 
As evidence of these infringements of human rights and of the Israeli 
government’s Judaisation policy, the memorandum referred to the Koenig 
leaked document that exposed the intention of the Israeli government to 
dispossess the Arab minority of their land and to settle Jewish citizens in their 
place. 723 In presenting a rational for the memorandum, a direct reference was 
made to this Koenig secret Memorandum:   
 
‘the successive Israeli governments have followed since the 
establishment of the state, a racist policy of discrimination and national 
oppression against the Arab minority in Israel to substantiate this 
statement it will surface to attach to this document a copy of the secret 
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memorandum presented to the government by Israeli Koenig, the 
Northern District Commissioner of the Galilee’724 
 
NCDAL concluded its memorandum by emphasising the historical connection 
between the Arab minority and the land and asserted their right to be respected: 
 
‘We also hope that you, on your part, will take whatever steps you deem 
necessary, to insure our decent life in our homeland, the homeland of 
our fathers and ancestors, and to safeguard our future and destiny’725 
 
It should be noted that like the absence in the UN database of Tubi’s 1956,726 
and al- Ard’s 1965 Memoranda,727 attempts to find reference to this 
memorandum have proven unsuccessful. Neither is there any documentary 
evidence to be found of any official UN response to the memorandum. The 
author of this work is indebted to Mossawa Centre for being directed to the book 
Vision and Practice (2012), which is the only source, which contains the full text 
of the NDCAL’s 1979 memorandum to the UN Committee on Human Rights.728 
A copy of this publication was made available to the researcher during the 
interview with Jaafar Farah. The Mossawa Centre, which is supported by the 
EU has documented the NCDAL’s Memorandum to the UN as one 
steppingstone in the process of organising national archive for the Palestinian 
community within Israel:  
 
Similar to Tubi’s memo, also in this case no evidence could be found in 
literature about the existence of human rights talk between Israel and foreign 
nations. Yet, one reliable important evidence about the impact of the 
internationalisation attempts of the 1975 Plan on the Israeli policies could be 
found in the study of Nida Shoughry (2012) through an interview with the most 
prominent leader of the 1976 Land Day protests, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh, 
who was the Chairperson of the National Committee for the Defence of Arab 
Land, (NCDAL) which led the Lad Day protests. According to Shehadeh: 
 
‘our capabilities were within the demonstration and the unified voice of 
our public. We used all resources. We would invite TV reporters; hold 
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press conferences with local and international press. Every year on 
Land Day, we would give interviews to international press. That would 
put pressure on Israel. We were revealing what was happening to us, 
and reflecting an image of Israel contrary to that which it had been trying 
to maintain. And Israel does not like that. But we were ready to do even 
more… we used the international public opinion. I remember in one of 
the meetings on land issues, which were normally held with local 
councils heads, I raised the issue of the provocations of Israeli security 
forces that would insult and terrorize the 1948 Palestinian public. So I 
suggested we approach the Israeli government on this matter, and if it 
does not cooperate, I suggested forming delegation that will head to the 
United Nations and expose Israel’s treatment of its 1948 Palestinian 
citizens. The proposal was adopted by a majority of votes. Next day, I 
received a phone call from Ibrahim Nimr Hussein, saying he received 
massive number of calls from ministers, begging us not to appeal to the 
United Nations. They [the Israeli government] are afraid of [international] 
public opinion, and we took advantage of this fact in a right, polite, and 
democratic way that had its effect on our struggle. We did not, stop 
[after at the killings], we were not silenced.  On the same hand, we did 
not want more killings … we did not want blood. Also, just because there 
were killings does not mean our struggle was wrong’729      
 
 
Shehadeh’s interview contribute to the broader understanding of the impact of 
the internationalisation efforts on preventing Israel from introducing more 
controlling policies. Shehadeh’s evidence shows to a large extent the attention 
the Israeli State paid to its international reputation. It also can explain the talks 
that started following the 1976 ‘Land Day’ events between the government and 
the Arab local councils to resolve the land dispute. These talks continued for 
almost a decade and eventually some concessions were obtained on behalf of 
Arab citizens. Eventually, there was a change in the government’s policy as it 
did not apply the 1975 Judausation plan, and some tactical concessions were 
made. For example, it is reported that much of the land that had been 
confiscated in Galilee in 1976 was returned to its original Arab owners.730 It is 
believed that the government could restore expropriated land simply because 
the planned usage for which the land was taken in the first place had not been 
effected.731 In any case, it is noticed that the Israeli government greatly limited 
its Judaisation strategy and especially during the Rabin- Peres government 
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between 1992 and 1996,732 which reflects to a large extent the success of the 
1976 struggle. 
 
However, it should be noticed that neither Shehadeh’s evidence nor the 
academic literature or interviewees of this study have provided information 
about the activation of any external transnational advocacy network that had 
influence on the behaviour of the Israeli government. Also, no information about 
international criticism of Israel’s 1975 Judaisation Plan or response to the 1979 
letter is found.  Given that, NCDAL’s efforts to introduce Israel as a country that 
is violating human rights, and to draw world attention to the land matter through 
its 1979 memorandum to the UN could count as a ‘step’ in the spiral model. Yet, 
it could be said that the combination of the internationalisation attempts that 
included the 1976 ‘Land Day’ protests, the publication of the ‘Black Book’, 
NCDAL’s memorandum to the UN, and the local talks between the government 
and the Arab leadership, all resulted in generating some strategic compromise 
from the Israeli government side. It is also might be that the geopolitical 
circumstances affected the Israeli polices as the late 1970s witnessed a 
historical peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.  
 
Overall, there is almost a consensus among Arab leaders that the 1976 Land 
Day protests were the main reason that affected the Israeli policies. For 
example, despite the high price that had to be paid in terms of fatalities and 
injuries, the results of the Land Day strike were described as ‘amazing’. The 
military closure order was not enforced following Land Day events; it remained 
in place many years later, and was eventually revoked by the Israeli 
government.733 In this sense, Tawfik Zayad, the Former Mayor of the city of 
Nazareth said: 
 
‘When people ask, how have we benefitted from the struggle? we 
usually respond that we paid a high price on and around Land Day, but 
those who fought succeeded in having rescinded military orders to 
expropriate 5000 acres of land. They further forced the state to forfeit 
similar plans. Today you can see alMahel lands that are planted, green, 
and in Palestinian hands. We call for anyone who is uncertain about the 
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struggle’s usefulness to visit these thousands of acres of land and see 
with their own eyes this crucial achievement’734  
 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that what appeared to be a victory turned to 
be a tactical concession by the state as it had merely changed the means of 
control over the Galilee region. Although there was no longer a massive land 
expropriation, the need to protect the land continues to be even more urgent 
than ever. While some original Arab owners have got their land back, many 
were now faced with having their homes destroyed because the building did not 
comply with national standards and that planning permission had not been 
obtained. Thus, the latter move could be a tactical ploy on the part of the Israeli 
government, which at face value seemed to grant concessions whereas in fact 
the government still retained control of the region without the need to confiscate 
the land.  
 
Figure 5: The Galilee (Judaising) Development Plan (1975) 
 
 
 
When compared with the forces who led the internationalisation process in case 
studies one (Tubi’s 1956 memorandum) and two (al- Ard’s 1964 memorandum), 
case study three (NCDAL’s 1979 memorandum) offers both similarities and 
differences. In case study one and case study three, the communist element 
was a key force in the internationalisation process through Arab communist 
                                                 
734 Shadi Khalilieh, Tal Ben Zvi and Jafar Farah, Land Day The History, Struggle And Monument, 2nd ed. (Haifa: 
Mossaw a Center, the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, 2015), 
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cooperation with democratic Jewish forces. A further two shared elements refer 
to firstly, the local protests that took place towards the end of the 1950s and the 
mid of 1970s, and the killing of civilian Arab citizens by Israeli forces that pre- 
empted the internationalisation in both cases.  
 
Yet, there are differences between case study one (Tubi’s 1956 memorandum) 
and three (NCDAL’s 1979 memorandum). Firstly, the letter to the UN in 1956 
was sent by an Arab MP whereas in 1979 it was sent by an extra- 
parliamentarian body. Although both were communist bodies, the single MP 
reflects that in 1956 the Military Regime did not allow extra-parliamentarian 
activities. This fact was even strengthened by outlawing al- Ard movement. 
Finally, the 1956 memorandum was an open letter, not directed to any one 
specifically and sent indirectly, via the Soviet Union to the UN. In contrast, the 
1979 memo was sent directly to the UN with a clear recipient and no need for 
an intermediary reflecting local Arab empowerment.  
 
A key difference that distinguishes between the second (al- Ard’s 1964 
memorandum) and the third case studies (NCDAL’s 1979 memorandum) from 
the third one is that in 1964 the letter sent to UN was directed to the UN by al- 
Ard movement, which represented a ‘nationalist’ extra-parliamentarian party in 
the eyes of the state, and this led to the outlawing of the movement that could 
be defined as ‘repression plus’ on the spiral model. This contrasts with the MP 
Tubi and NCDAL letters, which represented Communist ideology that to some 
extent was tolerated by Israeli governments.  
 
Also, in case study one, the letter to the UN was sent via the Soviet Union, a 
powerful international body. Conversely, in case study two (the 1956 al- Ard’s 
memorandum) the letter was sent to the UN via the PLO, a relatively new 
political body viewed negatively by the Israeli government and lacking the 
international reputation accorded the Soviet Union. This highlights the 
difference in quality of the transnational advocacy network and level of 
international media interest involved in the two cases and perhaps explains 
some of the success of the Kuf- Qassim case study in reaching ‘tactical 
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concession plus’ but the significant failure of case two in terms of progression in 
internationalisation and on the spiral model ‘repression plus’.  
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison between case studies 1948 and 1979 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter consisted of three different events whereby the Arab minority in 
Israel, represented by their elite used different mechanisms to internationalise 
their fight against discrimination and the denial of their human rights between 
1948-1979. In this period of time TANs were not yet highly developed. However, 
there were the international media, churches, trade union and parliamentarians 
who had the capacity to impact on international discourses and who are 
elements of what later came to be characterised as TANs. These historical case 
studies predated the time period for Sikkink/Risse Kappen ‘spiral’ model was 
developed, that is, towards the end of 1990s. However, as has been pointed out 
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previously, even in the absence of TANs there were efforts to internationalise 
the violation of human rights and minority rights and the spiral model is useful to 
analyse these efforts. 
 
The results demonstrate that the Arab citizens have been always internationally 
oriented while confronting Israeli strategies of control. Their efforts to raise 
international awareness concerning their grievances emerged in the 1950s due 
to three interrelated Israeli policy components: physical attacks on the Arab 
minority, inequality under the law and the failure to mobilise domestic courts. 
 
The use of three memoranda aimed to a letter was used to alert the UN, the 
media and foreign governments about the human rights situation in Israel. It 
represented a central means for the internationalisation attempts by those 
protesting against Israeli oppressive policies during its first three decades. In 
each decade there was a written international memorandum that forwarded to 
the UN (1956, 1965, 1979). All proceeded by local opposition and unheard 
appeals to Israeli authority. The main domestic actors who led these 
internationalisation attempts emerged from various parts of the political sphere 
(parliamentarian and extra-parliamentarian movements).  
 
In addressing the research questions, the boomerang- spiral model was used 
as a relevant way of understanding the internationalisation strategy adopted by 
the Arab intelligentsia in Israel to mobilise foreign support for their situation, and 
as a way to understand the state’s response to both domestic and external 
pressures. The application of the spiral model to the process of 
internationalisation of the relations between the Arab citizens and the state of 
Israel has raised questions regarding the existing five levels.  
 
The period of Israel’s Military Government demonstrates that Israel went 
through all stages of the spiral model, with two limitations. First, unlike the 
original model intended for authoritarian or Western regimes, the ‘denial’ and 
‘tactical concession’ phases occurred twice: before and after the activation of 
network action (the attempt to internationalise). Secondly, the transition to the 
fourth and the fifth levels occurred in relation to opposition to the whole Military 
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Regime (beyond individual cases of human rights violations). It is possible to 
see these limitations as unique characteristics of the application of the spiral 
model on hybrid regimes. 
 
The Military Regime was considered as an institution, which in its very essence 
constituted a violation of human rights norms and was designed to deny rights 
to Arab citizens of Israel and thus was the main factor that facilitated the 
occurrences of those events.  In this particular case, the state in question was 
responsive to internal and external political criticism because the identity of the 
state relates to the values embodied in liberal democracy, even though the state 
acted against them due to the perceived need to provide for its security (i.e. 
utilitarian reasons). Clearly the state’s commitment to liberal values since its 
inception in 1948, made the option of ‘denial’ of the legitimacy of international 
human rights impossible.  
 
Internationalisation attempts not only generated political forces that exerted 
significant pressure on the Israeli government but it raised doubts as to whether 
the existence of a Military Government and the violation of the rights of the Arab 
minority were compatible with the very identity of the state. This does not mean, 
however, that security is no longer a factor in relations between the state and its 
Arab minority. Thus the emergency rules continue and as the second case 
study shows if internationalisation is not accompanied by adequate cooperation 
with Israeli liberal Jewish forces then the spiral is terminated in its initial phase. 
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Figure 6: Summary of the spiral model results 1948 and 1979 
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Chapter 5: Internationalisation by Civil and Legal Advocacy  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter showed how the use of ‘public memoranda’ by an Arab 
parliamentarian, and another two extra-parliamentarian movements (the al-Ard 
and NCDAL), was a main tool in the internationalisation efforts during Israel’s 
first twenty-three years (1948- 1979). The previous results also demonstrated 
that, even though the spiral model had reached its fifth phase by the termination 
of Israel’s Military Government, the transition from a ‘hybrid regime’ to a 
democratic one was not a sufficient condition for the Israeli governments to 
maintain their liberal behavioural towards the Arab citizens. 
 
Nearly a decade after proposing the Galilee [Judaising] Plan in 1975, the 
dispute over the land remained highly relevant particularly to the Bedouin 
citizens in both Northern and Southern Israel. However, this time, Arab civil 
society organisations (e.g. The Galilee Society and Adalah) were the main 
actors in the internationalisation attempts for achieving basic human rights (e.g. 
water and electricity) for the Bedouin citizens who reside in these 
‘unrecognised’ villages. 
 
Arab NGOs in Israel started to emerge following the enactment of the 
Asssociation Law in 1981.735 Notably, human rights activists in these NGOs are 
highly educated and well connected to other global networks. Therefore, they 
have a vital role in raising national and international awareness about the Arab 
citizens. As Jamal (2011) argues: 
 
‘These NGOs are well connected to international circles that campaign 
for human rights and seek to bring the problems of their community to 
the international stage. Arab NGOs are run by educated Arab leaders, 
who have studied abroad or have established networks in Europe or 
North America’736 
 
                                                 
735Shany Payes, Palestinian NGOs In Israel (London: I.b. tauris, 2005). 
736Amal Jamal, "Civic Associations, Empow erment And Democratization: Arab Civil Society In Israel", in The 
Contradictions Of Israeli Citizenship: Land, Rel igion And State (London: Routledge, 2011), 43. 
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Notably, the first main source of funding for Arab NGOs is Western countries 
mainly European, Canadian and American. The second source is Arab states. 
Most of the money received from Western foundations goes to secular NGOs, 
while the money received from Arab countries goes to religious NGOs 
belonging to the Islamic movement. Only few Arab NGOs received money from 
the state. This heavy dependence of Arab NGOs on foreign donors increases 
the fears expressed in the literature that ideas are driven by priorities of 
donors.737  
 
It is believed that by channelling funds into Arab civil society organisations, and 
by declarative condemnations, the EU attempts to compensate for the lack of 
political support even though it cannot be replaced. 738 
 
An important development in relation to the Arab non-governmental sphere in 
Israel occurred during 2000 when few Arab NGOs such as Adalah ‘Justice’, 
Mossawa ‘Equality’, and the Human Rights Association (HRA) granted special 
consultative status for the United Nations institutions that deals with human 
rights bodies such as the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). 739 This prestigious status has undoubtedly empowered those 
NGOs, raised their international legitimacy, and provided them with influence 
over the United Nations’ resolutions. 
 
Arab NGOs use the strategy of international advocacy (INGOs) as a means of 
internationalisation to create external pressure on Israel to compel with 
international human rights and humanitarian law commitments. They are 
targeting international platforms by different ways 1) sending emergency 
requests and reports to EU’s officials and UN monitoring bodies of treaties that 
Israel is signed on 2) meetings with UN Special Committees and Special 
Rapporteurs 3) publications of reports in countries with close diplomatic 
relations to Israel 4) lobbying visits to the US Congress and academic 
                                                 
737 Amal Jamal, "The Counter-Hegemonic Role Of Civil Society: Palestinian–Arab Ngos In Israel", Citizenship 
Studies 12, no. 3 (2008): 283-306, doi:10.1080/13621020802015446, 296. 
738 Nathalie Tocci and Benedetta Voltolini, "Eyes Wide Shut: The European Union And The Arab Minority In 
Israel", European Foreign Affairs Review 16, no. 4 (2011): 521-538. 
739 "Activity Of Israeli Organizations With Advisor Status To The United Nations, Against Israeli Policy", Imti.Org.Il, 2015, 
https://imti.org.il/w p-content/uploads/2015/09/Activity-of-Israeli-Organizations-with-Advisor-Status-to-the-United-Nations-
Against-Israeli-Policy.pdf.  
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institutions 5) active participation in annually meetings of the Human Rights 
Council regarding the violation of the Israel’s Arab human rights.740  
In an interview with Omar Khamaisi, the Director of Meezan Centre for Human 
Rights (Nazareth) he spoke about the dilemma of Arab Attorneys in relation to 
the use of the Israeli Supreme Court: 
 
‘as Arab NGOs we always have the dilemma of whether to refer to the 
Israeli Supreme Court or not as it has its ways to protect the Israeli 
policies… imagine that in the Higher Supreme Court there is a judge 
who is settler, so how can you talk to him about human rights and 
international law while he is himself violates it. There is a well-known 
sentence in Hebrew that says “shoftim yoshvim betookh amam” which 
means “judges are sitting within their people”. This affects our trus t in 
the state’s system’741 
 
Clearly, there is a lack of trust in the Israeli legal system that is seen by Arab 
advocators as a serious obstacle when approaching them. As a result, it makes 
the choice of internationalisation more desirable for them. These dynamics also 
make some authors argue that Arab NGOs are not radical,742 others consider 
them as are another weapon in the political warfare, and assert that the majority 
of the Jewish population in Israel perceive them as a political threat for the State 
global standing.743 Generally speaking, Israeli NGOs both Arabs and Jews alike 
that deal with human rights issues are not popular in the Israeli public sphere, 
and in many ways they are seen as ‘traitors’. Recent survey shows that about 
59% of Israeli Jews believe that Human and civil rights organisations harm the 
State of Israel.744 This is negative approach towards the civil society 
organisations was translated in anti-campaigns that aimed to shame and 
delegitimise them (e.g. Im Tirtzu Campaign),745 and in promoting the 
controversial NGO bill which is formally known as ‘Transparency Requirements 
                                                 
740 Jafar, Farah, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, interview  by 
Ilham Shahbari. Nazareth, March 15, 2016. 
741 Omar, Khamaise, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, interview  
by Ilham Shahbari. Nazareth, March 15, 2016. 
742 E.g. Dov Waxman, "Israel's Palestinian Minority In The Tw o-State Solution: The Missing Dimension", Middle East 
Policy 18, no. 4 (2011): 68-82, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00511.x. 
743Steinberg 2006, cited in Hillel Frisch, Israel's Security And Its Arab Citizens (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 106. 
744 Tamar Hermann et al., "The Israeli Democracy Index", En.Idi.Org.Il, 2017, https://en.idi.org.il/media/9837/israeli-
democracy-index-2017-en-summary.pdf. such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B’tselem 
745 Chemi Shalev, "Im Tirtzu And The Proto-Fascist Plot To Destroy Israeli Democracy", Haaretz.Com, 2015, 
https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-the-proto-fascist-plot-to-destroy-israeli-democracy-1.5378187. 
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for Parties Supported by Foreign State Entities Bill’ that was enacted in 2016.746 
The bill aims to closely monitor foreign funding and activities of the civil society 
organisations, and it was widely condemned and ben described as 
‘discriminatory’ and ‘anti-democratic’. Commenting on this issue, Yariv 
Oppenheimer, the Former Head of the left-wing Israeli campaign group Peace 
Now said: 
 
‘We are portrayed as “foreign agents’”…promoting the idea we are 
working for foreign money is a way of branding us as “traitors” that aren’t 
part of society… NGOs are almost ‘the enemy from the inside…this is 
the language we are seeing…. the new proposal is not about getting 
new information to the public, It is about trying to shame and 
delegitimise critics of the government’747 
 
Both Israeli and international media have widely focused on the influence of the 
Israel’s policies towards the civil society organisations in relation to Jewish left-
wing NGOs. However, the latter bill has also a significant impact on Israel’s 
Arab NGOs. In a meeting in April 2016 with Mohammad Zeidan, General 
Director of the Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA),748 the author of this 
thesis received a copy of an open letter that was circulated to various foreign 
bodies in a response to the NGO bill. The letter was sent to on behalf 27 Arab 
NGOs to highlight the vulnerability of the Arab civil society organisations in 
Israel because of such legislations. It also raised the issue of the outlawing of 
the Northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel and its 20 charitable 
organisations: 
 
‘As an independent NGOs that serve the marginalized Palestinian Arab 
minority we write you to express our deep concern about the recent 
escalation of both official and public hostility and governmental 
restrictions to human rights and civil society…. current and pending 
legislation penalize the expression of certain opinions, law enforcement 
targets those who support dissenting views, and officials incite fears of 
foreign “moles’ sent to enable terrorism. At least 20 charitable 
organizations associated with the Islamic Movement in Israel, which was 
recently outlawed solely on spurious, ideological grounds, have been 
shut down for their alleged political affiliations…. these efforts serve not 
only to delegitimize the important work of civil society, but also to 
                                                 
746 "Proposed Legislation: NGO Transparency Bill", Adalah.Org, 2016, 
https://www.adalah.org/uploads/NGO_transparency_bill_English.pdf.  
747 Holly Young, "Israel: 'Some Ngos Are Seen As The Enemy From The Inside'", The Guardian, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/may/11/israel-some-ngos-are-seen-as-
the-enemy-from-the-inside.  
748 the Arab Association for Human Rights also know n as HRA w as founded in 1988 is one of the oldest and the most 
established NGOs in the Arab society in Israel. 
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“legitimize” intimidation, harassment and even violent reprisal. Activism, 
advocacy and philanthropy could be driven into silence, depriving 
marginalized groups particularly the Palestinian Arab minority of the few 
resources they have left, and exacerbating tensions in the country and 
the region ’749  
 
Yet, it is argued that negative attitudes towards human rights NGOs are not a 
unique Israeli phenomenon, rather part of an international growing trend of 
suppressing civil society organisations. As Mandeep Tiwana, Head of Policy 
and Research at Civicus states:  
 
‘This vilification of civil society is increasingly common across the world. 
When you have civil society actors uncovering uncomfortable truths, 
portraying them as acting at the behest of foreign interests or as threats 
to national security is a classic way for governments to divert attention 
away from the skeletons in their own cupboards’750 
 
This chapter seeks to explore a new pattern of ‘Civil and Legal’ 
internationalisation as one of the multiple modes of resistance that characterise 
the Bedouin struggles for recognition in Israel. This chapter examines two case 
studies concerning the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin Palestinian communities both in 
Northern and Southern Israel. The former examines the issue of clean water 
shortage and unsanitary waste disposal in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin 
communities in the North in 1992 through a petition to international tribunal. The 
latter looks at the ‘Prawer-Plan’ in relation to the arrangement for thirty-six 
‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in the South in 2011-2013 through international 
advocacy.  
 
At the core of the problem lays the fact that a significant part of the Bedouin 
citizens of who resides in 'unrecognised’ villages in Israel see themselves as 
indigenous communities and land owners, while the state authorities declared 
them to be illegal ‘infiltrators’ and ‘trespassers’751 on state land whom the state 
must evict. 752 Their identity is not recognised and this is evident in a discourse, 
                                                 
749 ‘Joint letter of 26 Palestinian Arab NGOs in Israel on the Grow ing Threats to Civil Society’, 3 March 2016.  
750 Holly Young, "Israel: 'Some Ngos Are Seen As The Enemy From The Inside'", The Guardian, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/may/11/israel-some-ngos-are-seen-as-
the-enemy-from-the-inside. 
751 Ratclif fe Richard, "Bedouin Rights, Bedouin Representations: Dynamics Of Representation In The Naqab Bedouin 
Advocacy Industry", Journal Of Holy Land And Palestine Studies  15, no. 1 (2016): 97-124, doi:10.3366/hlps.2016.0131. 
752 Richard, "Bedouin Rights, Bedouin Representations: Dynamics Of Representation In The Naqab Bedouin Advocacy 
Industry", 97-124. 
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which views Bedouin as nomadic people who have no territorial rights.753 The 
issue of their rights has been securitised because their very existence and their 
presence in the territory has been deemed to put the security of Israel at risk (or 
for state benefit). Accordingly, the use of the internationalisation strategy is 
unavoidable form of resistance. To examine these issues, I will begin with a 
brief overview of the literature on Bedouins, and the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin 
villages in Northern Israel. Then, in the second part, the issues are analysed in 
greater detail. 
 
 
5.2 Bedouin in Israel 
 
The term ‘Bedouin’ refers to a subgroup of Arab people who are seasonally 
nomadic and whose behaviour is connected to climatic variations in arid desert 
regions.754 They relied on cultivating sheep and farming for sustenance and 
they were also nomadic traders. Political and geographical divisions brought 
about by foreign powers,755 followed by the establishment of the State of Israel 
have contributed significantly to the disruption of the Bedouin’s life style and the 
loss of their traditional farming and agricultural habitats.756 Many Bedouins were 
compelled to settle in modern towns and cities and this happened at such a fast 
pace that adjustment was not without its difficulty. However, a minority of 
Bedouins clung to their traditional way of life and remained nomadic refusing to 
become urbanised Israel. The process of the settlements of the two groups 
(those in the Negev and those in the North) were quite different. In Galilee in the 
North the land was more fertile and sedentarisation happened much earlier than 
in the Negev desert in the South.757   
 
Since the creation of the State of Israel a significant number of Bedouin 
volunteered to join the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the belief that this would 
                                                 
753 Ben H, "Thousands Protest Praw er Plan In Global "Day Of Rage"", Palestinemonitor.Org, 2013, 
http://www.palestinemonitor.org/details.php?id=6w8fu5a5753yc0roxdd7x. 
754 Deborah F Shmueli and Rassem Khamaisi, Israel's Invisible Negev Bedouin [Recurso Electrónico] (New York: 
Dordrecht and London, 2015). 
755 Muhammad Youssef Suwaed, "The Bedouins In The Galilee In The War Of Independence Of Israel 1948–
1950", Middle Eastern Studies 53, no. 2 (2016): 297-313, doi:10.1080/00263206.2016.1240677. 
756 Ghazi Falah, "The Facts And Fictions Of Judaization Policy And Its Impact On The Majority Arab Population In 
Galilee", Political Geography Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1991): 297-316, doi:10.1016/0260-9827(91)90041-r. 
757 Ghazi Falah, "How  Israel Controls The Bedouin In Israel", Journal Of Palestine Studies 14, no. 2 (1985): 35-51, 
doi:10.1525/jps.1985.14.2.00p0126b. 
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ingratiate them with their Jewish neighbours. This involved Bedouin being in the 
front-line action on behalf the State of Israel. However, their belief that joining 
the armed forces of Israel would place them in the main stream of new state 
proved to be misguided as the Bedouin remained even more underprivileged a 
group than the rest of the Arab population which had not joined the IDF. Also, 
even though just a small percentage of the population is involved in terror or 
security activities against Israel,758 their issue has been securitised. After more 
than half a century as citizens of Israel, they remain illegal invaders and a threat 
to the vision of Zionism.759 
 
Generally speaking, Bedouin in Israel form a sub-group of the Arab-Muslim 
minority and they face the same political challenges. Yet, they have their own 
distinctive culture and history, which influences the nature of their land disputes 
with the Israeli State and which manifests itself in the ‘unrecognised’ villages. 
The issue of the ‘unrecognised’ villages is discussed in the following section.  
 
As of 2017, it is estimated the Bedouin population in Israel numbering 
approximately 300,000 persons and accounted for 16 per cent of the Muslim 
community.760 There are two distinct and geographically separate regions in 
which the Bedouin are mainly concentrated: in the Galilee region in the North, 
and in the Negev in the South. It is estimated that in Israel today there are about 
400,000 Bedouin citizens. According to unofficial data, about 300,000 live in the 
Negev,761 accounting for about one-third of the population in that region (of 
them about 100,00 live in unrecognised villages), some other 70,000 live in the 
Northern district (3000 of them still live in unrecognised settlements), and some 
10,000 Bedouin who live in the Central area of Israel.762  
 
 
 
                                                 
758 Lior Akerman, "Analysis: Fear Of A Beduin Intifada In The Negev", The Jerusalem Post, 2017, 
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Analysis-Fear-of-a-Beduin-intifada-in-the-Negev-478938. 
759 Akerman, "Analysis: Fear Of A Beduin Intifada In The Negev". 
760 Dov Chernichovsky et al., "The Health Of The Arab Israeli Population: A Chapter From The State Of The Nation 
Report 2017", Taubcenter.Org.Il, 2017, http://taubcenter.org.il/wp-content/files_mf/healthofthearabisraelipopulation.pdf. 
761 Yaakov Sitruk Dahan, ""The Bedouin Population In The Negev Doubles Every 15 Years"", Sheva, 2018, 
https://sheva7.co.il/news/112048/. 
762 "Negev Bedouin", Inter-Agency Task Force, accessed 20 October 2018, http://www.iataskforce.org/issues/view/2. 
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5.3 ‘Unrecognised’ Bedouin Villages in Israel 
 
There is a lack of clarity surrounding the term ‘unrecognised’ villages and their 
exact number. An ‘unrecognised’ village as defined in the state documents is a 
community whose existence is not recognised by the state within whose 
territory it is located. As a result, the unrecognised villages and hamlets exist in 
a legal vacuum as they are not considered to have legal status and they are not 
governed by a local or regional authority.763 This results in the denial of the right 
to the basic services that would be provided by a local authority, which would be 
elected by to represent the people of those villages.764 For example, the names 
of these villages do not appear on the state maps nor are they signposted. 
Furthermore, they are not eligible for roads, construction or repairs.  They also 
lack the essential services normally expected in a modern country including 
water and electricity supply, provision of public transport, refuse collection, 
health services and means of communication.765  
 
By branding them ‘illegal’, it is impossible for residents to acquire building 
permits. Generally speaking, unrecognised villages do not have many 
inhabitants, geographically located in distant locations, and are designated as 
either agriculture or state’s lands.766 This situation leaves residents in constant 
precarity, facing demolition and homelessness at any point. Planning 
permission to build houses is not available only tent dwelling is permitted. 
Attempts to erect buildings are met by heavy penalties and demolition.767 
Today, most ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages are concentrated mainly in the 
Negev in the Southern region of Israel, and are a major concern. However, 
many them existed until the 1990s in the Northern region and the position of 
Bedouins in this region will be examined in the following section. 
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5.4 ‘Unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in Northern Israel 
 
 
Prior to 1948, Bedouin people in Northern Israel were settled in their own 
private homes and land. Following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and 
the ensuing war, many of these Bedouin abandoned their homes but returned 
once the war had ended.768 However, on their return, their former homes were 
no longer formally recognised as their property, and they had no right to 
resettle. Their only option was to settle on lands near their former homes but 
these settlements had no legal recognition nor were they part of the 
government’s urban planning provision.769 Such resettlements were deemed to 
be illegal by the National Planning and Building Law (1965),770 which declared 
the land on which they had resettled to be categorised as non-residential and 
the property of the state. Section 157 of that law also prevented utility 
companies providing water and electricity services to any illegal dwellings.771 It 
is believed that this section of the law was drafted with the clear intention of 
hindering the displaced Bedouin from resettling on land adjacent to their original 
homes for the sake of Jewish expansion.772 
 
During the 1970s, the government had been consistently declining applications 
from the ‘unrecognised’ villages for approval for planning permission and 
provision of services. In 1981 there was an amended to the Building and 
Planning Law, which permitted some relaxation to the law of 1965 by 
authorising the Local Planning and Building Commission to exercise some 
discretion in individual cases based on local circumstances. This meant that 
Bedouin citizens could request to be connected to all the basic services; 
however, most of such requests were refused.773 This amendment was made to 
convey some degree of flexibility on the part of the authorities towards the 
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Bedouin people but in practice amounted to little more than a than a token of 
appeasement.  
 
One request that was of paramount importance was the provision of potable 
water and refuse collection in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in Northern 
Israel. While similar issues faced the larger population of the Negev in the 
South (see 5.4), this issue is the focus of the first of the case studies (see 5.3), 
which exemplifies the main thrust of internationalisation during 1992. 
 
 
5.5 The lack of potable water in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin 
Villages in Northern Israel in 1992 
 
This case study consists of the five phases of the spiral model and forms a 
structure for the analysis of the case. 
 
Repression (first phase). 
 
While the 1990s is often perceived an era in which minority rights triumphed 
with a emancipation of the Eastern countries of the Soviet Union, elsewhere the 
picture different particularly as there were still ‘unrecognised’ villages in Israel 
that had no connections for potable water and other essential services. The 
Arab Bedouin population in Northern and Central Israel were approximately 
15000 spreads across some 70 communities, which up to the early 1990s, were 
unrecognised by the Israeli state.774 Most of these Bedouin citizens had settled 
in this region prior to 1948.  
 
As previously discussed, it was already prohibited by law that dwellings in 
‘unrecognised’ villages should be served by the National Water Company, but 
after 1981 the government became more oppressive by denying these 
populations access to even a single communal water outlet.775 One of these 
‘unrecognised’ villages in Northern Israel, which was denied access to potable 
water, was Husseinyeh. Its citizens suffered from serious ill health conditions 
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due to unhygienic drinking water and lack of provision for the safe disposal of 
sewage from homes, which had inadequate lavatory systems. Without a proper 
water supply it was impossible to dispose a faecal waste in an acceptably 
hygienic way. Although an alternative would have been the building of pit 
latrines, which did not require flushing water, it was against the law to install any 
such system in Husseinyeh. The village did have a well but its water had 
become polluted by sewage overflow from a nearby Jewish settlements. During 
the rainy season, it was possible to collect and store rain water in rooftop 
containers. However, in the dry season water had to be bought from a nearby 
Kibbutz and transported by tractor or donkey.  
 
During the 1990s, the Bedouin citizens of the ‘unrecognised’ villages did not 
have access to sufficient supplies of water, which met the minimum standards 
of hygiene set by the World Health Organization. Due to shortage of portable 
water and unhygienic lavatory systems, there were many outbreaks of illnesses 
so 1989 there was an outbreak of hepatitis A in Husseinyeh, and in another 
village, with 21 cases of children under seven years of age being reported. Five 
of these were rushed to hospital and there was one fatality.776 These illnesses 
and the death of the child are incongruent with a modern state, which has the 
duty to safeguard the health of its citizens.  
 
The situation in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in Northern Israel was a 
violation of the provisions of international conventions that have been signed 
and ratified by Israel, which includes equality of esteem and opportunity in 
accordance with human dignity. Several international conventions make it a 
duty of the state to protect the wellbeing and health of all its citizens by ensuring 
that proper provision is in place to appropriately discharge this duty.777 It is 
noted that many clauses in international treaties refer to the right to water, 
including and especially the rights of Children to water and to an adequate 
standard of living. 778 These include: Article 25 of the International Declaration of 
                                                 
776 Kanaaneh, McKay and Eily Sims, "A Human Rights Approach For Access To Clean Drinking Water: A Case 
Study", Health And Human Rights 1, no. 2 (1995): 190, doi:10.2307/4065214. 
777 "Convention On The Rights Of The Child", Ohchr.Org, 1989, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 
778 Adalah.Org, accessed 21 October 2018, https://www.adalah.org/uploads/oldfiles/Public/f ile/3586p.pdf. 
  179 
Human Rights (1948).779 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966),780 the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment,781 Article 8 of the UN General Assembly Declaration on 
the Right to Development (1986),782 and Articles 6 and 24 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (1989).783 
 
 Clearly these Covenants and Declarations affirm the right to life and health of 
all individuals, and imply that any civilised state should ensure that its citizens 
have access to potable water and to sanitary systems of waste disposal. In the 
light of these international conventions, Israel is obliged to fulfil its duties equally 
towards all its citizens. It has failed to meet its obligations to protect the 
wellbeing of all its citizens, and is thus seriously in breach of human rights 
standards.  
 
Domestic blockage.  
 
In the aftermath of the incidence of hepatitis A illness in 1989, representatives 
of the citizens of the ‘unrecognised’ villages approached the Ministries of Health 
and the Interior to inform them of the tragic events, and to request that an 
investigation should be conducted to establish the cause of the death and 
illnesses so that future outbreaks could be avoided. However, the authorities 
were not prepared to take any action. There was no possibility of the community 
having legal recourse for a number of reasons. Firstly, the cost of taking 
domestic legal action was prohibitive. Secondly, the community representatives 
were, in any case, distrustful of authorities based on previous experience of 
inaction arising from the nature of the Building and Planning Law.784 
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Attempted internationalisation. 
 
Two years after the Hepatitis A incident, in October 1991, 785 a petition against 
the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Interior786was submitted 
on behalf of al- Husseinyeh citizens to the International Water Tribunal (IWT) in 
Hague.787 The Galilee Society (GS) submitted this petition. It was an Arab 
national organisation, was a non-governmental organisation, which was created 
in 1981, the same year that Israeli government legislation permitted the 
formation of such groups (Association Law). It was a leading non-partisan Arab 
National Society for Health, Research and Services (R.A.), which established in 
Israel by four healthcare professionals in 1981.788 Also it was particularly 
interested in health and environmental issues pertaining to the Bedouin Arab 
citizens. From the viewpoint of the different Israeli governments, the GS was 
seen the pillar of the Monitoring Committee for health matters, that is, one of the 
components of the established leadership of Israeli Arabs.789 The GS accused 
the Israeli Government of failing to provide clean potable water of acceptable 
quality and quantity to several ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages,790 and from 
connecting them to the national drinking water network.791  
 
Although IWT was designed to deal with cases in developing countries, and 
Israel is widely considered a developed country, living conditions in the 
‘unrecognised’ villages were deemed sufficiently under-developed to qualify for 
standing, and the petition was accepted.792 The mere fact that the plea was 
accepted is an illustration of the ‘boomerang effect’,793 the model, which 
preceded the spiral model and was an element in its early development. It 
exists in cases in which domestic actors who were ‘blocked' from expressing 
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their claims domestically by their states succeeded to mobilise an international 
ally to pressure their government to change its behaviour.794 Effectively this 
means that the ‘boomerang effect’ is highly congruent with   the notion of 
internationalisation.  
 
This phenomenon is described in the ‘boomerang effect’ (the precursor of the 
spiral model) as ‘domestic blockage’. In other words, the community felt that 
any domestic avenue of redress for their problems would be futile, and they 
would have to look elsewhere for support. In such circumstances, the spiral 
model intimates that citizens who are blocked in their efforts to resolve 
problems at local level tend to search for help in the international arena.795 
However, local communities in such circumstances are frequently powerless 
and are highly likely to need the assistance of some group with professional 
expertise to advance their cause.  
 
TANs. 
 
There was in existence now a local advocacy group called The Galilee Society 
(GS). The members of the GS acted as a Litigation Team for Residents (LTR) 
of the ‘unrecognised’ villages, and their work was to a large extent like those in 
Transnational Action Networks (TAN). This society has been operating in the 
North where it had a department from which a mobile clinic was managed to 
provide medical services to the citizens of the ‘unrecognised’ villages. The 
mobile clinic offered inoculation amenities for children and carried out checks on 
the general health and welfare of the Bedouin children in the ‘unrecognised’. 
The importance of the work of the GS in providing mobile health care is 
highlighted by the fact that ‘unrecognised’ villages did not have any healthcare 
facilities.796  
 
The GS team consisted of four members; a medical doctor, who managed the 
mobile clinic for four ‘unrecognised’ villages, which include Husseinyeh, a 
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nurse, a human rights attorney and an engineer with an environmental 
expertise. Thus, it was a well-rounded team who worked together for the 
welfare of the community. This team became more involved in the Husseinyeh 
incident and explored the underlying causes of the hepatitis A outbreak. The 
team decided to draw on the strength of their network, which constituted a TAN 
for them and through the network received the support of a British lawyer. This 
lawyer carried out the preliminary preparation for legal action under human 
rights for access to water, which was fit for human consumption. Documents 
were prepared in English for the International Water Tribunal (IWT) and a 
strategy was adopted for putting forward the case. This involved research in two 
current water regulations in Israel to show how the Israeli government was 
failing to comply with not only with international law but even with its own 
domestic standards.797  
 
The GS had a pivotal role to play in the case preparation.  The medical doctor 
had first considered the merit of seeking legal recourse through the IWT. The 
British based lawyer required the cooperation of the doctor and nurse in 
compiling and evaluating relevant information to move the case forward. This 
involved work over some twelve-months, which culminated in a complete 
account of Husseinyeh health data being sent to the British lawyer. In addition, 
the environment specialist prepared a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
Husseinyeh’s water supply.  
 
Following the spiral model, this case study now moves to second phase where 
the denial of the oppressive state can be examined.  
 
Denial (Second phase). 
 
The denial phase in this case study took the form of justification. Instead of 
denying the accusations outright, Israel tried to justify its conduct. Normally, 
denial takes the form of the oppressive state refusing to recognise the 
legitimacy of an international body to intervene in its own domestic affairs. 
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However, in this particular case the denial phase does not fully adhere to this 
classical reaction. In effect Israel appeared to tacitly accept the legitimacy of 
IWT. Its denial consisted not of calling into question the right of the IWT to pass 
a judgment in this case, but rather to rely on a cleverly constructed defence, 
which amounted to an outright denial of the accusations made against it. Thus, 
unlike many other states that did not respond to plaintiffs’ case against them,798 
the Israeli government actually attended the tribunal and was surprisingly 
represented by an Israeli Arab lawyer.799 Thus, although ‘denial’ more 
frequently involves resisting the legitimacy of an international body to intervene 
in domestic affairs, the originators of the spiral model still acknowledged that 
‘denial’ can take the form of a counter argument as a powerful rhetorical 
strategy to challenge the case against them. However, the authors did not 
provide a theoretical exposition of this form of denial,800 and this represents a 
possible line a future modification for the spiral model.  
 
Denial is a more plausible line of defence in the face of political pressure, but 
not if an international convention has been violated where there are accepted 
mechanisms to adjudicate competing claims. For this reason, Israel referred to 
other forms of denial that justified its repression by claiming an exceptional 
necessity to counter illegal settlements. The basis of Israel’s refusal to supply 
water to a group of its citizens was those citizens did not have the right of 
residence in the first place. This was a difficult argument for Israel to maintain 
given that the illegality merely amounted to a violation of planning laws, which 
does not rise to the level of legitimating the denial of human rights. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas were 
equally illegal under international law because the settled areas were not part of 
the recognised territory of the state of Israel.  
 
Yet, despite choosing to appear at the tribunal as a respondent, and despite 
being shamed in an international form Israel has failed to comply with the 
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judgement.801 In effect, the government’s defence based on the illegal starters 
of people who were ‘unrecognised’ gained some leverage and arguably resulted 
in a less punitive judgment. Additionally, the ploy of engaging an Israeli Arab as 
their representative on the tribunal is likely to have added some credibility to 
their case.802  
 
Internationalisation. 
 
It is reported in the academic literature that Bedouin plaintiff won the tribunal’s 
support as the jury of experts charged that they were not being provided clean 
drinking water. 803 Accordingly, in February 19, 1992, The International Tribunal 
in Amsterdam found that the government of Israel had violated international law, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,804 and the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972.805 The IWT stated that it was 
the duty of the state to connect the villages to the national water network, and 
that the 1965 Planning and Building Law806 should not be relied upon to prevent 
their connection villages, since they existed not only before the law but also 
before the establishment of the State of Israel. The tribunal also referred the 
health risk of not connecting these villages to the national water network.807 
Accordingly, the IWT declared that the Israeli government’s policy was illegal, 
and that it should accord with the request of the villagers for drinking water, and 
connect them to the national network:  
 
“5. The populations of the said communities, or a majority thereof, 
were already settled and/or owned the land prior to the creation of 
the state of Israel in 1948 and the Planning and Building law of 
1965 as later ammended in 1981. The impact of this law has 
initiated a process of displacement of populations and disruption of 
their cultures. 
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6. The jury is unable to countenance any governmental action 
which uses the denial of water as a means of enforcing zoning or 
planning. 
 
7. These policies have a negative effect on the health of the 
populations in the ‘unrecognized villages’. 
 
8. The jury deplores this denial of water of sufficient quality and 
quantity and recommends that the Israeli government: 
i. use the discretionary powers which the Planning and Building 
Law offers and forthwith connect the villages concerned to the 
national water network…”808 
 
In finding against the State of Israel on grounds of infringement of basic human 
rights demonstrates the power of the application of internationally recognised 
standards of behaviour on the part of the state in exposing and shaming a state, 
which is in violation of these standards. These developments meet Henkin’s 
definitions of the ‘internationalisation of rights’, which is the very hallmark of the’ 
boomerang effect’: ’recognition that the treatment of citizens in one country has 
become the cause of concern in other countries....’,809 and that ‘the process of 
internationalised human rights occurs by transforming matters that had 
previously been subject to exclusive domestic jurisdiction ‘sovereignty’ into 
matters of international concern, putting them permanently in the international 
political agenda, and providing the foundation for a sturdy edifice of 
international norms and institutions.’810  
 
The IWT was a channel of influence that empowered the GA, which in turn 
succeeded in influencing Israeli government policy; the profile of the society 
was considerably enhanced in aftermath of the tribunal’s decision in February 
1992.811 It is most likely motivated the Europe Community (EC) ambassador, 
Mr. Gavin Morgan to personally pay a visitation to the offices of the GA a few 
months after the tribunal’s decision. Morgan was scathing in his criticism of the 
Israeli government’s failure to discharge its responsibilities towards the Bedouin 
community. In any case he announced that the EC would consider providing 
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further financial assistance to the society regardless of whether this would be 
viewed as a political act.812  
 
In fact, the GA had in the previous year been granted $300,000 from the EC to 
aid its operations. The GA had risen in prominence in the international arena 
largely due to the recognition of the oppression of the Palestinian Arabs at the 
end of the First Intifada (outrage). Highlighting the plight of the Palestinians had 
the knock on effect of shifting the spotlight towards other Arabs such as the 
Bedouins in Galilee. However, from the Israeli Jewish perspective, these were 
instances where Arab Israelis were receiving political and financial support in 
the international arena based on the manipulation of human rights 
conventions.813 Such an opinion is yet another aspect of denial even having had 
a judgment which was unfavourable to the Israeli government.  
 
The form that internationalisation took in this case had both legal and political 
components. One aspect was the mere that a legal process was initiated to 
compel the Israeli states to fulfil the obligations that it had assumed by acceding 
to an international convention. This is in principle a compelling form of 
internationalisation because an adverse legal judgement may compel the state 
to change its behaviour. As far as the political dimension is concerned, an 
adverse judgement also has political consequences as it highlights the 
contradictions between the norms the state claims to adhere to and its 
practices. However, also he GS received political support from the European 
Commission that was another aspect of the process of internationalisation. 
 
 
Tactical concession (third phase). 
 
 
A few months following the IWT decision that the government should connect 
the villagers to the national network, the Israeli authorities announced their 
intention to supply each of the ‘unrecognised’ communities with one main water 
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point.814 A few months later, the majority of the ‘unrecognised’ communities had 
been partially connected.815 However, the serious issue of sewage disposal was 
not addressed and no effort appears to have been made to provide for sewage 
disposal despite the obvious threat that this presented to the well being of the 
community. Of even greater significance is the fact that the real issue of the 
alleged illegal status of the people of these ‘unrecognised’ villages remained 
unresolved.816 What this amounts to is that the Israeli government made a 
tactical concession, without fully accepting the core of the complaint against it 
and continued to resist to the extent possible the demands from the inhabitants 
of the  ‘unrecognised’ villages. 
 
Prescriptive status (Fourth phase). 
 
Following hot on the heels of the decision of the IWT in February 1992, Israel 
began the process of enshrining some aspects of international human rights 
within their own laws. Accordingly, Israel’s status of having human rights norms 
incorporated into its domestic law following the GS petition would place it in 
phase four of the model that refers to the socialisation mechanisms identified by 
turning international law into domestic practices.817 Although Israel had 
previously ratified human rights treaties as early as the 1960s, it was only in 
1992 that it began to incorporate human rights norms into its domestic law. For 
example, Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was enacted in March 
1992 and its article 2 states ‘there shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity 
of any person as such’.818  
 
This appears to be an attempt to guarantee to all citizens basic human rights, 
which would include the right to water of acceptable quantity and quality and 
protection from infectious diseases. However, the use of the phrase ‘any person 
as such’ is curious and is open to wide interpretation. It also characterised by 
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the negative way in which it is framed i.e. the avoidance of violation rather than 
the positive affirmation of a right. This negative way of framing a law mirrors the 
negative way in which many international conventions have been framed so that 
the emphasis is on the avoidance of some undesirable behaviour rather than a 
more positive affirmation of a right. 
 
The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (1992)819 has the status of being 
‘superior to normal legislation’ as if it had ‘constitutional force’. Israel, like many 
other countries relies on common law and does not have a written constitution. 
However, some laws are Basic Laws, which implies that they are ‘entrenched’ 
and can only be amended by an absolute majority in the Knesset.820The 
following year (1993) Israel ratified the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action,821 which ruled that all human rights were universal. This meant at least 
tacit approval for the enshrining of universal human rights into Israeli domestic 
law. This has all the hallmarks of prescriptive status stage of the spiral model. A 
further manifestation of the prescriptive status stage was the National Health 
Insurance Law (NHIL) in 1995,822 which extended health services to 30% of the 
Bedouin citizens who had previously had no entitlement. Thus, citizens who had 
to rely on the GS mobile medical service now entitled to all the health services 
provided by state.823 
 
 
Rule-consistent behavior (Fifth phase). 
 
The final phase of the spiral model happens when there is clear evidence that 
what has been prescriptive is now becoming a reality on the ground. Simply 
stated the fifth phase begins when what has been written begins to take effect. 
There is evidence that rule-consistent behaviour has been taking place recently 
although this phase must be considered as still on-going in part of Bedouin 
settlements in the Galilee region. Regarding recognition of the previously illegal 
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settlements, in the mid-1990s, the Left- centre government of Rabin granted 
recognition to most of the villages in the Galilee, 824 which was seen as a 
hopeful sign that Bedouins would eventually enjoy parity of esteem with their 
Jewish Israeli counterparts.  
 
It is possible however to argue that the link between internationalisation the 
water cause and the eventual recognition of the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages 
is weak. This is because the 1990s witnessed several events that one might 
look at their combination as an effective formula for internationalisation. For 
example, the literature acknowledges the intensive local advocacy of other Arab 
NGOs such as the ‘Association of Forty’, which consisted of representation of 
the unrecognised villages, and its prominent role in the struggle for achieving a 
political recognition for the villages such as Ein-Hud.825 Secondly, changing in 
the Likud right wing government and the raise of Rabin Left- Centre one that 
initiated peace process enduring the early 1990s, and signed of the interim 
agreements known as the Oslo Accords, resulted in decreasing the tension 
between Jews and Arab citizens in Israel.826 Notably, the peace process and 
the spirit of reconciliation, allowed for greater tolerance towards the Arab 
citizens. 
 
As of 2017, there are approximately 70,000 Bedouin living in the Galilee area in 
North of Israel.827 Many of those Bedouin in the Galilee are now living in about 
15 villages, which are recognised by the state. However, there still remain some 
3,000 Bedouin citizens who are living in five different ‘unrecognised’ settlements 
in that area. 828 In addition, following the success of the struggle to legitimise the 
‘unrecognised’ villages in the North, a parallel struggle began to the 
‘unrecognised’ villages in the Negev. Furthermore, the success of the struggle 
for the unrecognised Bedouin settlements in Northern Israel still is not achieved 
in relation to those in Southern Israel as will be shown in the next case study.  
                                                 
824 "Bedouins In The State Of Israel", Knesset.Gov.Il, accessed 20 October 2018, 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bedouim_eng.htm. 
825 Alexander Bligh, The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority In The Jewish State (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 293. 
826 "Protest Among Israeli Arabs - Characteristics, Reasons, And Trends", Maarachot, 2014, 78. 
827 "Negev Bedouin", Inter-Agency Task Force, accessed 20 October 2018, http://www.iataskforce.org/issues/view/2. 
828 Or Keshte and Noa Spiegel, "The Unrecognised We Did Not Know : Also In The North, Thousands Live In 
Unregulated Settlements", Haaretz, 2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.4087924; "Citizens Without 
An Address: Unregulated Settlement Of Bedouin In The Galilee", Dugrinet.Co.Il, 2016, http://dugrinet.co.il/node/17993. 
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Figure 4: The case study of the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin Villages in 
Northern Israel in 1992 on the spiral model 
 
 
 
5.6 Implications  
 
The initial presenting problem representing oppression was the denial of the 
right to water of sufficient quantity and quality. This masked the more 
fundamental problem of the recognition of the citizens living in ‘unrecognised’ 
settlements. By applying the spiral model to the events of the Galilee region it 
has been possible to understand the role of the internationalisation process in 
moving from a situation of repression through to eventual recognition of human 
rights, which is evident in the changed behaviour of the state toward the 
‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in Northern Israel.  
 
This case was different from other cases previously discussed. Unlike the three 
previous case studies presented in the previous Chapter, where the 
internationalisation process instigated by written memorandums, the GA turned 
to the IWT, an international regulatory institution, which is in charge of legal 
accountability. Put differently, the GA used the international law in its modality 
of legal advocacy as a mechanism of internationalisation to compel the Israeli 
state to adhere to the commitments it had made by acceding to an international 
convention. Ratifying the treaty gave Israel political benefits by underscoring its 
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obligations to human rights. However, it also provided a mechanism whereby 
Israel could be compelled to make good on this commitment in practice. This is 
more effective than mere political pressure.  
 
What is most striking in this case, is the fact that a small group of four Arab 
members of a domestic NGO with limited funds and credibility won the case. 
They used the internationalisation as a tool to rally their opposition towards the 
government policy and succeeded to a large extent to influence the Israeli 
domestic policy, with some help from transnational actors (e.g. the British 
lawyer). In this case, the internationalisation mechanism succeeded to generate 
a soft power exchange. This occurred with combination of other various factors 
that contributed to the success of the petition. The first factor is an opportune 
time when access to water was a prominent international issue; a global 
consensus that access to water is a fundamental human right; the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) had already designated the 1980s as a ‘Decade of Clean 
Water Supply and Sanitation’, and had a target of promoting clean water supply 
universally by 2000.829 Thus, at the time of the GA tribunal there was a 
consciousness of access to potable water as fundamental human rights. The 
second factor was the fall of the Eastern European countries of the Soviet block 
and the restoration of minority rights at the international level, which led to a 
general global discourse on ethnic and national minority rights. This would have 
raised awareness at international level of the plight of the Bedouin minority in 
Galilee. The third factor involved the commitment of individual nations to be 
seen to abide by international law. In Israel this inspired the enactment of the 
Associations Law domestic law (passed in 1980), which permitted the formation 
of civil activist association such as GA. As has been shown, the existence of the 
GA was essential for raising the Bedouin case to the international level and lent 
substantial support to the IWT intervention on the conditions of Israel’s Arab 
minority. A final factor was the relative vulnerability of the Israeli state to be 
affected by the IWT judgment. As Keck and Sikkink (1997) assert that in order 
for a networking to successful, the target state must somehow be susceptible to 
                                                 
829 "Global Water Supply And Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report", Who.Int, 2000, 
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp2000.pdf. 
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being influenced by a judgment in an international forum.830 The fact that Israel 
had previously ratified a number of human rights treaties meant that this could 
be held to account if they were found to be in violation of any of these treaties.  
This can explain the success of the GA that was committed to aiding the 
campaign of Israel's Bedouin citizens to meet some of their human rights 
needs.  
 
5.7 The Prawer- Begin Plan in Southern Israel (2011- 2013) 
5.7.1 Introduction 
 
Two decades after the water case in the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Northern 
Israel, a large part of the Bedouin citizens in the in the Negev (Naqab) area, in 
Southern Israel, were still struggling to obtain basic rights including the mere 
recognition of their existence. At the core of the problem is that the Bedouin's 
conception of their identity and rights was not and still is not accepted by the 
state of Israel. Most Jews believe that most of the land was arid, uncultivated, 
unplanned and unallocated and therefore must be seen including state land in 
every respect. As for land expropriation, the prevailing perception is that there is 
to expropriate private land for development purposes also from Jews, and that 
public needs serve the people the entire population, including the Arab 
population as well.831 Thus, in contrast with the Bedouins of Galilee whose 
internationalisation problem focused on water supply, in this case it was land 
rights, which was the immediate issue. The issue of their rights has been 
indirectly securitised because their very existence and their presence in the 
territory has been deemed to put the security of Israel at risk.  
 
This part seeks to consider the ‘Prawer-Plan’, which was created in 2011 to 
regulate thirty-five ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in the Negev desert area in 
Southern Israel. This plan involved the enforced relocation of the residents of 
these villages. The resistance of these citizens to the ‘Prawer-plan’ entailed the 
internationalisation of the problem, which renders it amenable to analysis by 
                                                 
830 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
831 Yitzhak Reiter, "The Land Issues, Chapter 5 [In Hebrew ]", Abraham Fund, 2009, https://www.abrahamfund.org/5544. 
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means of ‘Civil’ and ‘law-based’ models. It begins with a brief overview of the 
literature on the Bedouins in the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Southern Israel. The 
second part examines in greater detail the applicability of the five stages of the 
spiral model. 
 
 
5.7.2 Bedouin in the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages Southern 
Israel  
 
In the south of Israel lies a semiarid region known as the Negev desert. The 
region is vast in area and comprises 60% of the total area of Israel. 832 The 
northern part is most fertile region of the Negev accounting for some 640,000 
acres. It is suitable for irrigation, and has therefore been considered a target for 
settlement as part of the Zionist project.833According to David Ben-Gurion: 
 
‘Negev land is reserved for Jewish citizens, whenever and where ever 
they want … we must expel Arabs and take their places … and if we 
have to use force, then we have force at our disposal not to dispossess 
the Arabs of the Negev, and transfer them, but to guarantee our right to 
settle in those places’.834  
 
Before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, it is estimated that 
between 65,000 and 90,000 Bedouin lived in the Negev region,835 in an area 
covering about 12,000 sq. km in the Negev.836 In the aftermath of the war of 
Independence in 1948, between 80 and 85 per cent of the Negev Bedouin were 
forced to relocate as refugees to the neighbouring Arab countries such as the 
West Bank, Jordan and the Gaza Strip.837  
 
                                                 
832 Deborah F Shmueli and Rassem Khamaisi, Israel's Invisible Negev Bedouin [Recurso Electrónico] (New York: 
Dordrecht and London, 2015). 
833 Ismael Abu-Saad, "Retelling The History: The Indigenous Palestinian Bedouin In Israel", Alternative: An International 
Journal Of Indigenous Peoples 1, no. 1 (2005): 25-47, doi:10.1177/117718010500100103. 
834 Abu-Saad, "Retelling The History: The Indigenous Palestinian Bedouin In Israel, 5.  
835 Ghazi Falah, "Israelization Of Palestine Human Geography", Progress In Human Geography13, no. 4 (1989): 535-
550, doi:10.1177/030913258901300404. 
836 Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, Avigail Morris and Heather Ryan, "The Economy Of Survival: Bedouin Women In 
Unrecognized Villages", Journal Of Arid Environments 149 (2018): 80-88, doi:10.1016/j.jaridenv.2017.07.008. 
837 Ghazi Falah, "Israelization Of Palestine Human Geography", Progress In Human Geography13, no. 4 (1989): 535-
550, doi:10.1177/030913258901300404. 
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The Bedouin population lost about 90% of its pre-1948 land a result of judicial 
and legislative moves.838 A mere 11,000 Bedouin continued to live in the region 
but were eventually compelled to move, in the 1950s and 1960s, to a restricted 
region consisting of 1000 sq. km in the north- eastern Negev, known as the 
Siyag and to leave behind land that they considered had been their fatherland 
for many generations. The Siyag region represented a mere 10 per cent of the 
land they had inhabited prior to 1948, and was generally considered to be the 
least fertile area of the Negev. 839 Generally these Bedouin were tent dwellers 
due to the fact that they were prohibited by law from erecting any permanent.840  
The north- eastern of the Negev is considered as a strategic area. Israel is 
separated from Palestinian territories by a green line, which represents the 
armistice settlement of 1967. Ten per cent of this region forms the north- 
eastern Negev and is strategically region as it serves as buffer zone between 
Tel-Aviv and certain facilities, which include the nuclear plant at Dimona and 
some military bases. It is a border region, which includes some Bedouin 
settlements at Hebron hills in the south, and is adjacent to Jordan and the 
Egyptian-Israeli border.841  
 
Up to 1966, the Bedouin living in Siyage were subjected to Military Government 
and had no access to education or employment. Yet again, towards the end of 
the 1960s Bedouin of the Siyage region were resettled into seven government 
towns designated by the government, and this was justified on the pretence of 
modernisation. Modernisation however did not extent to the provision of 
amenities such as public transportation, telephone lines, sewage systems, 
banks or post offices. Accordingly, these residents were viewed as being of the 
lowest social class.842  
 
The government so called modernisation strategy was only partially achieved as 
half of the Bedouin refuse to be relocated into the townships and were still in the 
                                                 
838 Ghazi Falah, "Israeli State Policy Tow ard Bedouin Sedentarization In The Negev", Journal Of Palestine Studies 18, 
no. 2 (1989): 71-91, doi:10.1525/jps.1989.18.2.00p00773. 
839 Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder, Avigail Morris and Heather Ryan, "The Economy Of Survival: Bedouin Women In 
Unrecognized Villages", Journal Of Arid Environments 149 (2018): 80-88, doi:10.1016/j.jaridenv.2017.07.008. 
840 The Indigenous Bedouins Of The Naqab-Negev Desert In Israel (Omer: Negev Coexistence Forum For Civil Equality, 
2006). 
841 Uzi Rebhun and Chaim I Waxman, The Social Scientific Study Of Jewry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
842 Oren Yiftachel, "Critical Theory And ‘Gray Space’: Mobilization Of The Colonized", City 13, no. 2-3 (2009): 246-263, 
doi:10.1080/13604810902982227. 
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Negev region three decades later.843 As of 2017 it is estimated that about 
300,000 Bedouin live in seven recognised Bedouin towns and villages, and 
another 100,000 citizens live in illegal settlements, such as shacks (most of 
them use solar electricity),844 live in thirty-five so-called ‘unrecognised’ 
villages.845  
 
This Zionist version of history, which insisted that the Negev was empty and 
uninhabited, was instrumental in facilitating the enactment of numerous laws 
and regulations of land confiscation.846 Due to the policies of ‘Judaising the 
land’, the Palestinian Bedouin’s attempts to win recognition for their historical 
land rights through the Israeli justice system have been unsuccessful. The court 
offers no protection for their lands.847 Over the years, Bedouins citizens 
submitted some 3,200 legal claims to their expropriated lands, based on the 
traditional Ottoman or British records that attest to their past holdings. However, 
not even one Arab claimant has been awarded full ownership rights. Ninety-five 
per cent of Arab claims to land have not been settled, covering approximately 
800,000 dunams.848  
 
The Negev Bedouin being compelled to relocate also involves the loss of their 
traditional occupations and they are coerced into the Israeli workforce for their 
economic survival.849 They represent a particularly disadvantage group and are 
generally excluded from participation in the political economy.850 They are 
among the poorest in Israel with an average per capita income, which is only 
fifty per cent of that of Israel’s Arab community, and only twenty-two per cent of 
the national average. Unemployment rate among Negev Bedouin lies at fifty per 
cent and only twenty-four per cent of Bedouin women have jobs compared with 
                                                 
843 Oren Yiftachel, "Ethnocratic Policies And Indigenous Resistance: Bedoun in Arabs And The Israeli Settler 
State", Holy Land Studies 1, no. 2 (2003): 161-191, doi:10.3366/hls.2003.0002. 
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845  "Equality In Transportation And Education In The Unrecognized Villages In The Negev", Sikkuy, accessed 19 
October 2018, http://www.sikkuy.org.il/departments. 
846 "The Unrecognized Bedouin Villages In The Negev - Facts And Figures", Acri.Org.Il, 2013, 
https://www.acri.org.il/he/29287. 
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850 Abu-Saad, "Access To Higher Education And Its Socio-Economic Impact Among Bedouin Arabs In Southern Israel".  
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eighty per cent of Israeli women in the Negev and seventy-four of Israeli women 
countrywide.851 Some seventy per cent of Bedouin children live in poverty. 
Despite the dire economic situation of the Bedouin, their population growth rate 
is one of the highest in the world at five per cent per annum.852 The Bedouin is 
very much tilted towards the younger age group with sixty-per cent of the total 
population being the age of nineteen.853  
 
The issue of the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages in Southern Israel and the 
resolution of the Bedouin citizens’ land claims and economic development in the 
country's Negev region have received increased attention in recent years both 
from the media and from government institutions and became pressing issue 
that Arab citizens are facing in Israel.  
 
 
5.7.3  The application of the spiral model on the ‘Prawer-Plan’  
 
 
First phase: repression 
 
In September 2011, the Israeli government approved the Prawer Plan, the 
brainchild of former Deputy Chair of the National Security Council, Mr. Ehud 
Prawer.854 The plan seeks to implement the recommendations of a committee 
headed by Justice Eliezer Goldberg in 2008, which found that a grave injustice 
had been done to the Bedouin, which should be corrected by legalising as 
many of the 'unrecognised’ communities as possible.855 The main aim was to 
resolve the on-going intractable settlement issue concerning the Bedouin 
‘unrecognised’ villages by relocating tens of thousands of Bedouin from 
‘unrecognised’ villages into communities with official status.856 According to the 
plan, a law would be drafted whereby Bedouin who could prove they owned 
                                                 
851 "Development Of The Negev Bedouin Settlement", 2017. 
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853 "Negev Bedouin", Inter-Agency Task Force, accessed 20 October 2018, http://www.iataskforce.org/issues/view/2. 
854 "Demolition And Eviction Of Bedouin Citizens Of Israel In The Naqab (Negev) - The Praw er Plan - 
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land until 1979 would receive alternative land in exchange for the land that was 
transferred to the state. Others would receive monetary compensation.857 
 
This plan was condemned as racist by many who opposed it. The main 
objection to the ‘Prawer Begin law’ was the absence of a genuine consultation, 
which listened to the voice of the Bedouin people and treated them with respect. 
It is argued that the Plan’s legal framework is racist since it is applying only to 
Bedouin, thus it violates the principle of equality before the law. Also, there were 
critics in relation to the compensation offered for the lands to be confiscated, 
which is half of the value.858  
 
It can also be argued that the plan constituted a violation of the legal rights 
guaranteed by Israel’s Basic Law including the Bedouin people to ownership of 
their lands, self-esteem and rights to housing and freedom to choose where to 
live.859 The Plan has been said to involve violations of human rights under 
international law, violates the prohibition against discrimination stipulated in 
article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,860 and Israel’s obligations as a signatory of the International Covenant to 
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination.861 
 
 Like the ‘Galilee Development Plan’ that was suggested in 1975 in relation to 
the Galilee area, the ‘Prawer-plan’ shows that nothing has changed in the state 
policy. The Palestinian Bedouin citizens are still fighting against the same policy 
of Judaisation/ de-Arabisation of space.862 According to estimations, the 
‘Prawer- plan’ would displace about 30,000-40,000 Bedouin citizens to populate 
their evacuated land with Jewish settlers, and use it for military purposes. The 
result of this plan would mean the concentration of the Bedouin citizens who 
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make up about third of overall population of the Negev in one per cent of the 
total area of the Negev.863 
 
Accordingly, Adalah, the legal organisation advocating on behalf of the Arab 
minority in Israel described the plan as ‘a declaration of war on the Bedouin in 
the Negev’.864 Another example is the protest from the Institute of Middle East 
Understanding, which asserted in reference to the plan ‘If passed into law, it 
could result in the largest displacement of Palestinian citizens of Israel since the 
1950s’.865 Former Bedouin MK, Talab al-Sana condemned the plan as another 
‘Nakba’ [disaster] for the whole Bedouin population’. In using the term ‘Nakba’ 
he was invoking the Arabic term, which had been used to depict the 1948 
War.866 
 
Attempted internationalisation of the ‘Prawer-plan’ 
 
Adalah Legal Centre spent several months in intensive international advocacy 
with other TANs. The centre adopted two strategies of internationalisation, one 
at intrernational level and the other at local level. First, Adalah conducted 
consultation in June 2012 with the MEP’s Working Group on the Middle East in 
Strasbourg and a further briefing of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network (EMHRN) in Brussels.867 Second, on 24 October 2012, as part of the 
wider ‘Stop Prawer’ Campaign, Adalah conducted a tour of the ‘unrecognised’ 
Bedouin villages in the Negev for foreign diplomats to acquaint them with the 
conditions of the Arab Bedouin citizens in the region and to inform them of the 
potentially devastating effects of the Prawer Plan. This was a high-level tour 
that involved a number of key officials from European and Latin American 
embassies in Israel. 868  
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The events described in the previous section have all contributed to 
internationalise the issue of the ‘unrecognised’ villages. Indeed, the key player 
in that process was Adalah because it took the principle steps in bringing the 
issue in the international arena by briefing the EP and also by inviting foreign 
diplomats to visit the Negev ‘unrecognised’ villages. However, Adalah’s moves 
were accompanied by broad condemnations and actions carried by another 
NGOs and networks. 869 For example, on the national level, there were 
numerous local protests in various parts of Israel, which caught the eye of 
international media. The most significant of these were the various 
demonstrations held by ‘Alhirak al-Shababe’ (The Youth Movement), a newly 
formed organisation of young Bedouin Arabs, which had quickly grown in 
popular support sufficient to attract the attention of international media 
reporters.  It mainly drew support from young people who had become 
disaffected with other traditional types of leaders, political, religious and tribal, 
who had been challenging the government's policies of exclusion but without 
much success over the years.870 ‘Al-hirak al-Shababe’ also drew support and 
inspiration from the ‘Arab Spring’, which helped to highlight their grievances not 
only in other Arab countries but also in Europe and beyond.  
 
Some left-wing activists also supported mass demonstrations, which marched 
under the banner of catchy slogans such as ‘Days of Rage’. In the political 
arena Arab MKs strongly opposed the ‘Prawer-Plan’ and in unprecedented 
move they deliberately tore up draft copies of the plan and poured water on the 
drafts in an active protest in the Knesset.871 Many of these Arab MKs, believing 
that the ‘Prawer-Plan’ was an extension of the Israeli government’s conspiracy 
to alienate more and more Bedouin land, actually took to the streets to lend 
their support to the young protesters. This move was condemned by the right 
wing MKs accused Arab MKs of inciting their people and misleading them by 
politicising the ‘Prawer-Plan’ and erroneously linking it to the on-going wider 
Palestinian issue in order to magnify its significance.  
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The plight of the Negev Bedouin also received attention in the Israeli media. 
Prominent Canadian writers of international renown such as Margaret Atwood 
and Yann Martel signed their names to an appeal campaigning against the plan 
to the forcibly evict of the Bedouin in the Negev.872 The fact that Canadian 
writers of international acclaim took this action did not go unnoticed by other 
prominent writers on the international scene. These moves produced the 
‘boomerang effect’ by provoking immediate and intense criticism on the 
international level.  
 
Internationalisation. 
 
International groups including many public figures and civil society 
organisations outside Israel as well as the United Nations expressed their 
opposition to the ‘Prawer-Plan’, and echoed the calls of the Bedouin community, 
who demanded a meaningful consultation and participation in the decision-
making process that could determine their futures. Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International also denounced the Plan. Amnesty International was 
forthright in condemning the plan and saw it as a major setback to Bedouin 
rights to have housing drawing attention to Israel’s commitments to HR to which 
it was a signatory at international level.873  
 
Criticism of the ‘Prawer-Plan’ also came from The United Nations, which drew 
attention to its discriminatory nature.874 In February 2012, Raquel Rolnik, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing characterised the 
‘Prawer Plan’ as the ‘new frontiers of dispossession of traditional inhabitants, 
and the implementation of a strategy of Judaisation and control of the 
territory.875 Further UN condemnation came in March 2012 when the UN 
Committee on the Elimination for Racial Discrimination (CERD) demanded that 
Israel should not proceed with their proposed program, which was seen as 
                                                 
872 Maya Sela, "Margaret Atw ood, Yann Martel Urge Israel Against Relocating Palestinians, Bedouin", Haaretz.Com, 
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873 Jack Khoury, Zafrir Rinat and Oz Rezenberg, "Cabinet Approves Plan To Relocate Negev Bedouin", Haaretz.Com, 
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874 Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, "Israel's Bedouin Battle Displacement", Aljazeera.Com, 2013, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013828125945288209.html (Accessed at: 8 February 2017). 
875 "UN Human Rights Expert Calls For Urgent Revision Of Israeli Housing Policies", UN News, 2012, 
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discriminatory and racist in its approach.876 It was not the first time that the UN 
expressed its solidarity with the Bedouin citizens of Israel.877  
 
The European Union (EU) also raised concerns on several occasions.  The 
principal issue of contention was the fact that there was no forum in which the 
Bedouin people could be consulted and given a voice in matters that affected 
their lives and communities.878 This was a clear example of ‘domestic blockage’ 
where the oppressed people have no recourse internally. On 5 July 2012, a 
resolution was brought to a vote by the Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists & Democrats in the EP, which passed a historic resolution (291 to 
274, with 39 abstentions) and in the context of strong condemnation of Israeli 
policies in the East Jerusalem and West Bank, also condemned moves by the 
Israeli government to implement the ‘Prawer-Plan’:  
‘The European Parliament Calls for the protection of the Bedouin 
communities of the West Bank and in the Negev, and for their rights to 
be fully respected by the Israeli authorities, and condemns any 
violations (e.g. house demolitions, forced displacements, public service 
limitations); calls also, in this context, for the withdrawal of the Prawer 
Plan by the Israeli Government’ 879 
 
 
The Bedouin cause had never previously received attention from the EP. Now 
that it had been raised in the international arena drew comment from Dr. Thabet 
Abu Rass who was the Director of Adalah’s Negev bureau: ‘achieving 
recognition by the European Parliament that the Israeli government practices 
the same policies of displacement and dispossession against Palestinian 
citizens of Israel as it does against Palestinians living under occupation is a 
tremendous step forward’.880  
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the internationalisation of the Negev 
Bedouin situation was that as far away as Canada, their plight prompted over 
70 influential novelists poets and academics to denounce the Israeli ‘Prawer-
Plan’ in a signed an open letter to their own government and to the Israeli 
government.881 By this action they were lending support to the appeal signed by 
the renowned Israeli authors Grossman, Oz and Yehoshua.  
 
 
Denial (Second phase). 
 
As in the Galilean water case study, denial in this context also did not follow the 
classical lines but rather came in the form of a partial admission followed by an 
attempt at ‘utilitarian justification’.  
Since its promulgation, the ‘Prawer-Plan’ operated under the guise of 
‘modernising’ the Bedouin community by ‘urbanising’ them. The Israeli 
government’s reaction to criticism on such a grand scale was to attempt to claim 
that the plan was part of a campaign to develop the Negev, and that it aimed to 
‘modernise’ the Bedouin communities and that Bedouin communities would 
benefit from it.882 Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu claims that: 
‘the plan was aimed at ending the 65-year-long situation in which the 
state had given up control of land settled by semi-nomadic Bedouin 
tribes. It would also “put an end to the spread of illegal building by 
Negev Bedouin and lead to better integration of the Bedouin into Israeli 
society’.883 
 
Israeli army Major-General Doron Almog was appointed by the Israeli Prime 
Minister's office to head the issue of resettlement and economic development 
for the Negev Bedouin citizens said: 
 
‘The idea is to better integrate Jews and Bedouins; to bring many more 
Bedouins to our workforce; to employ and educate many more women 
                                                 
881 Philip Weiss, "Margaret Atw ood Signs On To Canadian Letter Opposing Palestinian Evictions", Mondoweiss, 2013, 
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882 Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, "Israel's Bedouin Battle Displacement", Aljazeera.Com, 2013, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013828125945288209.html (Accessed at: 8 February 2017). 
883 Lazar Berman, "Government Shelves Praw er Plan On Bedouin Settlement", Timesofisrael.Com, 2013, 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-shelves-prawer-plan-on-bedouin-settlement/. 
  203 
for employment; and to build new communities; and to expand some of 
the current communities and make them modern'884 
 
The official line of justification for relocating the Bedouin people into towns was 
that the Israeli government wanted to integrate them into a modern lifestyle in 
which they would have better conditions and services. However, some 
academic writers take the view that there was a hidden agenda to constrain the 
Bedouin by impeding them from agricultural development on land that they 
could then claim. Additionally, by urbanising the Bedouin the government would 
have more control over them.885 Such an agenda has all the hallmarks of 
‘utilitarian justification’. 
 
Tactical concessions (third phase). 
 
In response to the wide spread criticism of the ‘Prawer-Plan’ but still maintaining 
their position of denial, the Israeli government did make a semblance of a 
concession by involving the Bedouin in consultative sessions. Accordingly, MK 
Benny Begin held talks with representatives of the Negev Bedouin community 
and listened to their concerns. As a result of these talks minor changes of a 
cosmetic nature were made to the plan but in essence it was still intended to 
begin moving the Bedouin citizens. The modified plan now became known as 
the ‘Prawer- Begin Plan’. The minor changes included moderating the language 
used and offering small sums of money by way of compensation for those who 
were willing to move.886 Essentially, this was a compromise with very little by 
way of concession to the Bedouin but which was couched in rhetoric which 
pretended to formulate the plan as an attempt to help the Bedouin to move 
forward a catch up with the rest of Israeli society which had left them behind by 
modernising.  
 
                                                 
884 Jillian Kestler-D'Amours, "Israel's Bedouin Battle Displacement", Aljazeera.Com, 2013, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/2013828125945288209.html. 
885 Ghazi Falah, "Israelization Of Palestine Human Geography", Progress In Human Geography13, no. 4 (1989): 535-
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886 "The Government Approved Slight Changes In The Praw er Plan To Uproot The Bedouin From Their 
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According to Begin, the development of the Bedouin people needed to be 
formally stated in the new bill. This formalisation had the appearance of 
recognising that the Bedouin did have some land rights but that these rights had 
to be tempered by ‘reality’. This meant that they were limits to the recognition of 
their land rights as the greater good of the overall community required the 
building Highway across the Negev and this would necessitate the imposition of 
some limits to their land rights. Additionally, Jewish settlements were necessary 
as outlined in the District Master Plan for the Beersheba Region. This plan 
needed to be respected and should take precedence over the rights of the 
Bedouin.887 As well as this, national security called for the appropriation of some 
Negev territory for military installations. There was also certain development, 
which required land in the Negev for the economic benefit of the nation.  
 
Thus, the land rights of the Bedouin would have to yield to what was required 
for the good of the entire nation ‘utilitarian justification’ taken to its very limits. 
Accordingly, on 6 May 2013, the Ministerial Committee on Legislation approved 
the proposed ‘Law for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev – 
2013’ (‘the Prawer-Begin Bill’) after recommendations by Minister Benny Begin 
were included.888 Later, on 24 June 2013, the Knesset approved the ‘Prawer-
Begin Bill’ with a slim majority of 43 votes for and 40 votes against.889 It was 
supposed to receive second and third readings in the coming months. When the 
‘Begin-Prawer Plan’ passed a first Knesset vote in June 2013, it met again with 
heated local protest and international condemnation. The European Union 
(EU) expressed again its concerns regarding passing the Plan in first reading in 
the Knesset. At the European Coordination Committee for Palestine, the 
‘Prawer- Begin Bill’ was condemned on grounds of racist discrimination.890 
Israel was urged to reveal the bill by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Navi Pillay who was highly critical of a plan that would lend 
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legitimacy to the relocation of the Bedouin people and the and their deprivation 
of lands that were their ancestor rights: 
 
‘if this bill becomes law…it will accelerate the demolition of entire 
Bedouin communities, forcing them to give up their homes, denying 
them their rights to land ownership, and decimating their traditional 
cultural and social life in the name of development’891 
 
 
Pillay also recognised that the consultation efforts had been purely token in 
nature and urged for the resumption of talks that showed more genuine ‘respect 
for the legitimate rights of minorities is a fundamental tenet of democracy’.892 
Furthermore, in November 2013, over than fifty public figures including Antony 
Gormley and Brian Eno from Britain signed a letter against the proposed 
removal of the Bedouin people from their historic land.893 
 
 
Tactical concession (Second-time). 
 
The new ‘Prawer–Begin bill’ for regulating Bedouin settlement in the Negev was 
supposed to pass second and third readings in the Knesset session during 
2013. Nonetheless, on December 2013 the Former Minister Benny Begin 
announced that he was taking the bill of the Knesset agenda.894 Even though it 
was still not clear whether it has been temporarily delayed or shelved 
altogether, the withdrawal of the ‘Prawer-Plan bill’ was considered a significant 
achievement in the history of the Palestinian community in Israel. As Adalah 
stated in a press release that the cancellation of the bill: 
 
‘shows that popular action, legal advocacy and international pressure 
can succeed in defending the rights of 70,000 Arab Bedouin residents of 
the unrecognised villages in the Negev to live with freedom and dignity 
on their lands and in their villages'.895 
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Although the spiral model stopped at the third phase, that is, the ‘tactical 
concession’, which included two levels of cosmetic moves; first, amendment of 
the ‘Prawer-Plan’ and second shelving it. A further development occurred four 
years later that according to the author of this thesis could be seen as ‘tactical 
concession plus’.  
 
 
‘Tactical concession plus’. 
 
It was revealed during 2017 in the Israeli media that Israeli government has 
improved its stance towards the Bedouin citizens in the Negev ‘unrecognised’ 
villages by connect water to some 60-10,000 citizens in the ‘unrecognised’ 
villages in the Negev. In the first stage, three villages were connected, in which 
about 15,000 people live. 896 This dramatic move that came only few years after 
shelving the Prawer-Plan, could be defined as ‘tactical concession’ plus. 
However, according to Yair Maayan, Director General of the Bedouin 
Settlement Authority, and who is in charge of implementing the plan, connecting 
these villages to water does not mean that there is a change in Israel’s official 
policy towards the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages: 
 
‘the villages are still illegal and are intended for evacuation, nothing has 
changed in terms of the state or Mekorot [Israle’s National Water 
Company]… we make it easier for the residents, and prevent the 
possibility that the entire village will be cut off from water because there 
is only one person (from the same village) whose responsible for the 
connection’897 
 
As of 2017, there are in the Negev 1,700 ‘unrecognised’ residential centres (42 
villages), which constitute homes to about half of the entire Bedouin population 
(100,000 residents) live on about 400 thousand hectares.898 A full-service public 
transport service operates only in the seven veteran towns and in four of the 
eleven communities that have been recognised in recent years. In the rest of 
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the forty-two villages there is no public transportation service.899 Another Plan to 
regulate the unrecognised Bedouin settlements was suggested in 2017 by the 
Minister of Agriculture and it was called ‘Prawer II’  due to its similarity to the 
previous one. Once again Adalah petitioned against it to the UN, and the issue 
is still unsolved.900 
 
Figure 10: The ‘Prawer- Plan’ on the spiral model 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
The factors that gave rise to the internationalisation process in the two previous 
case studies under consideration included the cumulative effect of Israeli policy 
towards the ‘unrecognised’ villages. In the case of the ‘unrecognised’ villages in 
the Northern district of Israel, the internationalisation process was precipitated 
by the shortage of potable water and the diseases it caused in the population. 
The critical process of internationalisation in this case was to bring a case to the 
IWT, which could issue a judgement binding on the Israeli state. The Israeli 
government decided to respond to these claims in an international forum, thus 
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recognised to some extent that the issue of the Arab citizens is not any longer 
domestic Israeli issue. 
 
In the case of the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Southern Israel, concerted efforts to 
bring this issue to international attention were precipitated by the efforts to 
codify the policy of the Israeli state in a new law. This law made the 
discrimination and the violation of human rights as allegedly practised by the 
Israeli state explicitly and therefore enabled NGOs and other stakeholders to 
articulate and frame the issue as a deliberate violation of international 
conventions and obligations of the Israeli state towards its citizens. Those 
involved in the efforts to internationalise the issue raised this subject in 
appropriate international institutions, in particular the United Nations and the 
European Parliament.  
 
The issue of the ‘unrecognised’ villages had already been identified as one of 
the problems in the treatment by the Israeli states of its Arab minority and this 
accounts for the fact that they proved to be receptive to the efforts to 
internationalise this issue. The main achievement was to promote actions from 
these institutions and bring this issue to the forefront in relation to the proposed 
legislation in Israel. The abandonment of the proposed legislation (Prawer- 
Plan) in Israel was a tangible result of the efforts of civil and law based 
internationalisation, which similarly to the case of the military government was 
combined with local protests, and opposition from both right and left wing 
parties. However, in line with hypothesis 1, the response of the Israeli state was 
designed to diffuse international approbation and was not sufficient to resolve 
the underlying issue.  
 
Concerning the spiral model, the case studies show how the Israeli responses 
moved through the various phases. In the case of the unrecognised Northern 
villages, the first phase (repression) consisted in the failure to supply water. The 
denial phase took a form of justification based on the concept that the 
settlements were illegal. The third phase (tactical concession) involved 
connection a limit amount of water to the unrecognised villages. The fourth 
phase (prescriptive status) Israel ratified international human rights in its basic 
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laws. Eventually the Israeli government changed the underlying policy and 
legitimised most of the ‘recognised’ villages, a move that shows that the spiral 
model reached its fifth level.  
 
In the second case study of the unrecognised Bedouin villages in Southern 
Israel, the first phase (repression) consisted of the state’s effort to codify the 
unrecognised communities in domestic law, which in turn would result in 
undesirable relocation of the local Bedouin community. The internationalisation 
then caused Israel to move into the second phase (denial), which took the form 
of utilitarian justification of the policies and thereby denying the alleged human 
rights implications. Due to the success of internationalisation, Israel was driven 
to tactical concessions. First it was in the form of minor changes to the 
proposed law (phase 3), then another these tactical concessions involved 
dropping the proposed law entirely, and few years later, the Israeli authorities 
connected theses unrecognised villages to water. A move that was defined in 
this thesis as ‘tactical concession plus’. There was no further advance into 
phase four and five because the tactical concessions were sufficient to reduce 
the international pressure (the proposed law was not enacted), and the Israeli 
government was not compelled to change the underlying policy. 
 
Finally, the aforementioned two case studies demonstrate that similarly to the 
Kufr-Qassim massacre case, Israel’s respect for the international law was 
uttered by utilitarian attempt to protect its reputation. 
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Figure 12: Comparison between case studies 1992-2013 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary of the spiral model (1992- 2013) 
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Chapter 6: Internationalisation by Personal Diplomacy (2015- 
2018) 
  
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters looked at cases that illustrated two different 
modalities of the internationalisation strategy used by Israel’s Arab elite: 1) 
‘public memoranda’ sent to international organisations, foreign officials, media 
and superpowers, and 2) ‘civil and legal advocacy’ led by NGOs by invoking 
international conventions and treaties. The current chapter aims to investigate a 
third pattern of internationalisation promoted by the Arab parliamentarians that 
is defined in this study as ‘personal diplomacy’. 
 
The last decade in particular has witnessed a sharp shift in the outlook of the 
elected Arab representatives in of Israel. This change signifies a dramatic 
increase in their pleas to leading international institutions and EU top officials. 
More than ever before, individual and collective parliamentarian initiatives are 
targeting foreign institutions and governments that Israel share with them 
agreements based on common liberal values while these norms being violated. 
These include the UN and EU. They have also unexpectedly petitioned the US 
government directly as the United States is the main external security guarantor 
of Israel. The main aim of these initiatives is to bring the demand for egalitarian 
democracy for the Arab citizens to foreign attention. Yet, their external 
campaign for equality and integration within the Israeli society contains 
unavoidable challenging massages to those of the Israeli State that sees itself 
as ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’. Therefore, these efforts elaborate 
on the complexity and sensitivity of the involvement Arab MKs in such activities. 
 
In some respects, it could be argued that Arab members of Israel’s Knesset are 
in a contradictory position. It is because on one hand they were democratically 
elected to represent the interests of their constituents and thereby participate in 
the governance of the country, while on the other hand, they deliberately 
damage the country’s reputation (as their opponents would see it) by 
questioning Israel’s adherence to internationally accepted norms on the global 
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stage. Arab MKs are also very often accused in advocating Palestinians in the 
Occupied territories while neglecting the national interest of their Arab voters in 
Israel.901  
 
The spiral model postulates that in contrast to analytical approaches to 
international relations that focus exclusively on states as international actors, 
NSAs such as NGOs are able to undermine a state’s authority and affect its 
standing in the international community as its authors state.902 Various scholars 
have also emphasised the role of international organisations such as non-
governmental groups, and social movements903 and TANs904 in promoting 
universal human rights norms.905 Others have emphasised the diplomatic role of 
parliamentarians in generating soft power for their governments through 
parliamentary or public diplomacy that aim to enhance the global stand of their 
governments.906 However, much of this existing literature does not acknowledge 
the exceptional the role of parliamentarians in general and opposition 
parliamentarians from ethnic- minorities background in particular (such as in the 
case of Israel’s Arab MKs) as part of transnational advocacy networks in 
promoting the interest of their constituencies even if it opposes the foreign 
policy of the state.  Additionally, international activities of the Arab minority in 
Israel are limitedly evaluated in the literature based on their civil society. Hence, 
this chapter aims to fill this lacuna both in the academic and the theoretical 
literature by focusing on cross-border activities of Israel’s Arab parliamentarians 
in the years 2015-2018.  
 
The first part of this chapter gives background about the creation of the Joint 
List in 2015 that draws upon a variety of sources in Arabic, Hebrew and English. 
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It also builds on interviews conducted in 2016 with key informants selected from 
three categories: (1) Arab members of the Knesset (MKs) (2) Leading Arab 
NGOs in Israel (3) Israeli academic experts in Arab-Jewish relations. The 
second part examines three case studies where Arab MKs utilised ‘Personal 
Diplomacy’ as part of their efforts to ‘internationalise’ the status of the Arab 
citizens of Israel. 
 
 
6.2  The creation of the Joint List in 2015 
 
 
The creation of the Joint List in 2015 was an unprecedented political move in 
the history of the Arab citizens of Israel. It was the first time all four Arab parties 
(Taa’l, Balad, Hadash, Raa’m) whose members include secular Arabs to 
nationalists and pious Muslims have united together and created one list. The 
Party also includes a Communist Jewish MK (Dr. Dov Hanin). This was a 
historic achievement for the Israel’s Arab politicians. The party won 13 of 120 
seats, the highest number that Arab MKs have managed to achieve ever, and it 
became the third-largest bloc in the 20th Knesset election, and the second 
faction of the opposition. The unification of Arab parties could be fairly seen as 
a significant move towards their internal cohesion. It was a strategic partnership 
that was born as a reaction to the amendment of the Knesset Election Law in 
March 2014, which increased the electoral threshold from 2 to 3.25 per cent. 
The amendment’s ‘official’ aim was to increase stable governance of Israeli 
governments. However, the Arab and other small Jewish parties considered 
saw it as an attempt to reduce their chances of passing the parliamentary 
threshold, and ultimately, to keep prevent them of winning parliamentary 
representation.907 
 
The success of the Joint List to overcome the new threshold was in a large part 
the alliance of all Arab parties, a demand that Arab citizens have consistently 
called for. As a result, the turnout in the Arab society increased from 56% in 
2013 to more than 63.5% in the 2015 election, which was very close to Israel’s 
national average. Most of the Arab voters voted for the Joint List (more than 
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  214 
80%).908 In the same election Benjamin Netanyahu won office for the fourth time 
over eight years. Thus, he was the first Israeli Prime Minister to serve for a 
longer time period than Menachem Begin.  
 
It should be noted that that fact Arab MKs have gained most of Arab votes, 
does not mean necessary that their constituents are fully trust them. Previous 
surveys showed that there is a gap between the Israeli Arabs' leadership and 
their public. It is believed that this lack of trust and legitimacy of the Arab 
parliamentarians stemmed from their inability to bring about a fundamental 
change in Israel’s policies. The existence of a clear Jewish majority in the Israeli 
parliament prevents Arab politicians from effectively representing the Arab 
public who expect them to satisfy their needs. Considering this failure, there is 
much criticism of Israel’s Arab lawmakers from their voters.909 
 
The Joint List Party includes new members alongside veteran ones. They all 
highly educated and interestingly many of them have a professional background 
of work in local NGOs and human rights area. For example, MK Ayman Odeh, 
who serves as leader of the communist party and the Joint List Chairperson, 
worked previously as a lawyer for Sikkuy, an Association for the Advancement 
of Civic Equality in Israel.910 MK Dr. Yousef Jabareen, No. 10 on the Joint List, 
was as community activist and served as the founding Director of Dirasat, the 
Arab Centre for Law and Policy. Jabreen is also a human rights scholar and a 
previous law lecturer and, holds MA and PhD degrees in international law from 
American universities.911 MK Aida Touma Suliman, No. 5 on the Joint List, was 
the Chairman of the Arab NGO ‘Women Against Violence and Children’.912 
More veteran Arab lawmakers such as MK Hanin Zoabi, No. 7 on the Joint List 
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was a Co-Founder and General Director of I'lam Media Centre for the Arab 
Palestinians in Israel.913 MK Dr. Jamal Zahalka, No. 3 on the Joint List, is a 
Former Director General of the al-Ahali Centre for Community Development. 
Former MK Dr. Basel Ghattas, who was No.11 on the Joint List served as a 
Former General Director of both the Galilee Society (the Arab National Society 
for Health Research and Services) and of Ittijah, which was the umbrella 
organisation of the Arab NGOs.914 Due to the aforementioned examples, it can 
be concluded that the activists of the Arab civil society did not yield satisfied 
results in relation to the daily life standards of the Arab citizens, hence, they 
turned to the political arena in an attempt to have more influence on Israel’s 
policies. Put differently, civil advocacy did not bring the desired results, so they 
turned to personal diplomacy. 
 
A common view amongst interviewees was that until the year 2015, the Arab 
public in Israel lacked any effective political representation, which would have 
helped them to internationalise their demands; therefore, their international 
efforts had little impact. Prof. Sammy Smooha, an Israeli leading expert in the 
Arab-Jewish relations, argued that the formation of the Joint List was a major 
factor that triggered the increase in the international petitions of Arab MKs and 
succeeded in attracting unintentional unforeseen international attention towards 
it. Smooha also stresses the issue of legitimacy of the Joint List as a body that 
was elected and representing a group of people:  
 
‘The moment it was created, the Joint List constituted a national 
leadership and an address that presented the Arab public in Israel, 
something that did not exist before… it is a representative body that is 
easier to communicate and to deal with rather than with four parties. 
This was the first time that the State Department talked about it. MK 
Odeh travelled to the United States and had a stage to talk there. Before 
that, there were four parties, but now when there is one party with one 
leadership, it created a new situation. Also in Israel it created a new 
situation as in the last Israeli election, MK Odeh appeared as on of the 
legitimate participants in the campaign’s debate. He was the first Arab 
                                                 
913 "MK Hanin Zoabi: Biography", Knesset.Gov.Il, accessed 28 October 2018, 
https://knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=846. 
914 Ariel Ben Solomon, "Meet The New  MK: Basel Ghattas", The Jerusalem Post | Jpost.Com, 2013, 
https://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/Meet-the-new-MK-Basel-Ghattas. 
During 2017, MK Ghattas w as convicted of providing means for performing an act of terror for smuggling electronic 
equipment and letters to prisoners into prison, and transferring letters. 
  216 
participation in such a debate. It is also an elected body; unlike The 
Higher Arab Monitoring Committee’915 
 
Similarly, MK Jabareen argued: 
‘Since the creation of the Joint List, it became easier to internationalise 
our issues as we have now a clear address and greater power. It is also 
become easier for countries and embassies to arrange meeting with one 
party instead of four as it was before. Before that, there was a kind of 
competition between the parties… The creation of the Joint List also 
attracted international attention. Although in Germany the left parties 
have previously united together, they had much less contradiction 
between them unlike us communism and the Islamic movement. The 
creation of the Joint List increased the interest of international bodies in 
us; foreign embassies and the EU want to know more about 
us…perhaps our international work now will succeed in putting pressure 
on Israel’916 
 
MK Joint List Chairman, Ayman Odeh also confirmed that the creation of the 
Joint List was a significant step that helped to put the Arab minority on the 
international agenda: 
 
‘There is no doubt that there was unprecedented cover of the formation 
of the Joint List. The New York Times wrote about us during the election 
in its first page alongside other big international and American journals. 
Also my visit to the US was hugely covered in different international 
journals… we are now the third largest faction; it means that we can 
potentially have an influence on the Israeli domestic politics’917 
 
After the 2015 election, MK Odeh was invited to Washington for two weeks of 
diplomatic meetings. It was the first time that an elected representative of 
Israel's Arab citizens is invited to such a visit. On the eve of his departure, Odeh 
declared that his aim is to raise an international awareness regarding the 
situation of Arabs in Israel: 
 
‘The issues that matter to Israel's Arab citizens are hardly represented in 
the international conversation. I'm going to the US to bring that voice 
with me to influencing sources and opinion leaders, and to create 
contacts and connections with the progressive and civil rights 
movements…its seems that the predominant tone as far as the Israeli-
Palestinian issue is concerned is simply despair. I come with the clear 
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message – we don't have the privilege of despairing. Less than a month 
after Netanyahu's visit to the US and his half-apology, I go so that I may 
tell the hard truth about him and the government in Israel, which rose to 
power through racist incitement against Arab citizens’918 
 
In December 3, 2015, same week of Odeh’s diplomatic tour to the US, Mk Tibi 
also visited the UN and called on the United Nations to increase its attention to 
the conditions of the Arab citizens.919 By 2016 Odeh was chosen to be one of 
100 influential international personalities.920 
 
One of the main questions in this study sought to determine the reasons that 
triggered Arab lawmakers to increase their international pleas. In response a 
range of multifaceted factors were elicited. MK Masud Ganaim, No. 2 on the 
Joint List on behalf the Islamic movement claimed that this trend was increased 
due to the greater prominence of ‘racial discrimination’ against the Arab citizens 
and because of the ‘limitation of the traditional political and public tools’:  
 
‘The challenges have increased, and the racial discrimination reached a 
level where the traditional parliamentarian tools are not being enough 
anymore for facing discrimination and injustice. Also, public protests and 
other activities of The Higher Arab Monitoring Committee for Arab 
Citizens of Israel are not effective anymore. The racism has raised quiet 
dramatically to the extent that it received legitimacy through Israel’s 
laws. We have to look for another tool that can be more effective to put 
more pressure on Israel’921 
 
Similarly, MK Jabareen also refered to the limitations in making a local change 
within Israel: 
 
‘The phenomenon of the internationalisation started as a result of 
looking for options for change. There is a feeling that there are limited 
possibilities for having a local change. I would not say hopelessness of 
having a local change but rather a ‘limitation’. So, there were attempts to 
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find new horizons of work, and advocacy. One of these horizons is the 
international arena’922 
 
In the same vein, MK Tibi, the most veteran Arab MK, Deputy Speaker of the 
Knesset, and Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee in the joint list linked the 
issue of the Arab minority in Israel to the wider context of national minorities 
worldwide and to their status under the international law. Tibi also argued that 
Arab politicians could no longer let the Israeli governments to mislead the 
international community about the civil status of its Arab citizens:  
 
‘We did not use the internationalisation strategy a lot in the past. I 
started to use it more in the last few years, and I think that we should 
intensify its use. Firstly, because we are a national minority, and there 
are rights for national minorities that guaranteed by international 
conventions and human rights treaties. Secondly, Israeli officials and on 
the top of them Prime Minister Netanyahu keep mentioning the issue of 
Arab citizens in international platforms and claiming that they are treated 
equally and that Israel is a heaven for them etc. If they are allowed to 
raise our issue abroad and to mislead the international community, then 
why don not we present our issues abroad from our perspective? 
Netanyahu talked about us in the congress and in front of the world’s 
leaders and compared us with Arabs in the neighbouring countries, so 
my answer to him was that it is impossible to compare between citizen 
of a country that claim a democracy, and between citizens who are living 
under dictatorial or totalitarian regime like Libya, Syria. Comparing a 
‘control group’ [Israel’s Arab citizens] should be at the first place with 
their Israeli Jewish neighbours, and then with democratic countries like 
Sweden, Canada and Britain that support the ‘other’ citizen and treat 
him equally rather with dictatorial regimes only because they are Arab 
regimes and we are Arabs, this is a racist attitude’923 
 
Tibi articulates a strategy designed to counter the narrative offered by Prime 
Minister Netanyahu on the world stage and invoke the norms of liberal 
democracy to question the conduct of the Israeli government, while refusing to 
accept any suggestion that the conduct of foreign Arab governments should 
have any relevance for the political rights of the Arab minority in Israel. 
 
Prof. Smooha explains the international political behaviour of Arab MKs as part 
of an empowerment process that they are going through, and as copying the 
tactics of the Israeli Jewish left:  
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‘The reasons for this trend [internationalisations attempts] refers to the 
fact that the Arab minority in Israel are going through a process of 
empowerment, and whenever a minority is going under the process of 
empowerment so it is not enough for it only to raise its aspirations but it 
wants also to fulfil them. They [Israel’s Arab elite] know that it is very 
difficult to achieve their aspirations within the state of Israel. Therefore, 
they are turning abroad. Furthermore, Arabs in Israel are doing what 
Israeli left-wing Jews who are opposing the Israeli government do. They 
are using the international community to talk against the policy of the 
government, and it is not new. In the 1970s the left-wing Parties talked 
with ASHAF and with different kinds of international bodies to affect the 
Israeli government’s action. Hence, Arab citizens are saying if this action 
is permitted for Jews, so it is permitted for us’924  
 
On the question of the nature of the demands of the Arab politicians (e.g. civil or 
national) from the international community, this study found that the majority of 
Arab MKs see civil and national demands as un separated and that they are 
completing each other. As MK Ganaim put it: 
 
‘I do not differentiate between civil and national rights- they are both 
overlapping. My civil rights are oppressed as a result of my national 
affiliation and identity. When I do not have an Arab student does not 
receive an equal budget such as the Jewish student it is because of his 
affiliation as a Palestinian Arab, therefore these two issues are 
interrelating. We are justifying our claims by saying that in a normal 
state it is not supposed to be a contradiction between the national 
affiliation and the citizenship. Israel creates this contradiction and 
tension as it wants us to make a choice between either the Israeli 
citizenship or the Palestinian identity and we are rejecting Israel’s 
attempt to impose this examination on us. We cannot compare between 
our citizenship and identity and we cannot separate them. I did not 
choose the Israeli citizenship, I became a citizen of this state as against 
of my will, I was here and the state came to me. When we are 
petitioning to international bodies we are saying that we are citizens who 
are being discriminated because of our national affiliation’925    
 
Likewise, MK Odeh argued: 
 
‘Both the civil and the national issues are overlapping. For example, 
Kymlica one of the most important critical authors of the collective rights, 
started to see that liberalism includes collective rights. In other words, it 
is impossible to have full individual civil rights without full national rights. 
So, the issue of civil or national rights became strongly interrelating. 
Traditionally the Arabic language was seen as a national right but it also 
                                                 
924 Sammy Smooha, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, phone 
interview  by Ilham Shahbari. March 13, 2016. 
925 Masud Ganaim, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, interview  
by Ilham Shahbari. Sakhnin, March 12, 2016. 
  220 
can be claimed that it is part of cultural or civil liberal rights for a national 
group. Additionally, if you look at the issue of the Nakba’s recognition, 
you might say it is a pure national issue; however, you can find a civil 
and liberal interpretation for it as it can be labelled it under the umbrella 
of historical conciliation and recognition of historical injustice for the 
sake of the Arab-Jewish coexistence. In the past things were clearer, in 
other words, civil rights were derived from citizenship, and national 
rights from national affiliation. However, there was a lot of development 
in the issue of collective and historical rights for national and indigenous 
minorities in the world, and there is a lot of international acceptance to 
those rights’926 
 
MK Touma-Sliman also claims that there is no separation between civil and 
national rights. However, she acknowledged the fact that it is easier to advocate 
civil demands internationally: 
 
‘Regarding the civic rights we are asking for the traditional once those 
that are derived from the citizenship. I see that both demands [national 
and civil] are not competing. There is no one civil problem that is not 
connected to the fact that Arabs in Israel are a national minority and as 
long as Israel continues its occupation the issue of the national 
demands will stay more problematic and it will be harder to achieve 
them. The road for civil rights is easier and more understandable but the 
problem that it is that it is the Israeli governments that link between the 
two issues and not us. Normally the discussion is about our political 
behaviour, however, Israel’s position also should be checked’927 
 
Another Arab MKs also confirms that the international community is more willing 
to help with civil demands rather than the national ones. According to MK 
Jabareen: 
 
‘Regarding our demands, we find that the world is clearly reacting to our 
traditional civil demands such as the freedom of expression and equality 
in budgets. If you are raising issues such as the Jewishness nature of 
the state so they [international community] feel that it is going to a very 
political place that has a high potential of a clash with Israel and they 
avoid it. So, it is obvious that social issues related to children’ and 
women rights, budgets and unrecognised villages are seen as more 
reasonable issues to deal with. Let’s say they are ‘pure civil rights 
discourse’. If you have issues that touch the sovereignty of the state so 
it becomes harder to deal with’928 
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Former MK Ghattas also supports what Jabareen’s argument regarding the 
parliamentarian international advocacy in relation to the Arab civil rights: 
 
‘Civil rights are easier to achieve. It is easier for European ears to 
receive civil problems like poverty rather than national demands. Israel’s 
OECD membership helped us to increase our civil demands, as it is now 
obliged to close the gap between the Arab and the Jewish citizens’929  
 
The aforementioned perspectives were confirmed further during the interview 
with a senior figure from the Delegation of the European Union to Israel. He 
stated that the EU is dedicated to support Israel’s Arab civil rights and that the it 
is not playing a role in national issues: 
 
‘…after October 2000 it became more important for the EU to follow the 
issues of Arab citizens of Israel due to their connection to the issue of 
Palestinians in the West Bank. So whenever there is tension there it 
affects the Arab-Jewish in Israel… in the dialogue with the Israeli 
government, the EU discusses human rights issue and the issue of the 
Arab minority is one of our priorities… however, we are not going to play 
role in the issue of Jewishness character of Israel. We meet regularly 
with Arab MKs. We meet as well with civil society representatives as it 
helps us to focus on issues such as discriminatory legislation that affects 
the relations….930  
 
In response to the question whether there is a specific criterion for targeting 
foreign bodies, a range of responses was elicited. Interestingly, MK Jabareen 
observed: 
 
‘We target the countries that are interested in us, but also we look at 
countries that have foreign funding foundations for human rights issues 
in Israel including those that belong to political parties or to countries. 
For example, Germany has foundations that support human rights 
activities, and these foundations are belonging to German parties. There 
are also embassies such as the American and Britain ones that have a 
certain budget for investments. So I think that developing relations with 
these embassies either directly or through the foundations is also 
contributing to the internationalisation issue. Austria for example does 
not provide such a funding, but Germany because of its history with the 
Jews has several foundations in Israel… Switzerland because it was  the 
hub of the international human rights conventions is also has several 
foundations in the country… Canada also has a foundation, so there is a 
trend of supporting projects of the Arab minority either through the 
embassies themselves or through organisations that belong to 
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them…we have also relations with South Africa as we visited there 
twice, with the German minority in Northern Italy, and with a group in 
Northern Ireland… those relations were before the creation of the Joint 
List but also the Joint List put aims to goal to strengthen these 
relations’931  
 
There was a consensus amongst Arab MKs interviewees regarding the purpose 
and the use of the internationalisation strategy and in relation to its place on 
their political agenda. Firstly, unlike the state’s point of view, Arab MKs do not 
see the internationalisation attempts as a separatist act. On the contrary, they 
are calling for an equal integration within the Israeli system. Secondly, they 
emphasised that tarnishing the country’s reputation is not the theme of their 
work. Thirdly, they unanimously agreed about the indisputable role of their 
parliamentary activity on the local level as the front seat of their struggle and 
believe that their international activity should not replace their local work, rather 
to complete and support it. MK Odeh emphasised: 
 
‘This trend is not a separatist one; its main aim is to put international 
pressure on the Israeli government to change its policies towards the 
Arab citizens. It is important to emphasise that our protest is based on 
three circles; firstly, the local work. Secondly, building coalitions with 
liberal Israeli Jews. Finally, there is the international dimension. So, this 
tool by no means replaces our main struggle here in the ‘homeland’. The 
organising of public protests is the basis of our work and it is 
empowering us internationally. Both Martin Luther King and 
Nelson Mandela gained their international power and prestige because 
of their national activities and not due to their international struggle. Our 
struggle within the country is the base’932 
 
Similarly, MK Tibi said: 
 
‘The primary field for our struggle is here in the country; it is a public, 
parliamentarian, media and human rights struggle. Israel’s attitude 
towards our international pleas is in Hebrew ‘lo lehotsi it hakhbesa 
shelano mekhots la’arets’, which means, not to take the ‘dirty laundry’ 
outside the country. This is also expected from the Jewish citizens as 
well, but we are asking Israel to keep the laundry clean so we will not 
take it out. If there were an equality and justice we would not refer to the 
international community. We are petitioning against our will and not 
because the situation is good or because we want to distort Israel’s 
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image outside. The situation is bad and this is one of our ways to try to 
improve it’933  
 
MK Jabareen asserted: 
 
‘The aim of internationalisation is not to shame Israel, rather to serve our 
issues. We should not stop our work because of Israel’s criticism. It is 
[the internationalisation] part of our right and of the space that is given to 
us. I was in the UN and it is a totally peaceful tool. If the Israeli 
government will say that it is not acceptable so we should stop going? 
Of course not. However, it is very important to remember that at the end 
of the day that main influence is here [in Israel]. The main public opinion 
is here and the main decision makers are here, so we should not leave 
everything here and focus abroad especially that the international 
influence is limited. There should not be an exaggeration of the 
internationalisation and we should no let it come at the expense of our 
local work. They can complete to each other. Also, we should be careful 
while choosing the avenues. It is not helpful if we are going to talk in 
places that are calling for the destruction of Israel’934 
 
The aim is to achieve real action and not just sympathetic gestures, as Touma-
Sliman explained: 
 
‘we still did not lose the hope in the other political tool that include the 
public and the parliamentarian struggle, not to mention that the 
international campaign of the external Palestinians is not that useful, we 
do not need sympathy only on the declaration, we need more than that, 
and our public is fully aware for this point’935 
 
Tibi like other MKs is fully aware to the sensitivity of the Israeli society to this 
move, and he acknowledged that: 
 
‘There is always a huge political attack and a huge incitement against 
whenever we are turning to international platforms’ 
 
The meetings of Arab MKs with high-level diplomats put them in conflict with the 
state’s institutions. Arab MKs would not feel comfortable in the presence of the 
state’s officials. The nature of these meetings entails making statements 
regarding the marginal status of the Arabs in the Israeli society that would be 
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considered a negative statement on the actions of the government. MK Tibi 
expressed explicitly his opposition to cooperate with the Israeli Foreign Ministry:  
 
‘I do not inform the Israeli Foreign Ministry about my international 
activities or visits, I do not use their services and I do not want them to 
be with me in the meetings. They are representing Netanyahu and the 
Israeli government, and I am going there to speak against the Israeli 
government’s policy936 
 
MK Tibi gave an example about a clash with the Israeli Foreign Ministry 
during 2013: 
‘few years ago I was invited to India by the Palestinian community there 
on the occasion of the solidarity day with the Palestinian people. The 
Palestinian Authority’s Consulate there organised a meeting for me with 
the Indian Vice President and Foreign Minister. However, Avigdor 
Liberman, who was the Former Israeli Foreign Minister asked to cancel 
the meeting as it was not organised through the Israeli Foreign Ministry. 
Eventually, the meeting was cancelled and there was a report about it in 
the Israeli TV.937  
 
Tibi’s is not the only MK who had such a clash. There was another incident that 
illustrated the sensitivity of the Israeli authorities of the internationalisation 
attempts.  For example, during 2015, MK Touma-Sliman, ignored the request by 
the Knesset Speaker that the parliament's Diplomatic Adviser should be take 
part in a meeting between Arab MKs of the Joint List and the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights (DROI) which is subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the European Parliament. The meeting was planned to be hold in the 
Joint List’s office in the Knesset, but following a dispute between the Joint List 
members and the Knesset Speaker about the presence of the Knesset 
Diplomatic Advisor in the meeting, the European Delegation including the 
Ambassador Lars Faaborg Andersen were banned from entering the Knesset, 
and eventually it was moved to a nearby hotel.938 MKs of the Joint List spoke 
considered this incident as a helpful move for their claims to the EU delegation 
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against Israel’s treatment towards them.939 This was also reflected in the media 
coverage of the DROI mission.940 
 
The attempts of Arab MKs are not only limited to physical meetings with 
influential policymaking figures, rather similarly to a typical public diplomacy,941 
they are also targeting the broader public opinion of foreign citizens. To a large 
extent these efforts reflects an active approach for raising awareness and 
generating a wide-world public support for foreign policy approaches towards 
them. Meanwhile, these efforts aim to create counteract public opinions of a 
national country’s policies.942 Accordingly, Arab MKs are also using the ‘power 
of the pen’943 by frequently writing in foreign press, and other forms of e- 
diplomacy or digital diplomacy.944 In this context MK Jabareen said: 
 
‘we also use foreign and social media to internationalise our issues… I 
have recently written an article in the Guardian about the exclusion’s law 
and it had more than 1000 shares on Facebook’945  
 
Another example of these endeavours could be found in Odeh’s 2017 Odeh 
article in the New York Times about 35 villages in Southern Israel. Odeh 
mentioned that there are more than 100,000 Arab citizens who are living there 
while being officially ‘unrecognised’ by the state and denied services such as 
electricity and water. 946 
Furthermore, MK Jabareen stressed that the Joint List set the goal of increasing 
the level of internationalisation, and to that end, the party has created a special 
Committee on International Relations that he was appointed to act as its 
Chairman. Jabareen concluded the Joint List’s strategies of internationalisation 
                                                 
939 Aida Touma-Sliman, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, 
interview  by Ilham Shahbari. Acre, March 26, 2016. 
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University Press, 2013). 
942 Andrew Fenton Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Chandra Thakur, The Oxford Handbook Of Modern 
Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
943 Malamud, Andrés, and Stelios Stavridis. "Parliaments And Parliamentarians As International Actors". In The Ashgate 
Research Companion To Non-State Actors. Ashgate Joins Routledge, 2016. 
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are taking place on several levels and forms, and listed them as the follow: (1) 
Local meetings with foreign nations and their representatives in Israel (2) 
Meetings abroad with international organisations that Israel share with them 
international agreements that have influence on the Arab minority (3) 
publication through foreign, academic and social media.947 
 
Like the interviews with the heads of Arab NGOs, a recurrent theme emerged 
amongst the Arab parliamentarians regarding the fact that foreign nations 
distinguish between human rights issues and their self-interests. Thus, on the 
question of the efficacy of the internationalisation strategy, MK Odeh expressed 
his scepticism as follow: 
 
‘Basically, it is hard for anyone to reject our demands, but it is possible 
that in a certain place, the interests between states will triumph over 
their moral stance. There was nobody who did not sympathised with us 
when spoke about Um Elhiran, the 40 unrecognised Bedouin villages, 
about that Israel has built over the years 700 Jewish cities and zero 
communities for Arabs, and about that there are 941 Jewish cities that 
do not allow Arabs to live inside them as a result of the acceptance 
committees. Everybody is amazed and says that this is a crime that 
should not continue. However, unfortunately actions are more likely to 
be related to interests between states rather than to morality’948 
 
Another answer from MK Jabareen highlighted the high awareness of the Arab 
leadership towards the limitation of the international mechanisms in protecting 
their rights as a minority:  
 
‘Let’s not exaggerate about the efficacy of the internationalisation tool, 
we had a very good conclude recommendation from the human rights 
committee, so what?’949 
 
It is obvious that Arab MKs are highly aware of the constraints of the 
international system and its inability of making a meaningful policy changes in 
states. Yet, they still believe that exposing the policies of the Israeli government 
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in foreign avenues is important for their struggle as the case studies below 
demonstrate.  
 
 
6.3 Case studies 
 
The following section presents three patterns of international diplomatic activity 
of Arab MKs: (1) The meeting of MK Ahmad Tibi’s with the State Department in 
the US during February 2016 (2) The meeting of MK Ayman Odeh’s, the Head 
of the Joint List, with the Secretary General of the UN in April 2016 (3) The 
meeting of the Arab Joint List legislators to Brussels in November 2017. There 
are a variety of examples that could be provided about involvement of Arab 
politicians in international activities. However, these cases were chosen as each 
one of them exemplifies an unprecedented move in the history of Arab 
politicians in Israel. The interviews cited above contain significant details about 
the modalities and the objectives of internationalisation and the case studies will 
look in more detail at the process and outcomes in individual cases. 
 
 
6.3.1 Tibi’s visit to the White House 
  
Unlike the previous case studies in Chapter four and five, this case study and 
the following one would not start by introducing phase one ‘repression’ as it 
claimed by Arab citizens. Instead, the current case study and following one 
(6.3.2) will start directly by introducing the efforts of Arab MKs to internationalise 
issues in relation to their public. The reason for that is that these two cases 
(Tibi’s and Odeh’s meeting with international key figures) were not focused on 
one specific issue rather referred to wide range of on-going problematic daily 
life topics. This caused a difficulty for the author of this project in identifying one 
main theme to illustrate the first phase of the spiral model, that is, ‘repression’. 
Therefore, the author found it more useful to start by examining the attempted 
internationalisation efforts that took a form of ‘personal diplomacy’, and then the 
analyses moves to evaluate the efficacy of these endeavours based on the 
situation until writing this thesis. 
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Attempted internationalistion. 
 
In February 2016 MK Tibi met with senior American officials at the White House 
and State Department, Robert Malley, President Obama's Chief Advisor on the 
Middle East, Frank Lowenstein, Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian 
Negotiations, and Christopher Henzel, Director of the Office of Israel and 
Palestinian Affairs.950 Members of the team who are writing the annual State 
Department report on human rights also attended Tibi’s meeting with the State 
Department.951 This meeting with the State Department was seen as historical 
as no such meeting have been held in the past between high-level members of 
the American administration and an Arab Knesset member. 
 
During the meeting, Tibi talked about what he described Israel’s ‘systemic 
discrimination’ against the Arab minority. Tibi raised various claims pertain to 
the daily life of the Arab minority that the Israeli government would prefer to 
keep as internal matters. These include the unrecognised Bedouin villages, 
home demolitions, the wave of antidemocratic laws and socio-economic gaps 
between Arab and Jewish citizens: 
 
‘I spoke about the issue of houses demolitions, more specifically about 
the demolition of the unrecognised Bedouin village Umm al-Hiran in the 
Naqab [Negev area in Southern Israel] for replacing it by the Jewish 
settlement Hiran. For me this is a very difficult issue. It is a prototype of 
the Apartheid. This issue specifically pushed me to talk in the White 
House, the UN and in other foreign academic institutions. People found 
it hard to believe this story. When I am telling them that there are more 
than 40 laws in the Israeli Knesset that discriminate against Arabs, 
either directly or indirectly and impose inequality between Arabs and 
Jews, they are surprised. They have no enough knowledge of our civil 
and political situation’952 
 
Tibi mentioned during the interview with him953 that he gave the American 
officials a list of discriminatory laws that was published on behalf Adalah.954 
According to Tibi the visit was reported in Hebrew by the Israeli radio Reshet 
                                                 
950 Tamar Pilegge, "In DC, Arab MK Blasts Israel’S ‘Systemic’ Discrimination", Timesofisrael.Com, 2016, 
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952 Ahmad Tibi, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”, phone 
interview  by Ilham Shahbari. March 20, 2016. 
953 Tibi, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”. 
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Bet,955 and in another Israeli TV Channel that describe it as ‘aleyat madregah’, 
which means an ‘escalation in the tension’ between Israeli Arabs and the Israeli 
society and in the petitions to the international community.956  
 
Generally speaking, Palestinians have historically had an antagonistic attitude 
towards the US administration as they regard it as a pro-Israeli mediator and for 
this reason it was surprising that the Arab MKs believed such a meeting could 
be beneficial. But there was a perception that the American administration 
would give them a hearing a during President Barack Obama’s term of office. 
The US President Barak Obama was the first American President who 
mentioned the issue of the Arab citizens of Israel. In two occasions he has 
signalled positive massages of encouragement. This was when the Israeli PM 
Netanyahu warned in the final day of the campaign that 'Arab voters are 
heading to the polling stations in droves'.957 As a result, Obama delivered a 
message that he is supporting the Arabs citizens when he stated that he is 
‘deeply concerned by the use of divisive rhetoric in Israel that sought to 
marginalize Arab Israeli citizens’. In another occasion, in 2010, the U.S. 
President Barack Obama updated the America's official vision of Israel's future 
to stress that the Jewish state must ensure equal rights for its Arab citizens. It 
was a new national security strategy sought to address the Palestinian claim 
that recognising Israel, as a Jewish state without harming the rights of Israel 
Arab citizens.958  
 
It should be noted that Tibi’s visit to the White House in 2016 came at time 
where the relations between Netanyahu’s government with Obama 
administration were at a low point due to the Iran nuclear deal. Although the US 
is the largest and greatest ally of Israel, relations between the nations have 
soured during Obama’s eight years in office. Both President Obama and Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu were elected in 2009, and they had disagreements 
over key political issues such as the Israeli settlements, and the Iranian nuclear 
                                                 
955 Tibi, “Internationalisation of the National Aspirations of the Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel”. 
956 Moav Vardi, "Step Up: MK Ahmad Tibi Met With Senior US Officials In Washington", Nana10, 2016, 
http://10tv.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=1173494. 
957 "Binyamin Netanyahu: 'Arab Voters Are Heading To The Polling Stations In Droves'", The Guardian, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/binyamin-netanyahu-israel-arab-election. 
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deal. The deterioration in the relations reached a low point late at the end of 
Obama’s term in December 2016 when Washington rejected to veto the U.N. 
resolution calling to end Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territory. As a 
result, a historical UN resolution demanding Israel to stop building settlement on 
Palestinian land has passed. 959 The latter diplomatic move did not mean 
however reflect a real change in the United States supportive policy to Israel. 
Only three months before the 2016 U.N. resolution, same Obama’s 
administration has upgraded its annual military aid for Israel from 31 to 38 billion 
dollars assistance over the next decade, which was considered the largest such 
aid package in U.S. history.960 In other words, the tense relations between 
Obama and Netanyahu resulted in moral leverage, and financial sanctions were 
not a realistic option at that point.  
 
A brief look at the current situation in relation to the issues that MK Tibi raised 
during his meeting with American officials in the White House shows that no 
change has occurred in the status quo. In other words, Tibi’s personal 
diplomacy did not generate internationalisation or any actual political change. 
Accordingly, the spiral model did not move beyond the first level, ‘repression’. 
During the same trip to the US, Tibi also met with the President of the Inter- 
Parliamentary Union (IPU), and he spoke about other issues such as the 
Palestinian Journalist prisoner, Mohammed al-Qeeq, and Netanyahu’s 
incitement against Arab MKs that posed a threat to their lives. Tibi asked the 
UN’s intervention to protect the freedom of work of the Arab parliamentarians.961  
 
Another remarkable individual move in Tibi’s personal diplomacy occurred in 
June 2017, when his own political Party, the ‘Arab Movement for Change’ has 
signed a two years ‘partnership agreement’ with the Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists & Democrats (S&D) in the European Parliament in 
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Brussels.962 This agreement consists of three main articles that include mutual 
actions between the two parties such as consultation on political matters, 
organising joint events on subjects of mutual interest in Brussels and Israel, and 
discussing opportunities to host young trainees proposed by the Arab 
Movement for Change at the Secretariat of the S&D Group in the European 
Parliament in Brussels. Tibi’s recent move is considered as a unique for two 
reasons; firstly, because the ‘partnership agreement’ is the first one that any 
Arab political party within Israel has signed. Secondly, because this agreement 
was not on behalf the Joint List Party, which is supposed to be the main political 
address for the Arab minority; rather it was conducted on behalf Tibi’s political 
party.  
 
Figure 6: MK Ahmad Tibi’s meeting with the White House and State 
Department in Washington, DC. in February 2016 
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6.3.2 Odeh’s meeting with the UN963 
Attempted internationalistion. 
On April 22, 2016, there was a report on the website of the Joint List Chairman, 
MK Ayman Odeh, about his meeting with the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon and the General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft.964 According to 
the same report it was the first time that an Arab MK has ever met with such UN 
senior figures, and that Odeh also delivered to them during the meeting a 
detailed memorandum about Israel’s ‘systematic discrimination and nationality-
based oppression’ against the Arab citizens since the establishment of the state 
until 2016. A copy of the memorandum was found on the same page of the 
Odeh’s website and first paragraph reads as follow:  
‘I write to you as a son of the Arab Palestinian national minority in Israel. 
We, Arab Palestinians living in Israel, are native to the land and citizens 
of the state, are a part of the Palestinian people, and the Arab nation 
and cultural sphere, and the human one… since the Nakba and Israel’s 
establishment we have been subjected to severe systematic 
discrimination and nationality-based oppression… since 1948 Israel has 
established 700 new towns, of which 0 are Arab (with exception of 
towns built in the Negev in order to concentrate the Bedouin population 
in them)…Israel’s Palestinian citizens are often absent from the 
international discourse on Israel-Palestine although we are 20% of 
Israel’s population…’965 
 
A special attention in Odeh’s letter was given to the situation of the Arab 
Bedouin citizens in the ‘unrecognised’ villages in the Negev [in Arabic 
Naqab], such as Umm el Hiran and Atir with a requirement for sending a 
UN special committee to investigate the living standards of the Bedouin 
citizens in the ‘unrecognised’ villages: 
‘In the Negev, in Israel's south, 100 000 Israeli citizens live without the 
most basic infrastructure and services: running water, electricity, 
healthcare, paved roads, or educational facilities. These citizens live in 
villages the state does not recognize, although most of them have 
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existed before the state itself was founded or were relocated to their 
current locations by the state… The village of al-Arakib, whose residents 
currently live amidst their ancestors' graves, has to date been 
demolished 97 times by the state, but despite the daily fear of yet 
another demolition, the residents' spirit hasn't been broken… would like 
to ask you to dispatch a fact-finding mission to the Negev to examine 
the dire situation of the land’s indigenous Arab population, and work to 
secure their rights as guaranteed by international law and 
conventions’966 
 
Unexpectedly, two months following Odeh’s meeting, it was revealed in the 
Israeli media that on the contrary to Odeh’s press release back in April, the 
memorandum was not forwarded directly to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon during the meeting with him, rather it was submitted to via the Palestinian 
UN ambassador, Riyad Mansor. It was also revealed that Ban Ki-moon rejected 
Odeh’s memorandum by informing the Israeli Ambassador in the UN Danny 
Danon due to the UN protocol.967 Odeh’s move caused a lot of anger in the 
Israeli side and the Israeli Ambassador Danon described as ‘a red line that has 
been crossed’:968  
 
‘this is a very serious incident - cooperation with the Palestinian 
delegation that attacks the State of Israel every day, with anti-Semitic 
statements and political activity against Israel. This is the first time that a 
representative of the Israeli parliament chooses to cooperate with the 
Palestinian delegation against the State of Israel, and we must not 
cooperate with this grave act’.969 
 
In response Odeh said that it is known that he does not cooperate with the 
Israeli Foreign Ministry and that the Palestinian dimension is the ultimate 
choice.970 Odeh’s meeting with the UN was also criticised in the Arab media by 
Arab academics and leading figures from the civil society. For example, in his 
op-ed in April 2016, Dr. Sammy Miaari, raised questions in relation to the way 
Odeh’s meeting was organised, the content of the UN’s memorandum that he 
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described that it was written in a ‘secret’ way, and whether experts or 
academics were involved in writing it.971 There were also voices from the Arab 
civil society that saw this meeting as an individual act that its efficacy is doubtful 
and in the same interview, Odeh’s and Tibi’s personal diplomatic meetings were 
implicitly accused of populism. The fact that they were conducted individually 
and in the same period had gave an impression of a competitive atmosphere to 
the Arab public. Mohamed Zeidan in his interview with Mosawa TV expressed 
his anxiety about what he considered ‘spontaneous’ meetings, and for lacking a 
clear speech and unified national program for targeting international bodies: 
 
‘I am afraid that these individual initiatives on the international level 
would create a confusion. The multiple massages could result in a 
difficulty to generate a clear stand from the international institutions as 
they will not know what we are asking for… delivering different 
massages is undoubtedly harmful’972  
 
The UN’s rejection of Odeh’s letter was surprising as Israel’s diplomatic relation 
with the UN have never been considered good due to the organisation’s long 
history of sharp criticisms and anti-Israeli resolutions. According to Israel, the 
UN has been used for years as a battlefield in an unfair political war against 
it.973 In December 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the 
United Nations as a ‘house of lies’. This was prior the vote on a draft resolution 
calling on the United States to withdraw its recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s 
capital.974 Some authors argue that the treatment of Israel by the UN and its 
affiliated agencies demonstrates the country’s negative international image and 
poor reputation.975 Yet, this view might be challenged when taking into 
consideration the fact that Palestinians have an automatic advantage in the UN 
based on the high number of the 50+ states in the Islamic bloc. In any case, the 
rejection of Odeh’s memorandum proved that similarly to Al-ard’s 
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memorandum, the Palestinian network was not helpful for the case of Israel’s 
Arab citizens in the UN institution.  
 
It might be that the reason for the rejection is due to the UN protocol that says 
the plea should be submitted through the state’s representative, and in this case 
the Palestinian ambassador does not have any official standing to represent 
Arabs who are citizens of Israel. Nevertheless, it exemplifies the problematic 
situation of Arabs in Israel who fall between the Israeli government that does 
not treat them equally as Jews while turning to Palestinian officials who do not 
have any legitimate standing to represent or advocate on behalf them. So, the 
Palestinian network was not useful, also the UN does not pay much attention 
the Arab minority case as to the Palestinian case. 
 
In the language of the spiral model, Odeh’s personal diplomacy act did not 
achieve its goal, thus, it keeps all the problematic matters he complained about 
in phase one, ‘repression’. 
 
Figure 7: MK Ayman Odeh’s meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in   April, 2016 
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6.3.3 The visit of the Joint List Delegation to the EU,976 and 
OECD977  
 
Claimed ‘repression’. 
First phase. On 10 May 2017 a draft bill of the ‘Basic Law: Israel the Nation-
state of the Jewish People’ which is also known as ‘The nation-state law’ 
passed on preliminary reading in the Knesset plenary.978 The official aim of the 
legislation is to enshrine the concept that Israel is the nation state of the Jewish 
people. This issue is particularly important for the Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu who has been asking for years Palestinians to recognise 
Israel as a Jewish state as one of the main conditions to achieve peace treaty.    
 
The Nation- State bill was firstly proposed by MK Avi Dicther and Ze'ev Elkin in 
the 18th Knesset (2009-2013) who sought to pass it as a Basic Law. From the 
beginning, this law was highly controversial and was one of the reasons that led 
to a coalition crisis in the 19th Knesset that resulted in the dissolution of the 
government after only two and a half years of its work.979 Since then, the law 
has been under enormous discussions, resubmitted by another right-wing MKs 
and has undergone multiple amendments, with the final version dropping 
altogether sections regarded as discriminatory.980 
  
Although the nationality law is mainly declaratory, it proved to be a highly 
controversial. Opponents of the law argue that the law fails to declare equality 
before the law for all the state’s citizens which results in privileging Jewish 
citizens. In other words, it is believed that anchoring of the Jewish-national 
aspect, without guaranteeing the value of equality as defined in the Declaration 
of Independence, has a high potential of breaching of the delicate balance 
between Jewish and democratic values, which, according to a large part of the 
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Israeli public is already exists.981 Secondly, it is argued that the law states that 
the right to exercise national self-determination in Israel ‘is unique to the Jewish 
people’, thus it denies the Arab leadership’s demand to recognise the Arab 
minority as a national minority that is eligible to collective rights. Thirdly, the law 
calls for downgrading the status of the Arabic language from its de facto status 
as Israel’s second official unofficial language. Fourthly, the bill’s clause 7B, 
allows the person not to be accepted to settle based on his religion or 
nationality stipulates housing and planning policies. This was described as a 
very serious violation of equality and human dignity.982 
 
As a result, the country’s Arab elite described the bill as ‘racist’983 and ‘verging 
on apartheid’,984 and expressed their concerns of deepening discrimination 
against the Arab minority in Israel. Also, a vocal opposition from Left and Centre 
Left mainstream parties, and describes it as ‘assault the principle of equality’.985  
 
Attempted internationalistion. 
 
On November 8, 2017, a delegation of Arab parliamentarians from the Joint List 
travelled to Brussels to conduct a series of political meetings at the 
headquarters of the European Union (EU).986 The delegation aimed to voice 
their concern against the proposed ‘nation state bill’. However, it was not the 
only topic on their agenda. The Joint List delegation declared that its goal was 
also to ask the EU intervention to pressure Israel on the ‘population transfers’ 
proposal among high-level Israeli politicians, which threatens to deprive 
hundreds of thousands of Arab citizens who live in the so-called the Triangle 
area of their Israeli citizenship, and suggests that they to become citizens of a 
future Palestinian state. Also, the situation of the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin 
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villages in the Negev, and the demolition of illegally constructed homes were 
identified as topics to be raised in the meeting with the EU.987  
 
The delegation consisted of four Arab Joint List MKs; two on behalf the 
communist Hadash party; MK Dr. Youssef Jabareen (delegation leader), and 
Aida Touma-Sliman, Masud Ganaim, and Dr.Jamal Zahalka, as well as the 
chair of the NGO Mossawa Centre, Jafar Farah. This move represented 
unusual form of cooperation between local Arab NGO and MKs. Farah 
highlighted the importance of upgrading the international political networks of 
the Arab community, and explained the role of his organisation in this initiative: 
 
‘Arab civil society has established important networks that can support 
the Arab community, as well as its political, cultural, and economic 
institutions of Arab society in Israel. We are more than a fifth of the 
population and an important political and economic actor. This should be 
apparent in the international community’s engagement with the 
region’988 
 
According to the Joint List press release, this was an unprecedented 
international political activity on the part of the representatives of the Arab 
population in Israel in terms of the size, the composition of the delegation and 
the foreign senior echelon:  
 
‘The size and composition of the delegation and the senior echelon of 
the meetings are unprecedented in an attempt by the elected 
representatives of the Arab minority in Israel to turn to international 
elements to block the racist and anti- democratic legislation in the 
Knesset and the government’s policy against the Arab population’989 
 
The Joint List delegation was hosted by the Confederal Group of the European 
United Left, which is also known as the Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), as well 
as representatives of all 28 EU member states and all European Parliament 
factions. It also participated in a meeting of the Belgian parliament’s Foreign 
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Affairs Committee.990 At the meeting, Arab MKs focused on what they see as 
the government’s policy of discrimination against the Arab community, and 
called the EU to put human rights at the centre of its relations with Israel, and to 
intervene to stop the passage of the Jewish nation-state bill. 991  The Joint List 
MKs argued that Israel is violating Article Two of the 1995 the EU- Israel 
Association Agreement 992 that calls for the protection of human rights and 
democratic values: 
 
‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the 
Agreement itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and 
democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy 
and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’993 
 
The Joint List delegation sees the human rights (article 2)994 as a valuable tool 
for the EU’s diplomatic efforts to demand progress on equal rights for minority 
groups of which the Arab Palestinian minority is the largest. From their 
perspective, Israel cannot enjoy the economic advantages the EU grants it 
while violating the rights of Arabs in Israel and of Palestinians in the OT. 
According to Arab MKs, they received support from the EU figures they met 
with: 
 
‘In general we feel people are willing to hear us out on the issues we 
bring up, because protecting human rights and democracy are principles 
and values the EU is proud of… seeing the multilingual European and 
Belgian parliaments, Israel is very far from reaching European 
standards… Arabic, can’t be used in many public places, such as 
government offices or the parliament or in court… European officials he 
met were specifically sensitive to the article about Arabic language, 
because they are sensitive to multiculturalism, and said they are willing 
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to act against the Israeli government. We called on them to do so 
immediately’995   
 
MEP Martina Michels, who is a member of the European Parliament Delegation 
for Relations with Israel welcomed the meeting with the Joint List members and 
said that the EU must recognise Palestinian citizens of Israel and their struggle 
for equality as a German MEP commented: 
 
‘I am glad to see the development of a progressive opposition in Israel. 
Real change can only come from inside the Israeli society. The Left in 
Europe stands in solidarity with progressive forces in Israel in their 
struggle for a just and peaceful resolution to the conflict, against racism 
and discrimination, for the protection of human and citizens’ rights, for 
social and gender equality…our group’s support for the Palestinian 
cause must go beyond partnerships in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. I am pleased with our flourishing ties with the Joint List’ 996 
 
The Green Party acted as expected from transnational advocacy actor as two 
weeks after the meeting with the Joint List delegation in Brussels; the left-wing 
bloc in the European Parliament sent a letter to senior EU officials against the 
‘nation- state bill’ saying it discriminates against the Arab citizens. Remarkably, 
the statement was signed by the 189-member Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the European Parliament, and 
reads as follow:  
 
‘We express our deep concern over the nation-state bill currently under 
debate in the Knesset, which can be interpreted as an attempt to 
deepen and legalize systemic discrimination against the Palestinian 
Arab minority in the country’997 
 
The letter was also sent to the EU Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica 
Mogherini, and to European Parliament President Antonio Tajani. In The 
progressive MEPs stress the obligation of the EU of pressuring Israel to stop 
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the legislation of the ‘nation state law‘ due to its undemocratic implications on 
the Arab minority. Therefore, they urged: 
 
‘to raise their voice and to make it explicit that the adoption of this bill in 
its current shape against the strong protests of the Palestinian Arab 
community constituting one-fifth of the population is incompatible with 
the basic values of EU-Israel relations and with the image of Israel as a 
solid democracy in the Middle East’998  
 
This support from the European Left bloc was also received from the OECD 
officials. In the same week of their visit to the EU, the delegation of the Joint List 
also met with OECD Chief Angel Gurria at the organisation's headquarters in 
Paris. It was the first meeting between the Secretary- General and Israel’s Arab 
leadership. They urged him to pressure the Israeli government to implement the 
OECD recommendations that call for the improvement of the Arab community. 
Gurria expressed his sympathy to their cause and declared that the OECD 
would consider monitoring the budgets that are allocated for Israel’s’ Arab 
community.999 Clearly, Arab MKs received a moral support from the OECD. Yet, 
according to the literature of TAN, as long as the European declarative 
sympathy is not translated into any economic pressure on Israel (economic 
leverage), it is unlikely to expect a meaningful shift in Israel’s behaviour. 
 
Like Odeh’s and Tibi’s meetings, the visit of the Joint List delegation to the EU 
was criticised by the Israeli media and MKs from right and left centre parties. 
Likud right wing party MK Anat Berko said: 
 
‘They’re using their diplomatic passports and immunity to work against 
Israel… EU is motivated by ‘pure anti-Semitism’ to intervene in Israel’s 
affairs, and the Joint List MKs are ‘a cheerleading squad’ encouraging 
them1000  
 
Criticisms were also raised from the Israeli left-centre party Zionist Union. MK 
Itzik Shmuli who also criticises the government for promoting what he describes 
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‘anti-democratic policies’, believes that the Joint List MKs’ international actions 
are harmful to the State:  
 
‘It’s not clear to me if such extreme and unfounded statements are 
meant to improve their reality, or their political situation…we have many 
challenges in eradicating inequality and discrimination, but Israel has 
taken major steps toward integrating minorities in society, and it would 
he unfortunate to try to destroy those efforts... attempts to isolate Israel 
‘are not meant to promote peace and dialogue; rather, they’re meant to 
demonise Israel and lead us all to a dead end, strengthening 
extremists’1001  
 
It is worth noting that one month after the Joint List visit to the EU, in December 
2017, in unprecedented move, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
visited the European Union headquarters in Brussels and met with the 28 EU 
foreign ministers. It was the first visit by an Israeli Prime Minister to the Belgian 
city in twenty-two years.1002 This visit followed also the U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. So, it might be said 
Netanyahu has made this historical diplomatic visit to the EU to pacify European 
criticisms against Israel’s policies in relation to the Palestinian question in 
general and the Palestinian minority in particular, and to signal a massage that 
the Israeli- European ties remain strong. 
 
Indeed, the relation the EU is Israel’s greatest partner in security economic 
cooperation. In 2010, Israel became a member country of the OECD, the most 
prestigious European economic bodies, and it cooperates with the EU in fields 
such as science, research and trade. Furthermore, it is noted that Israel is the 
only non-European full participating member country of the ‘Eureka initiative’, 
the largest R&D pan-European network in the world.1003 Yet, a closer look at the 
Israeli- EU diplomatic relations reveals that Israel’s political-diplomatic relations 
with the EU are not strong as their economic ties, and they are more 
complicated, and have been mutually frosty since the election of the Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009. For example, the year 2014 
witnessed deterioration in the EU-Israeli diplomatic relations when most EU 
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countries recognised a Palestinian state against Israel’s expressed will.1004 One 
year later, in November 2015, the Union instructed its member states to label 
Israeli settlement products and announced they could not be marked as Israeli 
products.1005 This move caused a lot of anger in the Israeli side as officials 
considered it as anti- Semitism act, and called to curtail ties with the European 
Union.  
 
Additionally, the EU has increasingly been at odds with Israel on several key 
issues such as its opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran, recognition of 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,1006 and over its activities in the West Bank 
and Gaza. The Union has also recently urged Israel not to demolish the 
Palestinian Bedouin Village of Khan al-Ahmar, which is located in the area of 
East Jerusalem.1007 It is believed that the EU opposition to Israeli policies on the 
Palestinian issue (e.g. settlement expansions), and the disagreement on the 
Iranian nuclear deal have been key sources of tensions in the bilateral 
relationship and affected Israel’s international standing. 1008 Accordingly, it was 
is expected that the 2017 visit of the Joint List of Arab MKs to the EU would 
receive a diplomatic benefit and sympathy that already exists towards the 
Palestinian issue. 
 
 
‘Internationalisation’. 
 
The efforts of the Joint List members proved to be successful in translating the 
European sympathetic they gain into actual attempts to pressure Israel to stop 
the legislation of the nation state law. On July 12, 2018, it was revealed in the 
Israeli media that the EU Ambassador Emanuele Giaufret spoke with members 
of the ruling Likud Party who are involved in promoting the nation state law and 
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warned them of the implications of such a legislation on Israel’s democratic 
standing in the world. According the same report, Giaufret referred specifically 
to the controversial Article 2 of the law that allows separate settlements and 
tried to convince the Israeli lawmakers not to vote for the law. One of the Israeli 
MKs said that the EU ambassador said in a conversation:  
 
‘The law distances Israel from the accepted norms in democratic 
countries. The Law has a racist odour, discriminates against groups and 
especially Israeli Arabs and harms the values that the State of Israel is 
trying to project’1009 
 
The Israeli media acknowledged that the European intervention in the law was 
as a result of the endeavours of the Knesset members of the joint list and 
referred to their meeting with EU representatives in Brussels, countries such as 
Belgium and France, and meetings with senior EU representatives in Israel. 1010 
 
 
Backlash. 
 
Following the publication in the media, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, who also serves as Foreign Minister, instructed Foreign Ministry 
Director-General to summon the ambassador for a second reprimand and 
intends to take further steps. The Prime Minister's Office said in response: 
 
‘It is not enough that the European Union funds NGOs that fight against 
the State of Israel and finance illegal construction, now it is interfering in 
Israeli legislation … apparently they do not understand that Israel is a 
sovereign state’1011 
 
The European attempts to pressure the Israeli government to stop the 
legislation of the nationality law have failed, and eventually the law passed in 
the Knesset as will be detailed below. At this level, it is important to notice that 
the spiral model does not offer a phase that reflects a possible deterioration in 
the state- minority relations after any internationalisation attempt. Hence, this 
study suggests (similarly to the al-Ard case study) the concept of ‘repression 
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plus’ to overcome this shortcoming. It is also important to clarify that while the 
Arab minority consider the law as a further deterioration on the spiral model, it is 
a huge achievement from the State’s perspective. Anchoring the Jewishness 
identity of the Israeli State in a law is a fulfilment of the Zionist dream, even 
though the promise of equality for minorities is not guaranteed in this law or in 
other laws. 
 
‘Repression plus’.  
 
On July 19, 2018, the ‘nation-state law’ passed by a majority of 62 MKs against 
55 and two abstentions.1012 The law passed as one of the so-called Basic Laws, 
which is similar to a constitutional status and considered above ordinary 
legislation underpin Israel’s legal system, and more difficult to repeal than 
regular laws.  
 
The legislation of the new law could be seen as ‘repression plus’ from the Arab 
leadership’s point of because the status of Arabic is now downgraded to a 
language with a ‘special status’. From their perspective, even when Arabic was 
officially defined as a second formal language of the state, many governmental 
ministries did not have Arabic language websites, or had only partial information 
in Arabic. The nationality law worsens this situation by explicitly exempts the 
state from its obligation to provide official governmental information in the 
Arabic language unless there will be a specific legislation regarding this 
issue.1013  
 
Also, in the final version, clause Section 7B of the law, which previously allowed 
the person not to be accepted to settle based on his nationality or religion, still 
emphasise the importance of Jewish settlement but without explicit prohibition 
against members of another nation being members of the community.1014 Yet, 
this Section of the law still seen as allows for prioritising Jews’ access to land 
which is in fact a further deterioration in the status quo of the 2011 controversial 
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legislation of the ‘Admissions Committees Law’1015 that allows small 
communities to hold admissions committees on the basis of ‘adapting to the 
social fabric of the community’. Although the 2011 law explicitly stated that a 
person might not be discriminated against because of race, nationality, religion, 
etc., it is considered as one of the most racist laws against Arab citizens. So, it 
is argued that the new law of nationality establishes even a far more extreme 
norm, which explicitly allows the establishment of a community based on 
nationality [the Jewish one].1016  
 
Furthermore, the ‘Nation state law’ includes two significant political elements 
that are related to issues that are at the core of the Palestinian question. Firstly, 
the same clause 7B that stresses the importance of ‘development of Jewish 
settlement as a national value’ is open to interpretation that allows expansion of 
settlement in the Occupied West Bank Territories. Also, anchoring the status of 
Jerusalem under Israeli law as the ‘complete and united capital of Israel’ while 
Jerusalem under international law, while East Jerusalem is claimed as the 
capital of a future Palestinian State. Therefore, Palestinians consider this law as 
a further deterioration in the tense relations with Israel. In this sense, the 
Former Chief Palestinian Authority negotiator Saaeb Erekat stated that the 
nationality law ‘aims at destroying the Two-State Solution and replacing it with 
an apartheid regime’.1017  
 
Unsuccessful internationalisation.  
 
Notably, the EU’s major criticism following the legislation of the ‘Nation-State 
Bill’ focused on its implications on the Palestinians who reside in the Occupied 
Territories (OT) in the context of the Two State Solution. According the 
statement that was released on behalf the EU Foreign Affairs Chief Federica 
Mogherini:  
 
‘We are concerned, we have expressed this concern and we will 
continue to engage with Israeli authorities in this context… we’ve been 
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very clear when it comes to the two-state solution, we believe it is the 
only way forward and any step that would further complicate or prevent 
this solution of becoming a reality should be avoided’ 1018 
 
Mogherini’s statement shows that the Union has accepted the Israeli official 
stand, which rejected criticisms related to the political status of its Arab minority. 
Therefore, in order to avoid a diplomatic clash with Israel, it refrained from 
commenting on the impact of law on the Arab citizens. In other words, the Arab 
MKs efforts in this case study failed even to mobilise European moral leverage. 
The disappointed European declaration did not stop the Arab political elite from 
continuing their international efforts to find allies who can pressurise Israel to 
cancel the law. Accordingly, a new international battle started, as will be 
described follow. 
 
Case study (8) 
Figure 16: ‘The Nation State-Law’  
 
 
 
Second time internationalisation attempts of the ‘nation state law’.  
 
Despite the failure of the previous internationalisation attempts to stop the 
legislation of the Nationality law, Arab Knesset members decided to continue to 
conduct the tact of personal diplomacy with the senior figures at the UN and top 
European officials in attempt to pressurise Israel to cancel it. Following is a brief 
summary of their diplomatic actions after the legislation of the law: 
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● In August 2018, Arab MKs including Aida Touma-Sliman and Yousef 
Jabareen from the Joint Arab List met with UN Under-Secretary-General 
for Political Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo in New York to discuss the 
implications of the Nationality Law on the life of Arab citizens in Israel.1019 
Their visit was highly criticised by political figures from both the Right- 
Wing and the Left-centre Parties and Arab MPs had to justify 
themselves.1020 For example, in August 2018, MK Oded Forer from the 
right wing Yisrael Beiteinu Party, requested Israel's Attorney General to 
investigate Arab lawmakers for seeking the United Nations intervention 
against Israel's controversial ‘Nationality Law’. In his petition, Forer 
argues: 
 
‘Unlike most Knesset members, who generally represent Israel's 
interests in other parliaments and at the United Nations, Knesset 
members from the Joint List [Israel’s sole Arab political Party] are 
working in the international arena as the Palestinians' representatives 
while exploiting their status to harm Israel and undermine its foreign 
relations… many other instances in which Joint List Knesset members 
have worked to harm Israel and contrary to the country's national 
interests’1021 
 
Forer's based his request on the Israeli penal code, which allows the 
imposition of a ten years jail sentence for ‘deliberately damaging ties 
between Israel and another country, organization or institution’. MK Forer 
also asked the Knesset Ethics Committee to take punitive act against 
MKs of the Joint List. 1022 
 
 
● During September 2018, Joint List leader MK Ayman Odeh met with EU 
Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini in Brussels, and urged the EU 
official to condemn the legislation of the bill. It was the first time an Arab 
MK have such a high-level meeting with European official. Yet, shortly 
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following the meeting, Mogherini’s office released a statement that was 
disappointed to the Arab parliamentarians: 
 
‘The Nation-State Law is first and foremost a matter of how Israel 
chooses to define itself, and we fully respect the internal Israeli debate 
on this’1023 
 
Mogherini’s statement shows a shift in the European stand towards the 
nationality law, which is now seen as supportive to Israel. This 
declaration was described in the Israeli media as a moral victory for 
Israel and a failure for Odeh’s personal diplomacy. 1024  
 
● In parallel to Odeh’s meeting with Mogherini, a group of the Joint List 
members met in Luxembourg with top European officials including 
ambassadors to the EU of every European country, members of the EU 
parliament, and Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn.1025 
 
● In September 2018 MK Tibi and Zahalka met with Ahmad Abu Al-Ghait, 
Arab League Secretary General, and for the first time, Tibi held a speech 
there on behalf the Arab citizens in the League of Arab States.1026 
The recent developments show that on August 2018, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues, Fernand de Varennes, has started 
official proceedings to investigate a complaint against Israel in relation to the 
impact of the ‘nation state law’ on the Arab citizens in Israel. It is noted that this 
move was as a result of a complaint submitted by the High Follow-Up 
Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel.1027 
 
 
                                                 
1023 Martin Oliner, "The Jew ish Nation-State Law  Outside Politics", The Jerusalem Post | Jpost.Com, 2018, 
https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-Jewish-Nation-State-Law-outside-politics-566970. 
1024 Martin Oliner, "The Jew ish Nation-State Law  Outside Politics", The Jerusalem Post | Jpost.Com, 2018, 
https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-Jewish-Nation-State-Law-outside-politics-566970. 
1025 Moran Azolay, "Joint List Mks Discuss Nation-State Law  With Arab Chief", Ynetnews.Com, 2018, 
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5348076,00.html.During the meeting, MKs Ahmad Tibi, Jamal Zahalka, 
Yousef Jabareen, Masoud Ghanaim and Taleb Abu Arar demanded the EU condemns and acts against the law . 
1026 "For The First Time, Palestinians In Israel Host Senior UN Official", Middle East Monitor, 2018, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180510-first-the-first-time-palestinians-in-israel-host-senior-un-official/. 
1027 "UN Investigation Into Israel’S ‘Nation-State’ Law ", Middle East Monitor, 2018, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180806-un-investigation-into-israels-nation-state-law/. 
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6.4 case study comparison  
 
The three aforementioned case studies show the deep desire of Arab MKs to 
put their demands and narrative on the international diplomatic agenda. Unlike 
Case study eight (the Joint List delegation to the RU) that largely focused on the 
‘nation-state law’, both Case Study Six (Tibi’s meeting with officials at the White 
House), and Seven (Odeh’s meeting with Ban Kamoon) were unfocused and 
referred to wide range of daily life issues such as ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin 
villages, demolition of homes, the issue of ‘anti-democratic laws’, and economic 
gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens. Also, while these cases the 
internationalisation attempts led by individual MKs, the last case study 
represented a collective action that included several MKs, and a local Arab 
NGO provided MKs with network to promote their views and preferences. When 
Arab MKs linked to NGO that already formed partnerships with the EU, this 
provided them with more credibility and access to the EU, thereby greatly 
amplifying their impact. This represented an organised form of collective action 
and cooperation between different Arab political parties on one side with an 
Arab local NGO on the other and benefited from its network with the European 
Greens. It proved the effectiveness of the Arab NGO Mossawa as a local 
transnational advocacy network. Arab MKs showed that they are not only 
seeking declarative sympathy to their cause as they explicitly called on Europe 
to use its economic leverage on Israel. Notably, the personal diplomacy of the 
Joint List was very effective in generating political support from some 
representatives of the EU for their position, but it did not result in political action, 
including the use of significant economic pressure, to achieve a substantial real 
modification of the behaviour of the Israeli state. 
 
When compared the results of internationalisation attempts in the last case 
study in relation to the ‘Nation state law’ (repression plus) with those of the case 
study five, the ‘Prawer Plan’ (tactical concession plus), remarkable differences 
could be found. Although ‘Nation state law’ includes a critical article that carries 
high potential of negative influence on the land’s access for Arab citizens, there 
was no strong opposition and voices from the Arab young generation such as 
those who were dominant against the Prawer Plan (e.g. Alhirak alshababi). 
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Secondly, in contrast to the series of local demonstrations that pre-empted the 
internationalisation of the ‘Prawer Plan’, and continued until shelving the Plan, 
there was not even one local demonstration that pre-empted the 
internationalisation of the nationality law. On the contrary, the direct 
progression of a series of events that included ripping the proposed law to 
shreds in the Knesset plenum and the mass demonstration in August 11, 2018 
Tel Aviv were promoted after approving the law. Thirdly, the internationalisation 
of the ‘nation state law’ led by Arab parliamentarians (personal diplomacy) with 
the help of Arab NGO, rather than NGOs advocacy as in the case of the 
‘Prawer Plan’. Finally, unlike the ‘Prawer Plan’ that was explicitly directed to 
regulate the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin lands, the ‘Nation state law’ aimed in the 
first place to anchor the Jewish identity in state’s law based on previous 
international recognition, that is the 1947 UN Partition Plan. 
 
Figure 18: Comparison between spiral model results for case studies 
between 2015-17 
 
 
 
  
 
  252 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed that Arab MKs are no longer domestic or exclusive actors 
within the Israeli parliament and that they are highly seeing their role beyond it. 
In this study, the concepts of parliamentary diplomacy or public diplomacy 
cannot reflect the internationalisation attempts led by of Israel’s Arab MKs.  
Their role in international spheres seems to contradict Israel’s foreign policy. 
Not only that they are not taking part in increasing mutual understanding 
between Israel and other countries,1028 in fact, their cross-borders activities aim 
to increase criticism and pressure on the Israeli government in order to change 
its ‘unfair’ polices towards their constituencies. Therefore, the author of this 
study suggests inserting the concept ‘personal diplomacy’ to describe the 
exceptional role of opposition members of parliament especially those from 
minority ethnic groups as significant forces in the process of the 
internationalisation process, or as part of local transnational advocacy network 
in the language of the spiral model. 
 
They are playing a noticeable role in bringing the voice of ‘their people’ to key 
foreign officials and institutions that are proud of democracy values and human 
rights such as the UN and EU, as well as appropriate channels in the US. Their 
appeals to the international community to ameliorate the discrimination they 
faced take the form of personal diplomacy. This trend is facilitated by Arab 
leaders having become empowered (i.e. more experienced and united in one 
political party), and become more open to cooperate with professional Arab 
NGOs. The results show that the creation of the Joint List following the 2015 
election was a significant change that contributed to their work as transnational 
advocacy actors, and increased foreign attention towards the cause of the Arab 
society in Israel. 
 
The development of their international parliamentarian advocacy especially 
since the establishment of the Joint List, despite their limited power and 
resources, reflects their determination to draw international attention to the 
                                                 
1028 Tal Shalev and Yaki Admaker, "Delegations, Only Tw o Arabs: The Mks Who Are Not Sent To Represent Us 
Abroad", Walla, 2016, https://news.walla.co.il/item/2987299. 
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disadvantaged status of the Arab minority. Like Arab NGOs, they also believe 
that international law is an important tool that can facilitate the attainment of 
their civil and national goals. Therefore, they are calling to investigate Israel’s 
adherence to international guidelines on citizenship and minority rights issues. 
They are considering this move as a legitimate and peaceful protest on what 
they termed Israel’s ‘systematic institutionalised discrimination’, and base their 
claims on legal bilateral agreements. Their sharp critics referred to a wide range 
of local problematic issues pertain to the daily life of the Arab society in Israel 
that the Israeli government would prefer to keep as internal issues. It is 
noticeable that on international stages, the Arab MPs are focusing on civil and 
human rights aspects and less on the political/national demands.  
 
Out of all the three case studies, the EU and OECD were the most criticising 
bodies of Israel’s policies towards the Arab citizens. Both the White House and 
the UN did not vow any specific declaration or actions following their meetings 
with MKs Tibi and Odeh. This can be explained by the fact that the Arab MKs 
were using a diplomatic process to raise their concerns that is the preservatives 
of states. From the point of view of the UN bureaucracy, the Arab MKs have no 
standing because their government is not involved, and the Palestinian 
diplomats represent a separate entity and thus also have no standing with 
respect to an internal Israeli matter. The meetings with EU representatives and 
members of the US government did not have such a formal status and therefore 
there was no issue about the Arab MK delegation being received.  
 
Clearly, against the state network, Arab MKs develops their own network. The 
fact that they managed to engage in high-profile diplomatic meetings is 
something that cannot be taken as granted. The support they received from the 
EU, and the fact that they had ‘open doors’ at UN and the U.S. and agreed to 
hear about their situation first-hand, is to a great extent a political achievement 
and important step for telling their narrative. Nonetheless, if the West and the 
U.S. do not pose any clear position regarding Israel’s Arab minority in their 
foreign policy, the process of the internationalisation would continue to have a 
low meaningful impact. Also, the results show that collective action of diplomacy 
that involved civil society representative had more impact than personal ones. It 
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would be unrealistic to ignore the role that populist motives are playing in this 
process especially when the talk is about individual activities. However, it is 
clear that the international move is a by-product of Israel’s treatment of the Arab 
citizens, and due to their limited political power and ability to make a local 
change. 
 
Due to its newness, it would be difficult to draw conclusions regarding the 
effectiveness of the ‘personal diplomacy’ as an internationalisation strategy in 
relation to the third period (2015-18). It is more likely to see results on the long 
term. The real impact of this phenomenon on Israel is still unclear, and results 
are to be seen on the long term. To this point even when Arab legislators 
succeeded to attract a foreign elite sympathy, it did not go beyond the 
declaration level and did not achieve any actual legal ramification on Israeli 
governments. However, they undoubtedly succeeded to put the issue of the 
Arab citizens on the international agenda at times where more pressing issues 
are more likely to be the main focus of the international community. The results 
of this study also show that the internationalisation process is not a zero sum 
game; on one hand, turning up to external bodies did not guarantee help to 
Arab citizens such as in the case of the 2016 UN personal diplomacy and 
memorandum, meanwhile it exposed a gap between Israel's bilateral relations 
in military and economic spheres, and its political- diplomatic ties (e.g EU 
criticism). 
 
In contrast to prevailing opinion in Israel, shaming and working again the 
interests of the state are not the aim of the internationalisation. International 
activities led by Arab MKs are legitimate due to both the Israeli and the 
international law, and for them, it is one of the democratic tools they can use in 
the hopes that it would find relief. Their protest against the ‘state-nation law’ 
was also criticised by Jews in Israel1029 and worldwide,1030 and condemned by 
other key figures in the international community who consider it to be disastrous 
to Israel’s democratic character. However, as the evidences showed, the 
                                                 
1029 Mazal Mualem, "Outrage As Fight Over Israel’s Nationality Law  Reaches UN", Al-Monitor, 2018, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/israel-danny-danon-ayman-odeh-united-nations-joint-list.html#ixzz5QyEmFkhS.  
1030 Judy Maltz, "In Rare Rebuke, Jew ish Federations Slam Israel's Nation-State Law  As 'Step Back For All 
Minorities'", Haaretz.Com, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-in-rare-rebuke-jewish-federations-slam-
israel-s-nation-state-law-1.6340012. 
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Israel’s political elite, public opinion, and the mainstream media, all seem to 
give a serious attention to these initiatives and deem it a disloyalty to the state 
and as a ‘shameful’ tool that harm Israel’s international reputation. Accordingly, 
these findings are in line with hypotheses 1.  
 
Finally, the results suggest that there is a broad consensus among Arab 
lawmakers regarding the necessity of increasing the internationalisation through 
international personal diplomacy initiatives. These efforts are unlikely to cease 
in the coming years, and appear to be a real challenge to Israel's international 
image and reputation.  
 
 
Figure 17: Summarising spiral model results for 2015-2018 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 The results of the application of the spiral model 
 
This study is concerned with the concept of internationalisation as a tool for 
disadvantaged minorities to affect change in their situation. This phenomenon 
has been studied widely with respect to authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
The current study has focussed on the state of Israel and the situation of the 
Arab minority. 
 
In this particular case study, the analysis shows that internationalisation process 
whereby the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel sought to reclaim their rights by 
invoking the support of the international community emerged in the 1950s. It 
came to be perceived as necessary because internal legal and political 
processes were understood to be insufficient to achieve any redress for their 
grievances. Although Israel identifies itself as a Jewish and democratic state, 
the construction of the Israeli identity and its implications for the operation of the 
Israeli state has resulted in a failure to fully integrate its Arab minority and has 
produced systematic violations of the human rights of Arab citizens of Israel. As 
a result, Israel can be conceptualised as a hybrid regime that has notable 
elements of democracy while lacking others. This is a consequence of several 
key factors. There remains a fundamental tension between the concept of Israel 
as a democracy, which would be by definition a secular state, and Israel as a 
Jewish state in which non-Jewish persons can be at best second-class citizens. 
This tension results in the contradiction between the commitment to an 
egalitarian society on the basis of democratic principles and the failure to 
actually establish and maintain it. Meanwhile, Israel’s status as a democracy 
that embodies and adheres to the relevant norms is an important part of how 
the state seeks to be perceived in the international community and thus an 
element of its identity. This is part of the reputation that Israel seeks to maintain 
and therefore is a potential opportunity for challenging the conduct of the state. 
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Another factor is that conceptualised as a hybrid regime that has notable 
elements of democracy it remains a fundamental belief in Israel that the state 
has been under threat since its very creation as the state of emergency has 
never been lifted completely; the emergency regulations subject to certain 
adjustments have remained in effect until the current day. This means that the 
relations between the Israeli state and its Arab citizens have been distorted by 
the perception that national security concerns require the full rights of 
citizenship to be restricted for members of the Arab minority. However, the 
national security of the state can also be affected by a poor reputation in the 
international community, which plays a vital role in sustaining the existence of 
the state. This creates a space for Arab citizens to use internationalisation as a 
means to promote their cause. 
 
Palestinian Arab political elites and civil society groups articulate a strategy 
designed to invoke the norms of democracy to question the conduct of the 
Israeli government with the purpose of bringing international pressure (moral 
and financial leverage) to bear on the Israeli state to change its discriminatory 
policies towards the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. They find it necessary to 
lobby the UN and other international human rights organisations alongside 
European governments and the United States to achieve egalitarian 
democracy, and to counter the narrative offered by the Israeli governments on 
the world stage about their political status. 
 
The study sought to answer the following key research questions: 
 
1. How can the origins and the purposes of internationalisation be 
explained?  
 
2. To what extent did the process of internationalisation achieve its 
expected objectives and how can its success or failure be evaluated?  
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the process of internationalisation 
and its results, it seemed appropriate to use the spiral model that has been 
developed to understand the consequences of internationalisation for 
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authoritarian regimes and later for democracies shortcomings. The model itself 
does not require the regime in question to be authoritarian in a full sense, but 
assumes that there are some violations of the rights of citizens that are deemed 
contrary to the principles of liberal democracy. This study applied the spiral 
model to a number of specific case studies that yielded various results that will 
be concluded in the next section.  
 
The internationalisation strategy is seen to undergo a profound transformation 
from public memoranda, to civil and legal advocacy by invoking international 
conventions and treaties and finally to personal diplomacy. The results show 
that it is not a zero sum game; it is an especially effective method in different 
ways and with varying degrees of success. It created awareness of their 
situation and an extension of the critique of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in 
the Occupied Territories to the Arabs inside Israel. Using the international law in 
its modality of legal advocacy as a mechanism of internationalisation to compel 
the Israeli state to adhere to the commitments it had made by acceding to an 
international convention, proved to be more effective than mere political 
pressure. Yet, another factors such as the nature of the claims, geopolitical 
circumstances, global momentum, and domestic politics were crucial for moving 
the dynamics towards the fifth phase of the spiral model ‘rule consistent 
behaviour’. In theory, reaching the fifth phase of the spiral model should indicate 
a meaningful change in the policies of the regime in question. However, it was 
not the case in this current study. Israel’s respect for the international law was 
uttered by utilitarian justification attempt to protect its reputation, and its 
response varied in particular cases to minimise external critics. The ‘Nation-
State Law’ of 2018 strengthens the fundamental contradiction between its 
democratic character and its Jewish-Zionist character, and as long as the 
identity and the structure of the state are not transformed to meet universal 
equality of all citizens, the exiting international regulatory mechanisms for state-
minority relations would continue to be ineffective in the case of the Palestinian 
citizens.  
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It is the first comprehensive investigation into a selected series of case studies 
that document international appeals made by the plight of the Palestinian Arab 
elite in Israel due to three chronological periods: 1948-1979, 1992- 2013 and 
2015 onwards. On a theoretical level, it is the first time that the spiral model has 
been tested in the context of Israel and its Arab minority. This can serve as a 
strategic source for Arab MKs and NGOs.  
 
The first subsidiary research question concerns the factors that gave rise to the 
internationalisation process and its modalities. For convenience, the process of 
internationalisation has been considered with respect to three distinct time 
periods.  
 
The first period (1948-1979) 
 
During the first period (1948- 1979) Arab representatives relied on the use of 
‘public memoranda’ as a means of internationalisation. In the first case study of 
the, the first phase of the spiral model ‘repression’ started with the beginning of 
the Military Government in 1948. The outrage among the Arab minority about 
the Kufr-Qassim Massacre attacks against Arab citizens that inflicted 
considerable casualties (49) compelled an Arab politician to seek a new means 
to address such issues as the Israeli government and judicial system did not 
meet any of the Arab demands. The purpose was to generate international 
pressure for Israel to end the military government and the discrimination of Arab 
citizens in Israel. It is important to note that following the atrocity and before any 
internationalisation attempts, there was an unexpected move from ‘Denial’, the 
second phase of the spiral model, to ‘Tactical concession’, the third phase. 
While the former move took an ‘utilitarian justification’ form with the state 
indicating that the tragic events of 1956 occurred unintentionally while trying to 
protect the Arab citizens, the latter was through the announcement of 
establishing an Enquiry Committee to investigate the massacre. This 
progression on the model is unusual because it occurred prior to any attempt to 
apply internationalisation and may be explained as a characteristic of a hybrid 
regime as applied by the author in this study. In other words, the norms 
embodied in the construction of the democratic state that Israel claimed to be 
  260 
were sufficient to induce a ‘tactical concession’ even prior to any 
internationalisation and external pressure. 
 
Although the government issued a type of admission, Arab citizens viewed this 
statement with distrust. This meant that in reality, the Arab population 
considered the situation to be still at stage one, ‘repression’. Nevertheless, the 
admission did have one positive outcome; because the state admitted the 
massacre, local debate accelerated international debate and resulted in the 
instigation of the internationalisation process. This involved the leadership of the 
Arab MP ‘Tubi’ and the influence of communism through the connection with the 
Soviet Union with the expectation that the Soviet Union as a global power by its 
ideology ostensibly committed to support oppressed minorities would use its 
influence in international institutions. The process moved to stage two, ‘denial’ 
that again took the form of ‘utilitarian justification’ by the Israeli government. 
This internationalisation process gave rise to military trials (1958) for those 
responsible for the 1956 massacre, responding to international criticism, which 
can be described by level three of the model, ‘tactical concession’. Recent 
events indicate progress beyond tactical concession, suggesting ‘tactical 
concession plus’ with reference to the 1956 massacre in that the original 
investigation is once again being debated on the national stage and Israeli 
presidents have and are attending memorial services for the victims, although 
no formal apology has yet been issued.     
 
While the specific international petition about the Kufr-Qassim reached ‘tactical 
concession plus’ (a phase that so far was not acknowledged in the original 
spiral model), a progress toward the fourth (prescriptive status) and the fifth 
(rule-consistent behaviour) phases occurred regarding the military regime. In 
the late 1950s, the Israeli government was subject to a combination of both 
internal pressure and external criticism. Local protests escalated as the 
population, angered by the military government and the military trial of 1958, 
demanded change. It is crucial to note that these protests involved not only 
Arab citizens, but also Jewish liberal forces alongside support from Israeli right 
wing figures. This unrest contributed to the resignation of David Ben-Gurion 
(Prime Minister), and his replacement by a more moderate less security focused 
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minister, Levi Eshkol. The new Israeli leadership was more inclined to pay heed 
to protests against the abuse of armed force and disregard for minority rights. At 
the same time it could be argued that Israel had achieved its three original aims, 
decided upon the creation of the Israeli state. It had secured a stable economy, 
land and national security. In addition, human rights were being debated 
globally. All these factors contributed to the shift to phase four of the model 
(prescriptive status). This manifested itself in the accession to three 
international agreements: ICERD 1965, ICCPR 1966, ICESR 1966. Immediately 
after this, some severe restrictions on Arabs, such as freedom of movement 
and employment inequalities, were removed, although equality with Jews could 
not be claimed, and the Military Government came to an end in 1966.  This 
would seem to reflect stage five of the model ‘rule consistent behaviour’ but it 
has to be mentioned that whilst military rule ended in Israeli territories, it was 
about to begin for Arab inhabitants in West Bank and Gaza Strip after the war of 
1967. The gains by the Arab minority inside Israel did not extend to other 
Palestinian inhabitants of the newly occupied territories.  
 
The second case study in the first period relating to the measures against the 
al-Ard movement 1964 reveals a different pattern of responses. In fact, we see 
a reverse progress along the spiral as the initial repressive measures against a 
publication were extended to the entire movement that it represented. This may 
be accounted for by two factors. First of all, banning a newspaper did not give 
rise to the same degree of international criticism as the use of armed force that 
resulted in the deaths of people. Secondly, the intermediary in this case that 
acted as the vector of internationalisation, the PLO, was itself relatively 
unknown at the time and did not carry any significant weight with international 
opinion (in particular by comparison with the Soviet Union). In other words, the 
factors that give rise to a change of behaviour as illustrated by the spiral model 
had no traction in this case. It is also important to recognise the importance of 
the Arab MP as a part of this process. In case study one, an Arab MP, who has 
been elected through a democratic process, would automatically receive 
recognition and acceptance locally, nationally and globally. This clearly 
enhanced the prospects for success more than the plea of an extra- 
parliamentarian movement.  
  262 
 
The end of the Military Government over Israel’s Arab citizens in 1966 signalled 
a new era of liberalisation of the Arab minority in Israel and has considerably 
reduced the shortcomings in the post-Ben-Gurion era. However, the Israeli 
policies of land confiscation and shooting Arab civilians continued into the mid-
seventies.  
 
The third case study from this period relates to the Land Day events in 1976 
that consisted of Arab protests against ‘the 1975 Galilee Development Plan’ and 
the government effort to repress the protests that resulted in the killing of six 
Arab citizens by Israeli police. These events demonstrated that transition from 
the military (hybrid) regime to a democratic one was not a sufficient condition for 
what Risse and Sikkink call ‘sustained behavioural change’.1031 The 
commitment of the Israeli state to international norms (ICERD 1965, ICCPR 
1966, ICESR 1966) was undermined, and did not bring about fundamental 
alterations in its security policy toward the Arab minority. 
 
The Israeli Government stated that this plan would positively support Arabs in 
Galilee. This reflected confiscation of both Arab and Jewish land with the 
argument that these areas would be more fairly redistributed. In reality, the 
application of the Plan would result in further hardship for the Arab population 
as more of their land was allocated to Jewish settlements as well as land 
appropriated by the Ministry of Defence for military practice purposes. A further 
form of ‘repression’ occurred following the ‘Land Day’ events, in late 1976 when 
a leaked document the ‘Koenig Memoranda’ outlined Israeli government 
strategies to weaken the rights of Arab citizens in both the Galilee and Negev 
region. Efforts to internationalise the situation consisted of the publication of the 
‘Black Book’, which similar to Tubi’s letter in 1956, to bring international public 
attention to evidence concerning Israeli violence against Arabs, and a direct 
letter being sent (1979) to the UN by NCDAL criticising the Galilee Development 
Plan which it termed ‘Judaizing the Galilee’.  
                                                 
1031 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve Chapman Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power Of Human Rights (UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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The literature does not mention any response by the UN. However, it could be 
argued that the 1975 Land Day protests and subsequent book and publication 
invited international media interest. As such, the dynamics of these actions 
combined with continuous negotiation with the state resulted in the move from 
repression to ‘tactical concession plus’ over the following ten years because not 
only was the ‘Galilee Development Plan’ not actually implemented but some 
previously confiscated land was returned by the state to its Arab owners, and 
the policy of land confiscation has stopped. Yet, due to the absence of 
information about any official international criticism or intervention in the 1975 
plan, the aforementioned tactical concessions could not be count as a step in 
the ‘spiral model’. In other words, it is assumed that internationalisation did not 
occur. In any case, the Israeli ‘tactical concession’ in terms of land is limited, 
however. The battle for the land continued to be the basic struggle of the Arabs 
in Israel. For example, the Israeli policy which favoured Israeli ownership of 
land continued, with Bedouin citizens of traditional land refused recognition and 
ownership rights, such as electricity and water, a situation further explored in 
the section on the period 1992-2013.    
 
During the first period under study (1948-79), certain events which crystallised 
the perception of the Arab minority of its unequal status and violation of its 
rights by the Israel government gave rise to internationalisation due to the 
apparent lack of international political and legal mechanisms to change the 
policies of the Israeli government in relation to these issues. The instruments 
relied upon were ‘memoranda’ to international actors and internal protests. The 
intention was to highlight their plight in the international media as well to prompt 
international action to influence the Israeli government.  
 
In two of the three cases analysed, the actions undertaken to internationalise 
the issues did produce a limited change in the behaviour of the Israeli 
government (tactical concession plus in the 1956 massacre, and in the Galilee 
Development Plan). The most fundamental change was the abolition of the 
military government, which theoretically at least extended the same mode of 
governance to the entire population of Israel. In terms of the specific issues 
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highlighted, a partial redress of the grievances was achieved. In terms of the 
spiral model, the Israeli authorities moved from the initial state of repression to 
the state of at least formally rule consistent behaviour in relation to the 
dismantlement of the military government. In relation to the specific grievances, 
we see a movement from ‘repression’ to ‘tactical concession plus’. This 
indicates both the success and the limitations of this particular mode of 
internationalisation. 
 
 
The second period (1992-2013) 
 
During the second period examined in this study, the modality of 
internationalisation can be described as ‘Civil and Legal Advocacy’. It involved 
recourse to the effort to compel Israel to redress violations of international 
conventions and treaties that the state of Israel had acceded to. The particular 
cases examined relation to ‘unrecognised’ villages of the Bedouin population 
and the failure by the Israeli state to provide basic services to the population on 
the grounds that the land they occupied belonged to the state. The Bedouin 
population in those areas claimed the right to occupy the land on the basis that 
it belonged to them before the state of Israel came into being. 
 
This period brought about considerable progress for the Bedouin in 
‘unrecognised’ villages in Northern Israel. Historically, land claimed by the latter 
population was not recognised by the state and as such basic utilities such as 
water and electricity were not provided to these areas. The first phase 
(repression) consisted in the failure to supply clean water. Through the break of 
Hepatitis A and the deaths of one child, caused by a lack of potable water, a 
case was taken by one Arab NGO to the IWT (1992).  
 
The Israeli government accepted the validity of the case being held by an 
international court, but claimed the illegal settlements presented a security risk 
to Israel. However, the court, although considering the issue of security as valid, 
found in favour of the Bedouin citizens and Israel was instructed to supply water 
to these groups. In other words, the internationalisation process succeeded. In 
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response, Israel connected a limit amount of water to the ‘unrecognised’ 
villages. On the spiral model, this represents progression from ‘repression’, 
phase one, to ‘tactical concession’, phase three, omitting the ‘Denial’ stage. 
Following this case, Israel ratified international treaties and updated domestic 
policies to reflect its implementation of international norms, manifested in the 
accession to three international agreements: The Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Freedom (1992),1032 the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(1993),1033 and the National Health Insurance Law (NHIL) in 1995.1034 Thus its 
response moved from ‘tactical concession’, to the fourth phase, ‘prescriptive 
status’ in the mid-1990s. Eventually this ‘prescriptive status’ was followed by the 
recognition of most ‘unrecognised’ villages in late 1990s. Pressure from local 
Arab NGOs and internal groups combining Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin left-
centre policies resulted in the Israeli state gradually recognising the previously 
‘unrecognised’ Bedouin villages, representing a significant move forward from 
‘prescriptive status’ to ‘Rule consistent behaviour’, from stage four to stage five 
on the spiral model.  
 
In the other case of the Bedouin villages in Southern Israel, internationalisation 
was triggered by the ‘Prawer-Plan’, which consisted of the effort to codify these 
villages in domestic law in 2011 without the approval of the local community. 
This period is significant in that it represented a successful refusal of the 
Bedouin minority to be relocated according to Israeli demands. In effect, the 
actions of these Arabs meant a failure of the state to implement its plan.  
 
The initial introduction of the plan without consulting with the Bedouin local 
community reflects a starting point of ‘repression’. Then the internationalisation 
process mainly led by Arab NGOs through networking with an EU left-wing 
party and invitations for an EU delegation to carry out fact-finding missions to 
visit the ‘unrecognised’ caused Israel to move into the second phase ‘denial’, 
which took the form of ‘utilitarian justification’ of the policies where the state 
                                                 
1032 "Basic Law : Human Dignity And Liberty", Knesset.Gov.Il, 1992, 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
1033 "Vienna Declaration And Programme Of Action", Ohchr.Org, 1993, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx. 
1034 "National Health Insurance", Mfa.Gov.Il, 1995, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1990-
1995/pages/national%20health%20insurance.aspx. 
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promised to modernise the Bedouin lifestyle. Due to the success of 
internationalisation, Israel was driven to conduct two different forms of ‘tactical 
concession’. While the first one took the form of minor changes to the proposed 
law (phase 3), the second one was reflected in dropping the proposed law 
entirely, and indeed, abandoned when the state begun supplying water in 2017, 
a move that is suggested to be defined as ‘tactical concession plus’. Giving that 
these areas are yet to be recognised by the state, progression on the model did 
not move beyond the proposed ‘tactical concession plus’. 
 
The success of the internationalisation process can be attributed in achieving 
these tactical concessions to various factors such as domestic political 
opposition to the Plan from both Arab and Jewish parties, evolving of a dynamic 
Arab young movement (Al-hirak Al-shababi) public protests, media attention. 
There was no further advance into phase four and five because the tactical 
concessions were sufficient to reduce the international pressure (the proposed 
law was not enacted), and the Israeli government was not compelled to change 
the underlying policy.   
 
The abandonment of the proposed legislation in Israel was a tangible result of 
the efforts of civil and law based internationalisation. However, in line with 
hypothesis 1, the response of the Israeli state was designed to diffuse 
international approbation and was not sufficient to resolve the underlying issue. 
If we consider the issue of the ‘Prawer-Plan’ as a proxy for the broader fight for 
a change in the status of the ‘unrecognised’ settlements, then we can note that 
a very partial victory was achieved. The fact that the government stopped the 
plan and later connected them to water means an implicit recognition of their 
existence and their rights. However, it did not signal a complete reappraisal of 
the rights of these communities. Consequently, it is clear that the fourth and the 
final phase of the spiral model has begun but has not yet reached its 
conclusion. 
 
The two case studies from this time period demonstrate the effectiveness of this 
particular form of internationalisation. By using legal processes that invoked the 
enforcement mechanisms of international conventions that Israel had ratified, 
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the Israeli state had little choice but to make concessions that would satisfy the 
requirements of the international commitments. Both cases also involve the use 
TAN (the EU left-wing party in 2012, and the British Lawyer in 1992). However, 
there are notable differences. The 1992 case reached level five ‘rule consistent 
behaviour’ and as such, the problem has been solved. In contrast the 2013 
case, despite powerful local protests, reached only ‘tactical concession plus’ 
and is still problematic today in that land ownership issues continue. It is also 
important to consider the time scale required to adequately evaluate the 
success of internationalisation and events from 2013 are yet to reach their final 
conclusion. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Israeli state undertook the minimal 
actions required to ensure that it was not in violation of international treaty 
commitments. However, this time period in which there was significant 
international attention on the Arab-Israeli conflict and a Labour government was 
in power in Israel. This combination of factors increased the external and 
internal political pressure on the state of Israel, which contributed to the 
effectiveness of the process of internationalisation and the resolution of the 
issue of the ‘unrecognised’ villages during the 1990s and the spiral model 
shows that the fifth phase was reached.  
 
 
The third period (2015-2017) 
 
This period was characterised by a focus of ‘Personal Diplomacy’ to galvanise 
the international community to put pressure on Israel. In all the three case 
studies that involving MKs who were members of the Arab Joint List dealt with a 
wide range of daily life issues (e.g. socio-economic issues, ‘unrecognised’ 
Bedouin villages in Southern Israel, demolition of homes, the claim of 
‘institutionalised discrimination’, the issue of ‘anti-democratic laws’).  
 
Out of the three case studies, only the meeting of the Joint List delegation with 
seniors at the EU and OECD in 2016 was very effective in generating political 
support from the EU for their position. This meeting was organised and 
accompanied by a local Arab NGO (Adalah) that provided MKs with a 
transnational network (the Green Party) to promote their views. It also was 
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relatively more focused in terms of their claims from European officials. 
However, it did not result in political action, including the use of significant 
economic pressure, to achieve a substantial real modification of the behaviour 
of the Israeli state. In the other two cases where individual meetings of Arab 
MKs was held with key figures at both the UN and the White House 
 
Overall, it is clear from the case studies that the international institutions and the 
Western politician approached by Arab political leaders from Israel were 
generally receptive to their case. Although in the international discourse on 
Israeli- Palestinian relations the main focus has been on the plight of the 
Palestinians outside the borders of Israel, the general sympathy for the 
Palestinian course translated into sympathy for the cause of the Arab Israeli 
citizens. The main effect of internationalisation on the way in which the targeted 
international institutions articulate their stance on these issues was to give 
much greater prominence to what had previously been a neglected issue. 
 
 
[Hypothesis 1] 
 
Internationalisation is partially successful in achieving redress in individual 
cases but the behaviour of the Israeli state has altered to respond to the 
international pressures to the minimal extent considered necessary and has not 
affected the fundamental attitude of the state to the Arab minority. 
 
In general, these results show that hypothesis 1 has been confirmed by the 
analysis of the case studies, although the results were not uniform for each 
case. The process of internationalisation was particularly successful in most 
cases apart of the case of the Bedouin in Northern Israel, and in the Military 
Government as in both cases the spiral model reached its final level (rule 
consistent behaviour).  
  
The case of Israel differs from that of authoritarian regimes in some important 
aspects. The government of Israel is elected by free and fair elections and 
therefore has the kind of legitimacy that authoritarian regimes lack. Unlike 
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authoritarian regimes, the state of Israel does not have to defend itself against 
its own population using violence and authoritarian means of control. The failure 
to integrate Arab citizens and the violation of their human rights is motivated by 
the contradictions between the rival identities of the state as a Jewish state on 
the one hand and a secular liberal democracy on the other.  The former gives 
rise to the perception of Arabs as a threat to the integrity and security of the 
state which has to be addressed by controlling them in some fashion even 
though these controls are not compatible with the principles of social justice and 
equality under the law. This is related to the strategic geography of Israel in 
which the locations of ‘unrecognised’ villages are considered to have particular 
relevance to security. Another reasons why internationalisation was partially 
successful could include the following de facto:  
 
1. Lack of effective international mechanism for minority protection. 
 
2. Asymmetrical power; Israel’s has a stand and legitimacy in the 
international community as a significant superpower in the 
Middle East. Paradoxically, it has become more difficult to 
pressure a government whose human rights reputation within 
intergovernmental forums has improved considerably.  
 
3. Countries conduct their foreign policy based on interests, which in 
turns limited the role of the internationalisation process in 
generating a real political action 
 
4. Unlike European minorities, Arabs in Israel not only do not have a 
strong ‘kin state’ to support them, but their national affiliation 
with what seems to be their kin/mother state (the Palestinian 
State) is at war with their state. 
 
5. The basic rights of the Arab citizens are not adequately protected 
in the Israeli law due to the absence of a constitution or bill of 
rights that protect them. The only semi-constitutional 
protection that exists for minorities in Israel is the 1992 Basic 
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Law: Human Dignity and Liberty1035 but even this law does not 
explicitly mention the value of ‘equality’.  
6. On-going lack of legitimacy and mutual distrust between the 
Jewish majority and the Arab minority. Jewish public opinion 
supports preferential treatment of Jewish citizens. 
7. Present implementation of the Zionist- Jewish character of the 
state carries certain privileges to the Jewish majority. 
 
Each one of these factors, let alone the special effect of their combination, is 
sufficient to affect the success of the internationalisation of the status of the 
Arabs citizens. 
 
Figure 17: Spiral model results 1948-2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1035 "Basic Law : Human Dignity And Liberty", Knesset.Gov.Il, 1992, 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
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7.2 Case study comparison  
 
The manner in which Hypothesis 1 was partially confirmed as stated above 
emerges from the results of the application of the spiral model to a number of 
specific case studies. In particular the following can be highlighted:  
 
In all eight cases of this study over the years in the type the conduct of the 
internationalisation strategy led by the Arab Leadership in Israel involved 
different modalities, from the use of a ‘public memorandum’ (1956-1979) to ‘civil 
and legal’ internationalisation (1992-2013) to ‘personal diplomacy’ (2015-2018). 
Internationalisation is deemed to be particularly effective if the spiral reaches 
the fifth phase (‘rule-consistent behaviour’). In two cases it can be said that the 
process reached the fifth level of the spiral model. These were the termination 
of the military government in 1966, and the win of the water case appeal in 
relation to the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Northern Israel. These successes could 
be explained firstly by the nature of these demands, which reflected basic 
human needs and rights. Secondly, it was in conformity with the geopolitical 
atmosphere (e.g. the Six Day War and the Oslo process) and the momentum of 
the global human rights movement. In theory, reaching the fifth phase of the 
spiral model should reflect the success of the internationalisation process in 
changing the discriminatory policies of the state and transformation of the 
regime. Yet, in practice, the international advocacy of the Arab leadership in 
Israel did not yielded a meaningful change in Israel’s civil or national attitude 
towards the Arab citizens and the success was very limited. This is because the 
institutional, legal and structural nature of Israel as Jewish state does not allow 
a successful application of any international regulatory mechanism 
(integration/accommodation) for its Palestinian Arab minority.   
 
Third phase ‘Tactical concession plus’: In the 2013 ‘Prwaer-Plan’, the state’s 
response moved beyond the third level of the spiral model ‘tactical concession’ 
which could be termed ‘tactical concession plus’. In this level, significant results 
were achieved. The two proposed bills not only were shelved, but also some 
progress was achieved. After stopping the ‘Prawer-Plan’, the state connected 
  272 
some ‘unrecognised’ villages to water, and in the 1975 Plan, some lands were 
returned to their owners. In these two cases, the dispute was about land, 
internationalisation attempts were amplified by major protests, foreign media 
coverage, civil society advocacy (NCDAL and Adalah), and by new local young 
forces (Al-hirak- al-shababi). 
‘Repression plus’: In two cases the application of the spiral model showed that 
its first phase ‘repression’ could go through a further deterioration, what could 
be termed ‘repression plus’. These negative dynamics occurred in two cases, 
the outlawing of the al-Ard movement, and ‘the State-Nation Law’. What is 
common between these cases is the lack of local protests prior to 
internationalisation plus the nature of the demands (freedom of expression and 
resisting the identity of the state which is strongly backed international 
resolution). Both demands were an opportunity for the state to draw political 
boundaries for the Arab citizens in relation to their national aspirations.   
Phase one ‘repression’: In both MKs Tibi’s and Odeh’s personal diplomacy, the 
spiral model did not move beyond its first phase ‘repression’ as the status quo 
continued did not change regarding the issues that were raised. The two 
meetings involved a similar pattern of political behaviour in that they were 
individual initiatives, lacked focus and cooperation with NGOs or any other 
transnational dimension. 
In two cases the Palestinian transnational dimension generated negative 
consequences. Those were, Odeh’s memorandum to the UN, and outlawing al-
Ard movement. On the other hand, the cooperation between Arab MKs and 
local NGO generated soft power. Civil and legal internationalisation proved to 
be more effective than personal diplomacy (e.g. the ‘Prawer- Plan’, and the 
water cause in the ‘unrecognised’ villages in Northern Israel). 
The application of the social constructivist boomerang-spiral model to the 
process of internationalisation is deemed to be a particularly effective 
instrument to explore both the potential and the limits of the process of 
compelling the Israeli state to conform to internationally supported norms and 
the extent to which national security rationales are used to limit the adherence 
to such norms. Although the use of internationalisation cannot be 
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underestimated, the results of this study demonstrate that the construction of 
the state’s identity as a Jewish state and concerns over national securi ty are 
potentially in conflict with the norms that it claims to be governed by. These 
other two elements define the constraints on Israel’s response to claims that it is 
violating the rights of its Arab minority, and their implications for the operation of 
the Israeli state has resulted in a failure to fully integrate its Arab minority and 
has produced systematic violations of the human rights of Arab citizens of 
Israel. The Basic Nation-State Law of 2018 is the best prove why 
internationalisation has not been not successful Israel reinforces the legal and 
systematic discrimination against the Palestinians citizens of Israel and the 
illiberal Zionist character of the regime which defines itself politically legally and 
institutionally as a ‘state of the Jewish people’ and not ‘a liberal democratic state 
of its citizens’. 
 
 
 
[Hypothesis 2] 
 
The process of internationalisation has had the unintended consequence of 
antagonising and alienating the Jewish majority and contributing to tension, a 
sense of threat, hostility between the Arab citizens and the state. 
 
When considering hypothesis 2, it is important to note that the question of 
Israel's Palestinian minority is something that threatens Israel’s democratic 
credentials. The results show that the use of the internationalisation mechanism 
is politically sensitive, as the external campaign for civil equality in Israel entails 
unavoidably conflict with the policies of the state of Israel. Hence, this process 
is antagonising the Jewish majority that has a long history of mistrust of the 
Arab minority and the prevalent Israeli public sees this action as ‘political 
subversion’. There is a potential of deteriorating relations with the state, 
because even the people who believe in dialogue oppose the 
internationalisation of these issues and consider it as ‘breaking the rules of the 
game’.  
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In relation to the origins and purposes of internationalisation, it is clear that the 
key factors that gave rise to it stemmed from the discrimination of the Arab 
minority and the systematic violation of their rights as citizens and humans. 
Internationalisation came to be perceived as necessary because internal legal 
and political processes were understood to be insufficient to achieve any 
redress.  
 
The study has identified three key instruments of international lobbying efforts: 
(1) the use of public memoranda, (2) civil and legal advocacy (invoking 
international conventions and treaties), and (3) personal diplomacy (lobbying). 
Among the main institutions targeted were the United Nations, the European 
Union and individual great powers including the United States and the Former 
Soviet Union. Fundamentally, the institutions targeted had focused their 
attention on the plight of Palestinians outside Israel and the internationalisation 
efforts by the Arab minority inside Israel created awareness of their situation 
and an extension of the critique of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians to the Arabs 
inside Israel.  
 
The response of the Israel state varied in particular cases as has been outlined 
above and hypothesis 1 was largely confirmed as specified above. The civic 
and legal modalities of internationalisation proved to be the most effective. 
Hypothesis 2 also was confirmed in the sense that the Jewish majority, even to 
the extent that it may have sympathy with the cause of the Arab minority, largely 
disapproved of the process of internationalisation relating to domestic Israeli 
issues and this contributed to increased tension and a heightened sense of 
threat from the Arab minority given the perceived negative repercussions for 
Israel. 
 
This study has demonstrated how the rights of the Arab minority in Israel pose a 
dual challenge to the conceptualisation of the identity of the state of Israel. On 
the one hand Israel sees itself as the only modern democracy in the Middle 
East that is based on the foundations of equality for all. On the other hands, it 
sees its Arab citizens still as the enemy within who questions the identity of 
Israel as a Jewish state and seek to challenge its legitimacy. The application of 
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the spiral model to the process of internationalisation whereby the Arab minority 
sought to reclaim its rights by invoking the support of the international 
community reveals the possibilities and the limits of compelling the Israeli state 
to conform to internationally supported norms and the extent to which national 
security rationales are used to limit the adherence to such norms. It turns out to 
be a very effective instrument to explore both the potential and the limits of the 
process of internationalisation to achieve effective redress for the grievances of 
the Arab minority. 
 
Figure 18: Comparison between all three periods 1948-2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 Challenges to the spiral model 
 
This thesis proceeds from the basis that the spiral model suffers from three 
limitations. First, the social constructivist preoccupation with ‘reputation’ does 
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not give any guidance as to how reputations are constructed; where they rank in 
terms of other potentially conflicting priorities, such as security, at any given 
time; and how states deal with the need to maintain different and potentially 
conflicting reputations in different forums. In the case of Israel, the analysis 
shows that Israel’s status as a democracy that embodies and adhere to the 
relevant norms is an important part of how the state seeks to be perceived in 
the international community and thus an element of its identity. This is part of 
the reputation that Israel seeks to maintain and therefore is a potential 
opportunity for challenging the conduct of the state. However, its identity as a 
Jewish state and concerns over national security are potentially in conflict with 
the norms that it claims to be governed by. These other two elements define the 
constraints on Israel’s response to claims that it is violating the rights of its Arab 
minority. 
  
Second, the spiral model needs to be historically located. The networks and 
values that transnational activists mobilise vary over time, as does the nature of 
the state’s reputational concerns. Therefore, any analysis of the success or 
failure of a transnational activist network needs to pay attention to the historical 
context. This accounts in part for the changing instruments of 
internationalisation and the variation in the response by the Israeli state.  
 
Third, the spiral model directs considerable attention to the state, but less 
attention to the political status of the transnational actors themselves. This is 
because the model was mainly developed to understand the activities of NGOs 
whose relationships to local populations is often difficult to specify. However, 
arguably the level of authority with which internationalising actors can claim to 
represent local populations is crucial to their success in persuading external 
actors to respond to their concerns. In the particular cases under discussion in 
this thesis, the agents of internationalisation were parliamentarians who 
represented the Arab minority in Israel. They engaged in the process of 
internationalisation because of their inability to compel the state to respond to 
the violation of civil and human rights through the decision-making processes of 
state governance. Their advantage was their political legitimacy as elected 
representatives. Their disadvantage was the fact that in international 
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organisations it was hard to identify what standing they would have as they 
were opposed by their own government and did not represent parliament as a 
whole. The particular outcomes were therefore influenced by the nature of the 
actors in the process of internationalisation.  
 
As a result, the application of the spiral model to the process of 
internationalisation in relations to Israel and its Arab citizens has raised 
questions about the construction of this particular model and led to the proposal 
of some modifications to refine the results for this particular project. 
 
To begin with, this use of the spiral model has highlighted several weaknesses 
in relation to the existing five levels. Current literature assumed that the 
internationalisation process, which is based on the same concept of the 
‘boomerang effect’, is a vital condition for moving beyond the first phase 
‘repression’. Nonetheless, none of the aforementioned concepts appear neither 
visually nor verbally in the study of the spiral model. So, if we start at the first 
level, ‘repression’ and mobilise international support, the model dictates that the 
next stage would be automatically ‘denial’ because the state would deny the 
legitimacy of external intervention. If there is no response from the international 
communities which have been approached, according to the model, a lack of 
the internationalisation process being instigated would make it impossible to 
move on to the next level, ‘denial’. If a new level of internationalisation were to 
be introduced between ‘repression’ and ‘denial’ the model would more 
accurately reflect the different stages involved in the internationalisation 
process, particularly early on. Accordingly, it is suggested to introduce an 
interim level between the first phase ‘repression’ and the second one ‘denial’, 
which would allow for ‘internationalisation’, as opposed along similar lines to the 
‘boomerang-effect’.  
 
Furthermore, the current literature indicates that the first level on the model 
‘repression’ represents mainly the perspective of the civil society. Yet, this work 
shows that parliamentarian forces can lead the initial move of 
internationalisation and act either independently or as part of TAN. It is 
particularly related to opposition politicians from a minority-ethnic background.  
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In fact, the author of this work would suggest that this new level could be 
termed ‘personal diplomacy’ to reflect the hitherto unrecognised role of personal 
initiatives in this process.  
 
The spiral model has previously criticised for being too deterministic, that is, 
once the model moves forward to the next level, there is no room for 
deterioration. This point was relevant in two cases of this thesis (Case study 2 
and 8), as the backlash occurred after the internationalisation attempts. 
Therefore, it would seem logical to acknowledge the existence of this dynamics. 
The author of this work suggests referring to it as ‘repression plus’. This refers 
to a state where the repression has become worse that in the status quo ante.  
 
Another revision is suggested in relation to the third phase ‘tactical concession’ 
where real positive state actions move beyond cosmetic changes yet they are 
not enough to conform to the fourth phase ‘prescriptive status’. Hence, it is 
suggested to introduce an additional stage termed ‘tactical concession plus’.  
 
Finally, this work introduces for the first time the application of the spiral model 
to the case of a hybrid regime. Two notable dynamics emerged from the case 
study of Israel. There was no denial at any point. Secondly, the time for 
utilitarian justification to be made was comparatively short. One way to interpret 
this phenomenon would be to say that for a hybrid regime utilitarian justification 
substitutes for denial in authoritarian regimes. The state’s commitment to liberal 
values since its inception in 1948, made the option of ‘denial’ of the legitimacy 
of international human rights impossible. 
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